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Abstract  
This thesis is a sociological case study of news on corruption in Kenya. The study explores 
the autonomy and watchdog role of the Kenyan mainstream press. It analyses corruption 
content and the production and mediation of corruption news in the Kenyan mainstream press 
from 2001 till 2005. The study shows that journalism on corruption increased as President 
Moi resigned and President Kibaki took office in late December 2002. The newswortiness of 
corruption increased. Revelations boosted newspaper circulation and fed journalists’ 
ideological self esteem as independent watchdogs. New and more sources on corruption 
enabled a culture of more openness and transparency in Government organisations. A counter 
trend emerged in 2004 as revelations started to hit the sitting regime. Government’s 
(re)enforcement of means to maintain secrecy, particularistic use of state resources against 
media firms, and clientelist use of media practitioners, impact on production practices. These 
and other factors catered for a relatively more constrained environment for disclosures of 
corruption in late 2004 and 2005. Journalists’ autonomy enables revelations of corruption; 
however it also enables clientelist use of the press. The Kenyan mainstream press serves as a 
watchdog of Government deviances and simultaneously as an instrument for non-professional 
internal and external interests.  
Sammendrag 
Denne hovedoppgaven er en sosiologisk studie av nyhetsproduksjon om korrupsjon i Kenya. 
Studien utforsker autonomien og vaktbikkjerollen til den kenyanske dagspressen. Oppgaven 
analyserer den kenyanske dagspressens korrupsjonsinnhold, nyhetsproduksjon og mediering 
av korrupsjon i tidsrommet 2001 til 2005. Studien viser at korrupsjon fikk økt nyhetsverdi da 
Kibaki overtok som President i Kenya etter Moi i desember 2002. Korrupsjonsavsløringer ble 
godt stoff, solgte aviser, og tilfredsstilte journalister selvbilde som uavhengige vaktbikkjer. 
Nye og flere kilder muliggjorde en ny åpenhetskultur i offentlige kildeorganisasjoner. En 
mottrend finner sted i 2004 i det korrupsjonsavsløringer begynner å ramme det sittende 
regimet. Myndighetene iverksetter tiltak for å stoppe informasjonsflyten fra 
myndighetsorganisasjoner til pressen for å sikre hemmelighold. Innflytelsesrike kilder 
benytter statsapparatet selektivt mot mediebedrifter og bruker journalister klientelistisk for å 
hindre publisering. Disse faktorene vanskeliggjorde korrupsjonsavsløringer i pressen i siste 
halvdel av 2004 og 2005. Den kenyanske dagspressen er i dag både en vaktbikkje og samtidig 
et instrument for ikke-journalistiske interne eller eksterne interesser.  
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1. Introduction 
This thesis analyses the role of and the production of news on corruption in Kenya and 
discusses how the production and mediation of corruption news is shaped by negotiations 
over control over news. Public revelation of corruption as news change social relations and 
have become an important instrument for power and contestation over power. It changes 
relations in Government agencies, in the cabinet, and between politicians. Corruption claims 
change the public image of political leaders as national figures, reducing their political visions 
to images of personal greed, factional interests, or tribalism. News of corruption can ruin 
people’s careers, and promote others’. The disclosure of corruption can change relations 
between nations and affect the income generation of countries as donor support potentially 
dries up. Much is at stake as corruption is investigated and disclosed both for the accused part 
and the accuser. The construction of news on corruption is thus not an easy matter. However, 
these realities make news production on corruption an interesting object of analysis as certain 
aspects of journalism and its relative autonomy are illuminated.  
The case of Kenya is interesting in particular as the country has recently elected a new 
Government. In December 2002 a coalition of parties, the National Rainbow Coalition (Narc), 
won a historic general election by nearly two-thirds majority ending more than two decades of 
Moi presidency and nearly four decades of Kenya African National Union (Kanu) rule in 
Kenya. Mwai Kibaki won the Presidential election defeating his opponent Uhuru Kenyatta 
(Kanu), son of Jomo Kenyatta the first President of independent Kenya. In a country ridden 
by corruption Kibaki promised change. Narc’s election platform was anti-corruption and pro 
constitutional reform. In his inauguration speech President Kibaki reconfirmed his 
commitment to fighting graft:  
Corruption will now cease to be a way of life in Kenya. And, ladies and gentlemen, by 
the way you have voted in the last elections, I am calling upon all of you to come out 
and fight corruption, and agree to support the Government in fighting corruption as 
our first priority. (BBC web ed, 30.12.20021). 
The Narc cabinet seemed to act rapidly on graft. It established new anti-graft institutions, 
initiated new anti-corruption legislation, started campaigns, and initiated investigations into 
alleged state corruption (Getecha, 2004). For this they received applause from the national 
media. The Kenyan mainstream press reported extensively on corruption in 2003 and 2004 
detailing corruption from the Moi era and new initiatives to fight it. Moreover they 
                                                 
1 News articles are referred to with day of publishing. For a complete list of articles referred to in this thesis see 
appendix 5. 
investigated and revealed ‘new graft’ allegedly perpetrated by figures in the new Government. 
In January 2006, Kenya experienced an unusual resignation of a cabinet minister as Finance 
Minister David Mwiraria resigned over alleged involvement in the so-called Anglo Leasing 
scandal. These developments might suggest that media power has become important, not only 
to Kenya but to Africa. Thus we should be interested in analysing the case of the Kenyan 
media and the reporting on corruption in more detail. This thesis focuses on autonomy and 
control of the Kenyan mainstream press as it analyses news production on corruption from 
2001 till 2005.  
The role of corruption disclosures – two perspectives 
The theoretical framework for the study is a sociological one acknowledging that news is 
social constructions. When constructing accounts of reality, journalists adapt professional 
norms for source interaction and text writing. By employing routines for news production and 
selection, news workers are able to meet space and time demands and deliver news on a 
regular basis. Sharing an occupational culture accepted in society they are able to construct 
news that makes sense in the cultural and political economic context where it is published. 
The sociology of journalism is occupied with the multifaceted process of production that 
shapes journalists constructs. 
Few analyses have been conducted on news production in Kenya, indeed this counts 
for the whole continent of Africa. African mass media have traditionally been regarded as an 
extension of Government in centralised African countries enjoying less than little autonomy, 
serving development and nation building in fragile newly independent states (see for example 
Hachten, 1971). However, after the introduction of multipartyism in most African states in the 
1990’s, media was captured differently and with greater interest. There seem to be two ways 
to conceptualise what is going on in Africa. On the one hand there is optimism among 
analysts that the development of a Western institutional framework (including strong and 
independent media) will provide a strong bulwark against corruption. Chowdury (2004) holds 
that globally the level of corruption correlates negatively with the development of free press. 
Similarly Helge Rønning and Tawana Kupe conceive the exposure of corruption and other 
Government scandals in Southern Africa as the work of a free press protecting public interests 
against political misbehaviour.  
The history of investigative reporting and the uncovering of public scandals and 
corrupt practices by the independent press and courageous journalists in the official 
media in Southern Africa exemplifies how the media perform a public service by 
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investigating and stopping malpractice by public officials (Rønning and Kupe, 2000: 
175).2 
At the core of political liberal theory or ideology of development is the idea of the media as 
an autonomous force in society. Liberal press theory holds a normative notion of the press as 
a watchdog of Government activity pursued in the public interest. Important elements in 
building media autonomy is professional training and the sharing and practicing of the same 
occupational norms of objectivity and detachment.  
This positive view of the developing autonomy of media in Africa and the positive 
effects of journalism on corruption is not enjoying consensus. For instance the French 
political scientists Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz (1999) regard corruption revelations 
and media discourses on corruption primarily as instruments in political quests in African 
clientelist societies:   
Officially all African societies have accepted Western norms in respect of this 
phenomenon [corruption], which is why the local press regularly exposes the most 
blatant cases of venality and illegal deals. However, above and beyond such ritual 
disclosure of wrongdoing and the no less ceremonial demand for the upholding of the 
rule of law, it is well to ask whether this denunciation is not essentially instrumental. 
We would argue that, with few exceptions, such anti-corruption discourse is primarily 
rhetorical and that the recurrent purges that follow are, more often than not, 
convenient devices for eliminating political rivals rather than a real attempt to reform 
the political ‘order’ (1999: 104). 
Chabal and Daloz use the term clientelism in order to make sense of politics and 
organisational life in Africa. The concept has been developed within anthropology (see for 
example Eisenstadt and Lemarchand, 1981; Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984). Lemarchand, for 
example, suggests that ‘patron-client ties involve dyadic bonds between individuals of 
unequal power and socioeconomic status; they exhibit a diffuse particularistic face-to-face 
quality (…) they are voluntarily entered into and derive their legitimacy from expectations of 
mutual benefits (1981: 15).  
Developments within anthropology and political science should also be taken seriously 
by media sociology. However, literature on clientelism has not developed many arguments on 
communication issues, and the sociology of journalism has shown equally little interest in the 
notion of clientelism. Nevertheless, Hallin and Papathanassopoulos (2002) comparing media 
systems in Southern Europe and Latin America, and Hallin and Mancini (2004) comparing 
media systems in North America, Northern, and Southern Europe have developed its use. 
                                                 
2 This optimism is also shared by policy makers in international organizations discussing media’s normative role 
regarding corruption, see for example Peters, (2003), Pope (2000), or Stapenhurst, (2000). The role and the 
premises for the media effectively fighting corruption is also discussed by Rose-Ackerman (1999) and in a 
Kenyan context by Munene (2004). 
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Hallin and Papathanassopoulos provide this understanding of clientelism drawing on the work 
of Eisenstadt and Lamarchand (1980); Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984); and Roniger and 
Günes-Ayata (1994): 
Clientelism refers to a pattern of social organization in which access to social 
resources is controlled by patrons and delivered to clients in exchange for deference 
and various kinds of support. It is a particularistic and assymmetrical form of social 
organization, and is typically contrasted with forms of citizenship in which access to 
resources is based on universalistic criteria and formal equality before the law (2002: 
185). 
According to Hallin and Papathanassopoulos political clientelism of journalism is manifest 
where journalism ‘is not strongly developed as an autonomous institution, differentiated from 
other institutions – the family business, the political clique, the party – with a distinctive set of 
professional values and practices’ (ibid: 182). One aspect of clientelism is instrumentalisation. 
What Hallin and Mancini mean by the concept is ‘control of the media by outside players – 
parties, politicians, social groups or movement, or economic actors seeking political influence 
– who use them to intervene in the world of politics’ (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 37). The 
relevance of the notion of instrumentalism for the study of media in Kenya is highlighted by 
Anassi claiming Kenyan politicians become media owners to control news (2004: 334). 
Clientelism should not be understood primarily as the instrumental use of the media by 
its (political) ownership. As Hallin and Papathanassopoulos state clientelism ‘tend to blur the 
lines between the public and private domains, privileging the private (…).’  Information is 
treated as a private resource (2002: 189). Whereas corruption and tribalism are hot topics 
subjects for journalism in Kenya they were and still are issues within the media houses, as 
Gecau also informs (1996). Chabal and Daloz discussing professional life in general suggest 
that ‘vertical divisions remain more significant than horizontal functional bonds or ties of 
solidarity between those who are similarly employed or professionally linked’ (1999: 20), 
undermining professional culture as a core in professional practice. They hold that 
‘occupational or professional unity is more often than not undermined by internal discords or 
linked to questions of identity or community’ (1999: 20). Instead they underline the none-
importance of organisational boundaries and the importance of the particularistic and the 
informal to professional life. Umeh and Andranovich (2005) hold that professional life in 
Africa is characterised by many qualitatively different kinds of relations. They see these as 
based on the individuals ‘hierarchical position, status, educational background, seniority and 
gender’ (2005: 64). They hold that ‘local contexts’ do influence the performance of 
administrators who ‘often encounter conflict between the formal or expected administrative 
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behaviour based on Western bureaucratic norms and expectations’ (2005: 64). Chabal and 
Daloz (1999) equally refer to different ‘registers’ in order to explain seemingly contradictory 
behaviour by professionals. The relevance of these perspectives in Kenya is evident as 
tribalism (Mac’ochieng, 1996), and corruption (Mac’ochieng, 1996; Odhiambo, 2002; Gecau, 
1996; Munene, 2004) is claimed to challenges professional conduct of journalists. 
Within the perspective of clientelism the role of journalism in revealing corruption can 
be conceptualised in many ways. On the one hand it might be understood as an instrument of 
the owner and/or the political factions he supports. On the other hand journalists are perceived 
as guided by other norms and expectations than purely professional. They serve as clients for 
external interests. Finally, as recent developments in Kenya might suggest and as Rønning 
and Kupe hold with regard to media in Southern Africa, we might observe a different and 
more independent role of the media realizing it’s democratic and ‘watchdog potential’ and 
ambitions.  
Research questions 
The different ways to make sense of media in Africa makes it important to study news 
production in more detail. This thesis is thus a case study of journalism on corruption in the 
Kenyan daily mainstream press from 2001 till 2005, its coverage of corruption and its news 
production on the issue.  
My main research question is inspired by the different ways to understand the role of 
news on corruption in Africa. Whether corruption disclosures are the product of the 
instrumental use of news or a fulfillment of media’s watchdog ambitions is therefore an issue 
concerning autonomy and control of news in the Kenya.3 My main research question is thus: 
In a democratic perspective, what is the role of corruption news in the Kenyan mainstream 
press? A first important question is to what extent the Kenyan mainstream press reports on 
corruption. A starting point for my analysis is to measure the extent of corruption coverage in 
the Kenyan mainstream press from 2001 till 2005. This material provides some quantitative 
trends, by month, year and genre and served as a reference point for investigations into the 
process of news production. I also approach the main research question qualitatively as I 
consult media practitioners on how they perceive opportunities and constraints to their work 
reporting on corruption. The main research question invites to explorations along different 
paths: First, political and economic contexts of corruption news, the very interests of the firm 
                                                 
3 Media can play many roles with regard to democracy and democratication (see for example Randall, (1998)). 
In this thesis the attention is drawn to media’s ability to guard against public authorities’ abuse of power  (ibid: 
3) 
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in relation to the issue must be understood. Second, the news as an institution, journalism as a 
profession and how it informs news production in Kenya must be explored. Third, how norms 
and ideas of journalism are actually practiced in the Kenyan context as journalists consult 
sources and negotiate news on corruption needs attention. Moreover, as this is a case study of 
journalism on corruption in Kenya from 2001 till 2005 we need to be sensitive to changes in 
different aspects shaping news production. These ambitions can be formulated in a set of sub-
questions below. 
1) The role of the media reporting on corruption can not be analysed without 
understanding political and economic contexts of its production. How do politics and 
economics shape journalism on corruption? This question is split in two. First we approach 
the media scene in Kenya in order to understand regulative framework, state-media relations 
and the business model of the Kenyan mainstream press. What characterises state-media 
relations in Kenya? How do ownership interests shape journalism? Whose interest do media 
pursue reporting on corruption, political or economic? Second, the issue of ownership is 
revisited as we explore media owners merely as agents influencing editorial decitions 
concering corruption news production and mediation. How does ownership influence news 
and how is it approached by powerful sources seeking to influence editorial policies and 
production practices? Interviews, documents and content analysis are consulted to illuminate 
political and economic aspects of news production in Kenya.  
2) A second sub-question relates to news as a social institution and journalism as a 
profession as journalists’ ideas and norms inform their practices: How is corruption news 
shaped by journalists’ ideological and professional demands? The autonomy and authority of 
news (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 2002) is found in the norms and ideas of journalism. 
Professionals’ news values and journalistic norms frames journalists’ action and are resources 
for autonomy and professional conduct when interacting with sources. Crucial questions to be 
answered are therefore: How do journalists’ consider newsworthiness of corruption? How do 
professional norms shape news on corruption? How do organisational demands shape the 
practices of ideas and norms? Have any of these factors changed from 2001-2005? 
3) The third sub-question relates to the news process. The issue of autonomy and 
control of news production is relative to and subject to negotiations in different contexts and 
processes. The question concerns the negotiation of news and access to Government secrets: 
How is journalists’ access to corruption information negotiated and shaped by whistle 
blowers and the source organisation? A qualitative reading of corruption news content from 
three periods of intense media coverage suggests emphasis on the qualitative process of 
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revelation of corruption. Thus the role of the so-called ‘whistle blowers’ in the process of 
news production and how source organisations seek to control disclosure of corruption 
information must be analysed. Who are sources of corruption news? How is journalists’ 
access to corruption information negotiated with sources? How do source organisations seek 
to patrol and control the flow of secret information from the source organisation to the news 
media? Are journalists merely instruments for their sources or do they maintain any autonomy 
in the process? Have there been any changes to the quality and quantity of the source 
participation from 2001 till 2005? These issues are approached through interviews with media 
practitioners. 
4) Professional norms of balance and objectivity provides for the participation of the 
accused part in a news story. Thus he becomes a source. The participation of the whistle-
blower and the accused, or affected part in the disclosure of corruption, are distinct in time 
and space, and their negotiating powers and skills are unequal. The fourth question concerns 
powerful sources, and journalists’ autonomy and control over the news process: How is 
production and mediation of news negotiated between journalists and powerful sources 
(accused or affected by corruption claims)? We need to understand how news is negotiated 
between powerful sources accused of corruption and media practitioners, and the resources 
used in these negotiations. What kind of resources do sources employ in these negotiations? 
How do journalists act in order to remain in control of the production process? Have there 
been any changes to journalists’ autonomy in the process of news production from 2001 to 
2005?  These issues are explored through interviews with media practitioners.  
The order of the thesis 
In chapter 2 I discuss terms used in this thesis and theoretical perspectives the thesis draws on 
mainly culturalist approaches inspired by political-economic notions of clientelism and 
instrumentalism. Exploring autonomy and control in the Kenyan mainstream press from a 
pluralist position I acknowledge that production is not determined by structures but negotiated 
within structures reshaping the latter in the process. I use Ericson et al’s (1989) negotiation 
model in order to analyse source-journalist interaction in two arenas of negotiation: the 
Government and the media. 
In chapter 3 I introduce the methods applied in order to collect empirical data. The 
thesis applies (in the terminology of Philip Schlesinger (1990)) a mediacentric approach 
using news workers as primary informants, and analyses the journalism on corruption using 
different analytical tools. First, quantitative content analysis provides an overview of the 
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extent of journalism on corruption from 2001 till 2005 and patterns of and changes in the 
published volume of this issue. Qualitative interviews with media practitioners provide insight 
into the factors that shape the production and selection of corruption articles. Qualitative 
interviews are used in order to find significance rather than a quantitative mapping of factors 
of news production. 
In chapter 4 different contexts for news production are presented. I account for 
political developments and institutional changes in Kenya with regard to corruption, and 
present an overview of media regulations, the Kenyan media scene, media ownership and its 
interests.  
Chapter 5 provides a quantitative analysis of journalism on corruption. The volume 
published on corruption in the Kenyan newspaper the Daily/Sunday Nation4 is measured and 
changes in the attention given to the issue from 2001 till 2005 by year and by genre are 
analysed. I also analyse news discourses on corruption in three periods of intense coverage. 
In chapter 6 aspects of news as an institution in Kenya is explored. I analyse how 
professional norms and journalists’ ideas of journalism inform and shape news value on 
corruption and how they vary in the different political contexts in Kenya. Internal priorities in 
the newsroom that provide for journalistic enquiries into corruption and changes in the 
organisation of news production are examined. 
In chapter 7 journalists’ access to information on corruption is explored. Inspired by 
Ericson et al (1989) I analyse negotiations between whistle blowers or covert sources and 
journalists over corruption leaks and their term of use. Using the space-knowledge model of 
Ericson et al (1989) I analyse how source organisations seek to prevent leaks from the 
knowledge-enclosed back region officially confined to secrecy and the methods used to 
maintain secrecy. In doing so aspects of journalistic autonomy as it relates to source 
influences are touched upon. Changes to covert source participation in news stories on 
corruption and how these changes are understood by media practitioners are accentuated. 
Leaks enable journalists to investigate corruption. However they can not base their 
stories on leaks alone. Professional norms oblige journalists to balance news stories. As 
corruption information leaves the source organisation as leaks, sources affected by such leaks 
strive to maintain enclosure through censorship. In chapter 8 I analyse source-journalist 
relations and how influential sources and those affected by disclosure use their 
knowledgability of organisational demands, journalistic norms and routines to negotiate and 
                                                 
4 From now on termed the Nation. 
 8
perform different control measures in order to impact on the production and selection of news 
on corruption. I analyse how sources shape news on corruption and the distribution of 
knowledge to the public, and how source methods of control have changed during the past 
few years. Likewise counter strategies journalists employ in order to gain autonomy of the 
production process and enable publishing are examined. 
Chapter 9 revisits the issue of ownership exploring the role of the media firm and 
powerful sources as players in struggles over news. The chapter explores powerful sources’ 
avenues for control over corruption news disclosures.  
Finally I summarise the findings and discuss how different factors have shaped the 
reporting of corruption over the five year period. In chapter 10 I also discuss the empirical 
findings in relation to issues of autonomy and the watchdog role of the Kenyan mainstream 
press. Some issues for further future research is proposed. For the impatient reader, each 
chapter contains summary and comments at the end.  
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2. Sociological approaches to news production and their 
applicability in the Kenyan context 
 
Conflicts over secrecy – between state and citizen (…), or in journalism or business or 
law – are conflicts over power: the power that comes with controlling the flow of 
information. (Bok, 1982 cited in Ericson et al, 1987: 13) 
The sociology of news has a long history of making enquiries into issues relating to different 
power relations and how they shape the news production process and the output of journalistic 
practice. As news is knowledge and knowledge is power, the control over news means control 
of the environment and players who inhabit it, according to the Canadian researchers Ericson 
et al (1987: 12-13). However, the ability to gain and make use of knowledge is unequal. The 
same can be said about the ‘ability to prevent its acquisition and use by others’ (Ericson et al 
1987: 13). Thus, when making enquiries into media power in Kenya the notion of control over 
news production is a central one. How is the news production and knowledge distribution on 
corruption shaped in the Kenyan context of news production? What enables and constricts 
journalists’ access to information? Which factors shape journalists transformation of 
information into published news accounts? In short, how is the production of public images of 
politics in Kenya – particularly issues related to corruption - shaped by different opportunities 
and constraints?  
A key issue to the sociology of news production is thus the level of autonomy for 
journalists and how this degree of autonomy is shaped. However, different approaches to the 
study of news have traditionally provided diverging views on how the product and process of 
journalism can be explained and what factors influence and shape the autonomy of journalists 
in liberal capitalist democracies and thus the mediation of reality by the news media. News is 
shaped by social, cultural, political and economic aspects, and different approaches to news 
production accentuate these factors differently and provide analyses on different levels of 
enquiry. The different approaches to news production are not exclusive of eachother but 
provide complementary explanations, when focusing on news coverage and journalism on 
corruption.  
News production – three approaches 
One way to understand news production is as a product of economy and politics. According to 
Street (2001: 41) news is in one sense a consequence of economics, a product of trade, and a 
product of politics. Political economic explanations put emphasis on the economic ownership, 
the influences of the state and the logic of the marketplace (McNair, 1994: 39-45). The 
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political economic approach sees journalists’ autonomy as structured by political and 
economic forces in society. Moreover, ownership can be active players pursuing political or 
economic interests through their position (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). In this perspective 
ownership of Kenyan media, its commercial and political interests, and state-media relations 
might be important to explore in order to understand journalism on corruption in Kenya. 
Another branch of academic analysis understands news content as a product of the 
social organisation of the news production process, ‘the limitations imposed by the news 
form; constraints imposed on journalists’ ability to gather news; and the routine professional 
practices of journalism’ (ibid: 45). Professional ethics, routine practices, aesthetic codes, the 
notions of objectivity and the applications of news values guide the journalistic work and thus 
have a major impact on the journalistic product (ibid). According to Tiffen, ‘institutional 
routines’ provide predictable and productive means for gathering news, and conventions 
about news values that are shared by news workers (1989: 4). Thus news are not journalists 
arbitrary, personal accounts of reality, but manufactured in accordance with professional 
standards and routine work conventions. Now, in this perspective my research questions can 
be said to concern themselves with how the organisation and routines of news production on 
corruption are producing direct or indirect influences on news content.  
A third approach is the culturalist approach, which combines the political economic 
and the organisational approach, focuses on ‘how media are positioned relative to the power 
elites in society’ (McNair, 1994: 48). The culturalist approach does not understand journalism 
as a function of ownership nor organisational constraints, but emphasises the interaction 
between news organisations, the sources they report on and ‘social institutions’ (ibid: 48). 
According to Curran, culturalists generally assume that relatively autonomous journalists 
enjoy authority within media organisations, but ‘[t]heir reporting is structured by cultural and 
ideological influences’ (1990: 120). Culturalist analysts have extended sociological scopes of 
analyses to include how active sources are part of the news construction process as they act 
strategically in order to influence the framing and mediation of news (see for example Ericson 
et al, 1989; Schlesinger, 1990; Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994; and Slaatta, 1999). The 
concept of negotiation is an interesting one since it opens up for a model of news production 




This thesis draws on perspectives from political economic and organisational analysis 
accounted for above, and attempts to combine these in a primarily culturalist approach 
accentuating negotiations over the production and selection of news. I would argue that there 
are good reasons for combining these approaches when studying news production in Africa. 
First, political and anthropological literatures on Africa challenge the very notion of 
organisation. We need to take seriously claims that Africa (and then Kenya) are understood by 
‘a lack of institutionalization, a general disregard for the rules of the formal political and 
economic sectors, and a universal resort to personal(ized) and vertical solutions to societal 
problems’ (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: xix). If it is so, macro and meso-analyses of regulations, 
ownership, and formal rules will prove of limited value as formal organisations are overruled 
by vertical informal layers of decision-making. We therefore also need to analyse 
personalised relations in order to achieve an understanding of how autonomy and control in 
professional life work.  
Second, and thus, political economic significance might also be better understood 
through a micro level analysis of relations rather than a macro level analysis of formal 
institutions and regulations if we want to comprehend the factors that shape news production. 
Descriptions of state-media relations and patron-client relations in Kenya in the 1990s should 
be taken seriously. If powerful sources use the courts and regulations concerning media 
particularistically as arguments in conflicts over control over news, then we need to approach 
these conflicts. 
Journalists are not social robots as they produce news (Eide, 1992: 18). Neither are 
they culturally determined merely responding to non-professional demands of kiths and kin. 
When approaching autonomy and control in the Kenyan mainstream press I thus find it useful 
to understand journalism on corruption as negotiations of control between different actors in 
different processes of news production where different norms and cultural bonds and 
expectations are used as resources. There are negotiations between media practitioners and 
‘whistle blowers’, covert sources of information, over access to corruption information and its 
interpretation. There are negotiations between media practitioners and the accused part over 
the enclosure or disclosure of corruption as news. These negotiations are shaped by political 
and economic factors.  
Thus we need, first, to acknowledge the importance of and explore how media 
ownership is important for corruption news. Second, we need to explore social and 
ideological resources journalists bring into these negotiations as professionals. Resources of 
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journalism must be explored: professional norms for production, journalist cultures and ideas 
of news and organisational demands that inform news values and journalistic routine 
practices. The news institution is not a fix in time and space. As social rules are continuously 
constituted by social practice it is also subject to negotiations and change. Third, we need a 
framework to understand sources participation in news production and how they shape it, the 
contexts for negotiations and the strategies employed. My position is that journalists are 
neither predetermined by professional norms or by primordial cultural demands. Their action 
is structured by different demands in situational contexts. Norms and cultures serve as 
frameworks for their actions and as resources when negotiating news. Analysing news 
production on corruption in Kenya I find it useful to take a pluralistic position inspired by 
Eide (1992).5 There is a ‘duality of structure’ as social structures are both the medium of and 
the result of action (ibid). Acknowledging this, political, economic and social structures are 
reproduced but at the same time we allow for change. The presentation below does not reflect 
the different approaches presented in the introduction to this chapter. The different sections 
below draw on different perspectives of these approaches in order to illuminate the analyical 
platform of this study.  
Ownership and instrumentalism  
Mediaowners do not produce news. The news organization does, so why give attention to the 
news firm? First, a key issue for political economic approaches to news production is who 
owns the media and whether they use their ownership for personal or political purposes 
(McNair, 1994: 40). In a Western liberal context it is often held that journalists hold 
considerable independence from management control (Curran, 1990: 143; McNair, 1994: 41). 
Is this also the case in an African contect? If we take serious Chabal and Daloz claims with 
regard to the role of corruption revelations in African societies we need to take the issue of 
ownership and control in the Kenyan media seriously. Analysing media in the Kanu era 
Gecau provides examples of occurences where the boundary between firm and news 
organisation has been blurred. Gecau even suggests that the reason the Kenyan press was not 
nationalised after independence in 1963 might be understood due to close relationship 
between the editors and the Government. There was no need for it as the press supported the 
Government anyway (1996: 205). Without subscribing to this view we need to have in mind 
the role of owners with regard to newsroom influences. Second, the laws and regulations 
politics imposes on the society’s cultural producers must be understood (McNair, 1998). 
                                                 
5 Eide (1992) interprets Giddens ‘theory of structuration’. 
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Third the economic relationship between the political apparatus and the media - whether the 
state inhabits any control of financial resources - influence journalistic practices (ibid).  
With regard to the second and third point above I would like to draw attention to the 
work of Hallin and Papathanassopoulos (2002) who might serve as guides in this respect. 
They note namely that ‘rational legal authority is less strongly developed’ in countries with a 
history of clientelism; other branches of Government and the bureaucracy are often 
politicized; ‘and there is often a tradition of evasion of the law’ (2002: 186). This also impacts 
on the practicing of media politics and regulations. According to Hallin and 
Papathanassopoulos 
[t]he persistence of a culture in which evasion of the law is relatively common means 
that opportunities for particularistic pressures also are common: Governments can 
exercise pressure by enforcing the law selectively, and news media can do so by 
threatening selectively to expose wrongdoing (2002: 187, my italic). 
In this regard controlling state resources through political or financial power become a 
significant resource when control over news production is subject to conflict.  
In this respect I would also like to draw attention to the contribution of Hallin and 
Mancini (2004) and the concept of instrumentalism. By instrumentalization they mean the 
‘control of the media by outside actors – parties, politicians, social groups or movement, or 
economic actors seeking political influence – who use them to intervene in the world of 
politics’ (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 37). The study put its emphasis on the microcontexts of 
news production. However, if we do not give any attention to ownership issues this analysis 
will lack a framework that gives meaning to the findings. I believe these notions might be 
valuable in order to illuminate aspects of news production in the Kenyan context.  
News institution, news organisation and news values 
In what way do professional norms shape news production? How do journalists value 
corruption news? How is journalist autonomy shaped by internal social demands? When 
analysing the process of news production my point of departure is the news institution. An 
institution is structured social practice in time and space acknowledged by its members (Eide, 
1992: 16). Journalists share occupational norms and ideas of their work but work for different 
organisations, in different media houses, or as Gans narrowly defines it; as a ‘set of 
professionals’ (1980: 93). I share his definition as it enables to distinguish between 
journalistic, professional aspects of news production and economic and political aspects. 
News values inform the journalistic practices of constructing and selecting corruption news 
for publishing. Rodney Tiffen, holds that ‘[i]n approaching news values, it is (…) 
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fundamental to understand them as responses to the various cross-pressures in news 
production than to construct imaginary formulas of newsworthiness’ (1989: 68). Professional 
norms and organisational demands are important in this respect. 
Professional norms of objectivity, journalists’ ideas of news and the role of journalism 
and organisational demands of productivity shape news value. Journalists as professional 
news workers use their professional judgement to decide what news is. In this lays their claim 
to autonomy.  
Journalists ideas of journalism  
Mancini discusses why the ‘professional model’ or ‘liberal model of the press’ has become 
the dominant model in media theory and practice around the world (2000: 265). The model 
has been aggressively exported since the WWII; there has been a ‘free press crusade’ 
(Margaret Blanchard quoted in ibid: 267). Kenya is no exception. Jens Barland (2005) 
analyses how the Western model of the press has been established also in the Kenyan context. 
Mancini holds that the theories of the press once suggested by Siebert et al have become 
occupational ideologies of the press (Nerone, 1995; Mancini, 2000: 267). However, Hallin 
and Mancini (2004) argue that ‘the adoption of an ideology of journalism as ‘public trust’ is 
an important historical development and should not be dismissed as ‘mere ideology’ any more 
than it should be accepted as pure altruism’. Journalists’ ideas of the journalism inform their 
work practices. One of my Kenyan informants reflected on professionalism and expressed:  
I think when each side is calling you names it means that you have done it 
professionally. If the Government think you have done a bad job and the businessmen 
who were chasing some contracts think you did a bad job so then you are on the right 
track.  
This way of understanding professionalism is also observed by others. Tiffen points out that 
‘in no other profession would universal hostility be taken as evidence of quality’ (1989: 2). 
For journalists criticism gives them the impression that they watchdog the execution of power 
in society fulfilling their societal role.  
Objectivity: Professional norms and routines  
This idea of journalism is in dialogue with norms for the practice of journalism as a 
profession. In the case of Kenya the Media Council, an umbrella for most news media in 
Kenya has set a range of rules on how journalism should be conducted professionally, 
including norms for how to handle sources, achieve objectivity and handle complaints (MCK, 
2002). Norms of objectivity are important as the public legitimacy of journalism as a 
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profession is drawn from it’s reporting objectively or balanced (Ericson et al 1987; Gans, 
1980; Tiffen, 1989; Mancini, 2000). Hallin and Mancini note that journalists’ adoption of a 
public service ethic is important in order to ‘claim autonomy and authority’ (2004: 36-37). 
Whereas journalism is a social construction there are different conventions used to 
achieve journalistic objectivity. One way to operationalise objectivity is through the genre 
conventions of the media separating news from commentary (Mancini, 2000: 272). Tuchman 
creatively suggests with regard to the news genre that ‘[n]ews is a window on the world’. It is 
a frame (1978: 1). For journalists as professionals it provides a view on the world as Tiffen 
informs: 
The distancing devices of ‘objective’ formats should not obscure the sharpness with 
which these formats delineate the most newsworthy point. It is the selection of these 
‘frames’ or orientations or ‘angles’ which is the essence of news judgement (1989: 
65). 
The news format and any other journalistic formats ‘exist to discipline the routine 
performance’ (ibid: 64). ‘The story format favours resolution over doubt, the concrete over 
the abstract, the narrative recounting of recent, finite events over the analytical account of 
continuing conditions’ (ibid: 65).  
The application of news values might thus be understood as undertaking objective 
reporting as professional and routinised ways to value news are employed. According to 
Tiffen ‘[t]he strengths of news values transforms difficult decisions into routine choices, 
reduces an ambiguous and infinite mandate – covering the news – into a set of unproblematic 
routines, all but removing doubts and options’ (1989: 66). Thus media practitioners see news 
selection as an instinctive or self-evident action: ‘News values minimise the role of individual 
attitudes, so that news judgement transcends the preferences of the individuals producing it’, 
according to Tiffen (ibid: 67). Confronted with criticism they can claim they made a 
professional consideration of a story’s or perspective’s news value.  
However, the selection of angles, frames and accounts of reality might be considered 
objective as journalists are obliged to follow norms to achieve objectivity within a news 
report. To be balanced is to give equal coverage to different parties of an event regardless of 
the relevance or news value of their contribution (Street, 2001: 19). Eide and Hernes (1986) 
suggest that objectivity, and autonomy from sources, can be achieved over time as a case 
unfolds and sources act on previous accounts made in acts of staged dramas. When handling 
exposés, however, facts must be ‘evidenced’ for editors to be able to support their journalists 
if controversy over a powerful source develops (Gans, 1980: 120), and this impacts on the 
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negotiation between sources and journalists. I believe these different notions of objectivity 
might be fruitful when discussing news production on corruption in the Kenyan context.  
Source participation in the news process 
When valuing news and selecting stories, news workers consider different organisational 
demands. Any news report must adhere to the space requirement of the outlet. Thus space 
becomes a scarce resource, and a constraint limiting the number and the depth of news reports 
(McNair, 1994: 45-6). Time is also a critical factor as copy must be delivered at deadlines that 
fit the production cycle. Likewise, human resources are limited and thus oblige news workers 
to choose between different potential stories to pursue. Due to these constraints news 
gathering is to a large degree organised as beats or institutional contexts for news reporting 
that are likely to produce news. Organisational demands thus inform the routine practices of 
journalism. In Tiffen’s vocabulary sources are ‘supply factors’ (1989). Corruption news in 
Kenya is for example the product of journalistic activity at different beats: Corruption is 
debated in Parliament and reported by parliamentary reporters. Politicians hold press 
conferences or speeches at funerals and make accusations of corruption against each other or 
they demand action to be taken, which in turn might be reported by political journalists if 
deemed newsworthy. This perspective is important as it underlines the importance of the 
allocation of human resources at different beats for news production. Likewise, news 
organisation’s resource allocation to non-beat or investigative reporting must be understood as 
a premise for revelations of corruption in the Kenyan mainstream press.  
Official and non-official sources 
The conception of sources as mere suppliers of information, however, simplifies journalism as 
construction of meaning. The frequent and routinised use of institutional and powerful sources 
on beats has been subject to much academic debate. It has often been claimed that journalists 
merely reproduce the accounts of the powerful in society as they rely on institutional elite 
sources. Molotch and Lester state that official sources appear frequently and regularly in the 
news; and that ‘[r]outine access is one of the important sources and sustainers of existing 
power relationships’ (cited in Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994: 26). However, regular exposure 
to journalists does not guarantee positive coverage. Access can not be taken for granted, 
‘powerful sources still have to pursue goal-oriented action to achieve access’ to news (1994: 
26). This observation of Schlesinger and Tumber is also important in the Kenyan context. 
Corruption claims in Kenyan media targets the political and economic elite like government 
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ministers and heads of public or semi-public institutions. Thus institutional sources and 
powerholders can not take positive coverage in the news for granted. 
Schlesinger and Tumber also draw attention to the contribution of non-official sources 
to news production, challenging the notion of all-powerful powerholders with structural 
access to positive news coverage. They underline the need to bring analyses into the 
participation of non-official news sources to the news production process and the competition 
between these sources, issues previously ignored by news sociologists (ibid: 33). Whereas 
most news on corruption in the Kenyan mainstream press probably are reports of public 
statements or speeches made at rallies, funerals, seminars etc some news stories diverge from 
the bulk of routinised beat news reports. Schlesinger and Tumber’s perspectives are important 
for my research. Revelations of corruption by the Kenyan news media are to some extent 
based on the participation of non-official sources who leak Government secrets to the news 
media. These are often covert sources (Tiffen, 1989). My interest is mainly these revelations 
and what enable and constrain them. Non-official and covert sources play an important role in 
this respect. I use the term non-official source and covert source synonymously as individual 
sources do not necessarily represent their formal organisation when they perform this role.  
Pressure and negotiations 
What control do sources have of journalists and vice versa? Conducting journalism on 
corruption or other sensitive issues that produce negative coverage of individuals or 
organisations is not a light matter. Herbert Gans analyses in his classic Deciding what’s news 
the different forms of pressure that journalists are exposed to (1980: chap. 8). He argues that 
‘[s]tory selection and production is (…) a power struggle over what meanings enter the 
symbolic arena’, the ‘public stage’ of which messages are presented (ibid: 249). By pressure 
he understands criticism, but not demands of factual corrections; protests, organised or 
unorganised; as well as threats against journalists. According to Gans they have the intention 
of altering stories, censor or induce journalists’ self-censorship. Journalists experience 
pressure especially as they report on issues where much is at stake as corruption revelations 
potentially have a huge impact. Gans observations and reflections are important. Inspired by 
Ericson et al I prefer to understand pressure as arguments or resources in negotiations over 
control. Ericson et al explore journalists and sources relations on different institutional beats 
in their newsbeat ethnography Negotiating control. A study of news sources (1989). The 
Canadians hold that source organisations have a ‘dual mandate’ as they interact with news 
media: ‘They want the public face of their organization to be covered in the news, and their 
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private face to remain under cover’ (1989: 25). Sources ability to do this is neither routine nor 
fixed, according to Ericson et al. ‘Obviously negotiation with journalists is itself an exercise 
in social control: control over organizations in the environment requires control over the 
news’ (ibid: 25-26). The term control is a useful one when referring to the ability to negotiate 
enclosure of corruption information or its disclosure as news. Negotiations for control take 
place in different terrains: physical, social, and cultural (ibid: 26). Negotiating control 
sources, individual or organisational, are not equal in terms of physical, social and cultural 
resources and with regard to the ability to employ these resources skilfully.  
Institutional contexts and regions  
Ericson et al (1989) also provide a model that illustrates journalist-source interaction. In the 
Canadian researchers’ model (based on the work of Goffman (1959) and Giddens’ later 
refinements (1984)) organisations are divided into regions of physical access and knowledge 
access which are used as a framework for how organisations protect and promote themselves 
through information management and regulation of journalists’ access to information (see 
figure 2.1).  
Front regions 
 
Cencorship    Publicity 
 
Enclosures      Disclosures 
 
     Secrecy    Confidence 
 
        Back regions  
 
Figure 2.1: Journalists’ 




The back regions are spaces where decisions in the organisation are taken but access is 
restricted to those who are formally employed and externals officially authorised to be there 
(Ericson et al, 1989: 9). The front regions are the areas where the source organisations public 
business is ‘transacted’. Not only those who have an official role in the organisation, but also 
those who do or wish to do business with the organisation, might be allowed access (ibid: 10).  
Ericson et al use the term enclosure as attempts to ‘circumscribe’ or censor 
information or signs that are given in front or back regions. Secrecy is efforts to keep 
knowledge away from others for example by physically restraining access to back regions. 
Censorship on the other hand is restrictions on publicizing. Disclosure refers to attempts to 
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communicate in front and back regions. Confidence refers to ‘the revelation of private matters 
with mutual trust’ usually in the back regions of an organisation. Publicity on the other hand 
is accounts made for public consumption: ‘Here the source organization work hard to give off 
signs that make it appear to be doing what interested publics think it should be doing’ (ibid: 
10-11).  
How should leaks and covert sources be understood in this context? Rodney Tiffen 
(1989) is one of few who analyse leaks in his analysis News and power from an Australian 
context. He defines leaks as ‘unauthorised release of confidential information’ (1989: 96). 
Tiffen underline that the term refers to different phenomena as the release might come from ‘a 
dissident’ or powerful individuals seeking political advantage. On the other hand the nature of 
information leaked varies as ‘confidentiality ranges from the very sensitive to the innocuous, 
from what was intended to be forever secret to the about-to-be announced.’ Leaks are used 
strategically by sources, often covert, in order to gain different purposes, and journalists 
perceive the legitimacy of the leaks and its news value differently (ibid: chap 5). Within 
Ericson et al’s model leaks transpire in or concern the back region of Government and state 
agencies transforming secrets into confidentialities. Whatever the intentions behind leaks or 
the formal position of the whistle blower, news exposés on corruption are enabled by 
journalists or their covert sources access to the back regions of source organisations.  
Acknowledging leaks is also acknowledging complexities of source bureaucracies. As 
Ericson et al observe there are many conflicts among subunits and levels. The organisation is 
better depicted as having a myriad of ‘microcultures’, and characterized by ‘multiculturalism’ 
(1987: 26). This is an important observation as it enables us to understand that corruption 
news is not only the result of goaloriented and skillful action of streamlined source 
buracracies, but of sources but significantly a consequence of internal differencies in the 
source organisation.  
It is important to underline that the term source does indeed refer to many agents and 
individuals. There is not one powerful controlling agency that employs its power on media 
practitioners and the news organisation. Indeed, when analyzing journalist-source interaction 
sources must be considered plural with regard to agencies and individuals and heterogeneous 
and unequal with regard to powers and skills they are able to employ in negotiations with 
news workers and news organisations over news on corruption.  
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Autonomy  
The conduction of journalistic professionalism is the very argument for journalists’ claims of 
autonomy in Kenya as elsewhere. The notions of autonomy is however coloured differently in 
research literature. Curran notes that the nature of journalistic autonomy is conditional: ‘it is a 
freedom exercised on terms determined ultimately by employers’ (1990: 133). According to 
Tuchman journalists insist on autonomy from owners and superiors as they claim ’the right to 
judge what news is’ (1978: 174). Gans hold that news organisations are bureaucracies staffed 
by professionals, and as professionals journalists do not like to be given orders, rather 
suggestions, if their professional autonomy is to be respected (1980: 93). Gans holds that 
journalists perform ‘seriatim journalism’ as every story is shaped by many levels of the 
organisational bureaucracy before it is published. ‘The daily routine is like screwing nuts and 
bolts’ (ibid: 84). However, sociologists usually refer to journalists’ newsroom autonomy as 
relative to different work processes. Autonomy, according to Gans, is greater in story 
production than story selection (ibid: 103). Ideas of news, social norms for the conduction of 
the craft and organisational demands might be seen as constraints on the autonomy of 
journalists. However, they are also resources journalists use when negotiating news with their 
sources.  
Autonomy of journalists is thus also relative to sources. Journalists depend on sources 
for their news accounts. Allern (1997) holds that journalist autonomy can be circumscribed as 
news workers regular access to sources depends on sustained positive coverage of the sources. 
This is an important argument. Ericson et al hold that journalists enjoy a relative autonomy 
from sources as they hold the power to reframe their accounts in their news stories (1989: 12-
6). The source can provide his accounts of or interpretations of events but there is no 
guarantee that the journalist will adhere to his constructions. Eide and Hernes (1986) suggest 
that journalists gain autonomy from sources as sources are staged in media dramas ultmately 
decided by news workers. When conducting corruption exposés professional norms with 
regard to objectivity are tools journalists can employ in order to maintain autonomy from their 
sources. Journalists claim to professionalism is thus a resource when autonomy is challenged 
by sources. Clientelism challenges this journalist autonomy.  
Clientelism tends to break down the autonomy of other social institutions, and 
journalism is no exception. It forces the logic of journalism to merge with other social 
logics – of party politics and family privileges, for instance. And it breaks down the 
horizontal solidarity of journalists as it does with other social groups (Hallin and 
Papathanassopoulos, 2002: 189).  
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The term clientelism is also used in order to capture the influence of non-professional ties and 
norms (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos 2002). Both tribalism (Munene, 2004) and corruption 
in the media (Mac’Ochieng, 1996) must be observed as a challenge to professonalism in 
Kenya. Both practices are understood and sometimes referred to as clientelism in this thesis.   
My use of the term autonomy is relational rather than absolute,6 acknowledging for 
example that social norms constrain journalist freedom, but it also inspire it (Eide, 1992); and 
that autonomy from superiors might enable cooptation by sources (Gans, 1980). 
Comments on terminology and research outlining 
A few terms and their use in this thesis are presented above; however a few more 
considerations must be done before the outlining the research. When analysing news 
production there are many terms in use depending on the research approach and research 
tradition the researcher is affiliated to. News gathering (see for example McNair 1994: 45) is 
commonly used when journalists attend institutional beats and interact with sources. As both 
journalists and sources are involved in construction of meaning I prefer simply to use the 
word production. I use the term mediation in the primary meaning of selecting ‘other parts of 
experience for special attention and closing off other views and voices’ (McQuail, 2000: 66). 
The alternative terms of the selection of news in the meaning of deciding what is to be 
published, or deciding ‘suitability’ (Gans, 1980: 81) is also used. My informants simply use 
the term publish. Whereas discourse is commonly used by culturalists on news I prefer to use 
disclosures or revelations in order to signal that it is mostly single news item, certain points in 
a discourse or the point of departure that premises a discourse - that is the interest of this 
thesis.  
Research outline 
In order to understand autonomy and control of news production on corruption we need to 
understand the context of which it is produced. The first explorations of this thesis are the 
contexts for news production on corruption, media-state relations and media ownership. 
Analysing aspects of media autonomy and control in this regard I draw on the notions of 
clientelism (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 2002) and instrumentalism (Hallin and Mancini, 
2004).  
News is a social institution reproduced and changed by social actions (Eide, 1992). I 
approach key aspects of it as the resources and authority of journalists are found in the news 
                                                 
6 See also Tunstall (1971) for a discussion of autonomy. 
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institution (Mancini, 2000). The news institution; professional norms and journalists ideas of 
corruption as news and journalism, inform news production on corruption. In my perspective 
they become journalist resources as they negotiate news with their sources. 
From the organisation and institution I enter the news process which I split in two 
processes of negotiation: First between news workers and covert sources over government 
secrets and journalists’ access to information, and second, journalists’ negotiations with the 
accused part. Inspired by Ericson et al (1989) I approach the first as negotiation over secrecy 
and confidence, the second as negotiations over censorship and publicity. In these analyses I 
borrow Ericson et al’s notion of different ‘terrains’ in which interaction of journalists and 
sources take place: the physical, social and cultural (ibid: 26). I choose to use the term 
‘resources’ for my purposes. First, analysing the physical resources of negotiations with 
whistle blowers I account for journalists’ physical access to regions, and the use of 
communication tools. Analysing the social I investigate ‘what holds the relations together’ 
(ibid: 26) as friendship, money, and trust. Analysing cultural resources I account for shared or 
divergent meanings of news and corruption between different players; sources and journalists. 
Second, as journalists are informed about corruption through leaks they approach the accused 
part. When corruption information becomes known to journalists sources use different means 
in order to maintain enclosure. Journalists make efforts to remain in control of the production 
and publishing of corruption news. I analyse how influential sources use different resources in 
order to prevent disclosure of damaging information gained in back regions of source 
organisations. Powerful sources use cultural resources or ‘registers’ (Chabal and Daloz, 1999) 
of identity as they negotiate news; they use social resources as their knowledge of journalistic 
norms and routines in order to negotiate corruption stories in the pipeline; and finally they use 
physical means in order to control news production, particularistic use of laws etc.  
Analysis of news content during 2001 till 2005 is presented early in the thesis and 
serves as a reference point for investigations into news production. As the process of news 
production is analysed I also expect to find features that might give information on some of 
the changes in content published from 2001-2005. This includes factors shaping media 
autonomy in different phases of news production.  
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3. Methods 
Due to unavoidable circumstances, we were unable to run a continuation of 
Githongo’s secret diary as promised. We apologise for the inconvenience. 
         The Standard, 26.01.067 
Scope of analysis 
This thesis analyse autonomy and control of the journalism in the mainstream press through a 
case study of journalism on corruption in Kenya from 2001 till 2005. The daily newspapers 
the EastAfrican/Sunday Standard8 and the Nation represent the Kenyan mainstream press in 
this study. These papers are chosen as the objects of analysis for a number of reasons. First, 
they are known to report regularly on corruption issues. The fact that much research on 
corruption in Kenya is empirically based on mainstream press reports indicates the 
importance of the mainstream press as providers of information on corruption to the public 
sphere (see for example Sihania (ed) 2005; Kibwana et al 1996; or Odhiambo and  Mitullah 
(ed), 2005). Second, the papers have a long publishing tradition spanning many decades. They 
are privately (and foreign) owned. They are the biggest newspapers in terms of circulation, 
and are run on a commercial basis depending on sold copies and advertisements. And as 
Jensen informs, the readers of these outlets are the urban based elites, state employees, 
business men and intellectuals in a multicultural Kenya (2000: 72). Therefore what I term the 
mainstream press is to some degree an exception to politically owned printed and electronic 
media in the country. This position makes the mainstream press an interesting case of analysis 
as they provide a cross ethnical cultural canopy in a country with many political factions.  
The scope of analysis is the journalism on corruption undertaken by the mainstream 
press. Emphasis is put on revelations of corruption rather than regular beat reporting, ‘the 
reporting of speeches,’ as one of my informants put it. This back region journalism is 
interesting as it is well suited to illuminate certain aspects of journalist autonomy in Kenya 
due to the conflicting nature of the topical issues in question. This choice is also reflected in 
the selection of informants (see below).  
The time frame 2001 till 2005 is chosen as it incorporates a significant change of 
Government in Kenya in late December 2002. This provides for an opportunity for 
comparison of factors shaping news production from one regime to another. An interesting 
factor is also the Standard’s traditional loyalty to Kanu and former President Moi and the 
                                                 
7 Standard team and agencies, 2006: World Bank warns Kibaki on corrupt ministers, the Standard 26.01.06 
8 From now on termed the Standard 
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Nations traditional sympathy for the Kanu opposition. This makes the issue of ownership and 
control a potentially interesting issue when corruption news is constructed and published.9  
Methods 
News content is the outcome of news production processes and factors shaping it. An analysis 
of news content however does not reveal the social processes and power relations shaping it, 
and only rarely does news reveal constraints on its production, selection, and distribution. The 
initial quote in this chapter is an exception to this as the paper makes the reader aware that a 
story has been ‘killed’. Even if the result of the social construction of news is obvious and 
concrete, the quality of how power works and shapes news is not self evident. Understanding 
news production on corruption requires that we go beyond the actual news items and 
investigate the practices of news workers and the forces working on journalism. These we do 
not know beforehand, hence a reliance on quantitative methods alone is not a good option for 
this inquiry.  
Repstad notes that qualitative methods are useful when the significance is the 
objective and not the occurrence of predefined variables (1993: 15). According to Holme and 
Solvang, a qualitative approach is a flexible one enabling the researcher to integrate new 
knowledge obtained as research proceeds. You may change or add questions as you learn and 
acknowledge during the research process (1991: 77). Indeed, the research questions developed 
prior to the field work changed before, during and after the undertaking of the field research. 
Qualitative research – content analyses and interviews - can strengthen theories and make 
them more or less credible, but we can not test theories (Repstad, 1987:86). On the other hand 
a qualitative approach enables the researcher to develop hypotheses and theories. As my aim 
is to explore and describe the informants experiences, my main approach is a flexible and 
qualitative one accentuating understanding more than explanation; finding significance rather 
than causality; and diagnosis rather than prediction (Ericson et al, 1987: 78).  
This does not mean that quantitative tools are not valuable for the process of 
understanding. Ericson et al (ibid: 76-77) emphasises the importance of using different 
techniques to gain knowledge. Through quantitative content analyses the extent of corruption 
coverage in the newspapers and changes over time become visible, while qualitative 
interviews can accentuate the players experiences and strategies. Quantitative and qualitative 
methods are not in conflict, they rather complement each other (Holme and Solvang, 1991: 
                                                 
9 This potential opportunity is however rarely exploited due to divergent empirical material and due to concern 
over informant anonymity. 
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74). The triangulation of methods, i.e. the application of different tools on the same 
phenomena gives a broader basis for interpretation (Repstad, 1987: 20).   
Quantitative content analysis  
Quantitative content analysis was a starting point for my investigations. One way of 
reviewing journalism on corruption is to measure the volume written. The main purpose for 
this exercise is to get an indicator of change in the volume published on the issue of 
corruption during the last five years. During September to November 2005 I went through the 
articles filed under the labels of ‘corruption’ and ‘scandals’10 in the archives of the Nation 
Media Group (NMG) for the purpose of quantifying their reporting on corruption. These are 
not the only files containing corruption stories. Court stories are not accounted for. Neither is 
the separate file on the Goldenberg scandal. From spring 2004 and throughout the year the 
Nation reported daily from the court hearings on the scam of the 1990’s.  
The same exercise for the Standard proved to be a most difficult task as they do not 
have the same filing routines.11 Based on this lack of availability, I chose to focus on the 
coverage of the Nation only.  
Defining variables 
One genre convention is the distinction between opinion articles and news. Opinions and 
editorials are normally seen as expressions of subjectivity. News convention on the other hand 
aspires to objectivity and factuality, balance and impartiality when reporting events (Street 
2001: 18). In my study, I have measured journalism on corruption by different variables: news 
articles (including news notes), commentaries, letters, and editorials. In my analysis they 
represent different aspects of journalism: the professional news selection (amended by source 
negotiations and internal commercial demands), authoritative voices of journalists and experts 
on topical issues in the news, the voice of the reading public, and the voice of the 
editor/owner of the paper respectively.  
Another variable is the number of front page stories on corruption. As the Nation is 
not a subscription news outlet, but relies on copies sold by street vendors and kiosks, the front 
page purpose is to sell each edition to a reading audience. The number of front page stories 
might thus indicate changes in the perception of the public interest in corruption issues. 
                                                 
10 This file contained a few stories that were not graft or corruption cases. These are not accounted for.  
11 Identifying and analysing news items from the last five years’ editions of the Standard would be extremely 
time-consuming. 
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Analysis, validity and reliability 
The files contain articles that include the term corruption whether this is in the headline, the 
lead or in the body of the article. As such, articles mainly focusing on other issues might fall 
into this category as long as they include the term. Whether corruption is a major issue in the 
story or not can be better measured if only headlines or leads are counted. I have not counted 
how many articles carry ‘corruption’ in the headline or lead due to the workload of such a 
measurement. However the number of front pages on corruption might serve as an indication 
of the reliability of the measurement of the other genres. 
The archive files consist of articles from different media outlets including the Nation, 
the Standard and the People. Only articles published in the Nation are analysed. It has to be 
taken into account that the numbers might not be an exact measurement of all that is written 
on corruption by the the Nation, as some articles might have disappeared from the files. 
However, even if the accurate number might not be correct, the trend these files show is not 
compromised, according to the NMG librarian. She also assured me that the filing routines 
had not changed during the time frame measured. I therefore believ that the trends found 
reflect the actual attention given to the topical issue and not the filing routines of the library.  
One problem I experienced when classifying content was that it sometimes proved 
difficult to know whether an article was a letter to the editor or a commentary. As I went 
through my files I became aware that my practice was not consistent with regard to the 
column Talking Point. All news analyses, commentaries and letters are therefore aggregated 
under a category I term opinion articles. As the exercise is conducted consistently for the 
whole time frame the result for the aggregated category is reliable and the data valid. Due to 
small number of samples I have not conducted any analysis on variance or any regression 
analysis. Due to the fact that the sample size is small and that the samples are not 
independendent it is not justifiable to do statistical analysis. Thus it is not possible to make 
deductive conclutions on statistical differences. I choose to make descriptive analysis of the 
data only. 
Qualitative interviews 
My main methodological tool is qualitative interviews. The main group of informants (16 of 
25) is journalists and editors. I did however interview nine non-media practitioners including 
two parliamentarians and a former civil servant in order to get views on the media from 
sources’ perspectives. A qualitative approach is flexible. It enables the researcher to integrate 
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new knowledge obtained. You can change or add questions as you learn and acknowledge 
new aspects during the research process (Holme and Solvang, 1991: 77).  
Selection of informants 
The starting point for this exploration was qualitative and quantitative reading of articles on 
corruption. A quantitative reading provided an overview of the coverage of corruption and 
changes in the period from 2001 till 2005. A qualitative reading of articles on corruption in 
the Nations web edition (www.nationmedia.com/dailynation) prior to my fieldwork provided 
knowledge on current issues (for example Anglo Leasing and Finance scandal, the Rotich 
case, and Clays dossier to mention a few) and players involved. Both approaches indicated 
possible informants, as these were selected based on the quantity they had written and quality 
(investigative stories or revelations) of a saga. These informants have led me to their editors 
and colleagues and thus provided me with informants with different functions and 
responsibilities within the media houses. Other sources led me to informants representing 
specific knowledge or experiences on particular issues brought up. 
The selection of informants is based on the main approach, namely following the flow 
of information on corruption where significance is more relevant than representativity. My 
qualitative approach in search of premises for information flow has therefore led me to 
investigative journalists, who are overrepresented among the informants. The selection of 
these informants is based on the quality of experience they represent. The informants do not 
represent all the desks involved in journalism on corruption and the research findings do not 
represent the media houses’ general news production process and routines. Thus, concluding 
that Kenyan journalism is mainly investigative would be committing an error. In this context 
these journalists and their production represent certain qualities or (investigative) aspects that 
are fruitful to analyse in order to understand back region journalism on corruption.  
Semi structured interview approach 
The qualitative interview as a method seeks the informants own understanding of the reality. 
As a researcher it is important to prepare the field work in a way that will unfold this reality, 
instead of confirming ones own prejudices. Flexible and semi structured interviews are 
valuable when you want to look into and understand the informants, their working space and 
how they understand their role. One tool for the interviewer in this regard is interview guides. 
The guides served as a starting point for the interviews (see appendix 5 for an example). The 
guides were to a large degree individualised. I found this necessary in order to include the 
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relevant topics depending on the informant’s position and articles the informant had produced. 
The latter provided me with individualised references which sometimes served as entry points 
to their world of reporting. The purpose was to enable informants to relate to a concrete task 
they had performed. As Ericson et al (1989: 29) point out, discussion on specific matters the 
interviewee has been involved in, rather than ‘questions about concepts and processes in the 
abstract’ is to be preferred. Giving attention to their individual work possibly made the 
informants motivated for further revelations on the subject.  
Journalists were asked how their articles were initiated, what premised their access to 
corruption information, and about source communication tactics. They were also asked about 
working methods, routines and ethics. Many interviews focused on how their ‘journalistic 
space’ was configured: what they see as opportunities and constraints to their work and 
whether they have experienced any changes in the space for reporting on corruption during 
the past five years (2001-2005). As new information, angles and premises were brought up, 
the guides and interviews shifted attention, letting the informants co-determine the issues to 
be discussed. Some of the interviews also discussed the quantitative content data (see chapter 
5) on media reports on corruption. Thus, the interviews have not consisted of a fixed set of 
questions but evolved and changed during my explorations while in Nairobi. The flexibility is 
one of the strengths of the semi structured interview technique (Østbye et al, 2002: 102). Thus 
interview guides have served merely as a reference points to be revisited during the 
interviews.  
Ethics and transcription  
The informants were informed about the scope of the research, its methodology and how the 
information gathered would be used. Media practitioners were told that their names would 
appear in an appendix and that quotes would not be attributed to their names. Non-media 
practitioners were not given this opportunity i.e. they are quoted under their names in the text. 
Thus, informants’ decisions to participate were informed decisions (Kvale, 1999: 67). Some 
informants gave conditions. One former state bureaucrat requested me not to use his name or 
the name of his office in the text or in the appendix. Two informants (one media practitioner 
and one non-media practitioner) did not want the conversation to be tape-recorded. Three 
media practitioners requested me to turn off the tape recorder during sequences of the 
interviews. Quotes/citations from these sources are based on notes taken during the 
interviews.  
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The transcriptions made from the interviews provide thorough and informative 
accounts of the conversations. They include representations of interruptions (by telephone 
calls, waiters etc.) laughter, halting speech, and pauses. I believe a thorough transcription is 
valuable in order to enable a valid analysis of the information when this is undertaken weeks 
and months after the interviews. However, the representations of speech in this thesis are 
slightly edited versions of transcribed speech, as I conceive stumbling on words, coughing, 
and telephone interruptions i.e. as being of little value and rather destructive for the action of 
reading. The ‘raw’ transcription is therefore edited for the purpose of clarity and reader 
friendliness. At the same time I try to represent speech as spoken and have upheld incorrect 
grammar and other language errors in the conversations. Codes guiding the representation of 
speech in this study are found in Appendix 2.  
Document analysis 
A third source of information is documents. Various documents were gathered prior to, 
during, and following fieldwork in Nairobi. These include the code of conduct issued by the 
Media Council of Kenya, journalistic guidelines issued by NMG, annual reports from both the 
STG and NMG and selected laws issued by the Government of Kenya.  
Media content is also used for the purpose of illustrating or contrasting arguments 
made. The thesis does not contain separate qualitative content analyses, but uses articles from 
different sagas eclectic in order to illustrate certain points. One of the cases is prominent and 
is given the most attention: The Anglo Leasing scandal is a saga containing hundreds of news 
items, commentaries and editorials. Different aspects of this case have been reignited on many 
occasions since April 2004, with series of articles to follow. 
Analysis and validity 
Ericson et al underline the importance of keeping different data separate in order to avoid 
confusion between ‘seeing is believing’ and ‘believing is seeing’ (1987: 78). It is important to 
underline that it is difficult to draw causal deductions on content from the news production 
process or from process to news content. When undertaking analysis for this thesis I have 
tried to separate cognitive knowledge and evaluating statements or interpretations of events. 
This line is not easy to draw. Indeed it is fluid. However, as Ericson et al accentuates, ‘the fact 
of having been in the world under study to obtain detailed background knowledge, and the 
derivation of different types of data through different methods to be compared and contrasted 
with one another, is the best guarantee of veracity and accuracy’ (1987: 78). However, the 
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quantitative content data informs the qualitative data and vice versa. The employment of 
different methods aspires to what ethnographers as Ryle and Geertz term ‘thick description’ 
(Geertz, 1973: 7).  
Limitation to the topical, media-centric approach 
There are some limitations to the approach applied. The thematic approach leaves out 
important players in the process of news production. Traditionally ethnography on news 
production aims to map social relations in the newsroom (see Ericson et al 1987). Ericson et 
al also suggest that each news beat must be investigated empirically in order to fully 
understand beatbound news (1989). When journalists police corruption issues, it involves 
many different news beats: the Parliament as legislators and as monitors of Government 
performance; the Government as an executive authority allocating human and financial 
resources; the police investigating crime; and the Judiciary among others.  
My approach is narrow at first, as I am primarily interested in the back region 
journalism on corruption and only map social relations as these are relevant to the 
construction or obstruction of news on corruption in context of Government institutions. 
Second, being media-centric implies as Schlesinger (1990) and Ericson et al (1989) note, that 
I leave the strategic acts of sources to be mediated through the verbal representations of 
journalists. There are pragmatic reasons for these choices. First, handling many institutional 
contexts of negotiations would have breached the format of this thesis. Second, as I 
experienced how difficult it was for the former bureaucrat employees to discuss whistle-
blowing (as it is a violation of the Official Secrets Act) I decided to concentrate my efforts on 
journalist informants. Anyhow, the knowledge gained on journalism neither represents the 
beat reporter, the stringer nor the strategic sources of journalism. However, recognizing these 
limitations I believe my approach also has valuable gains as the back door journalism is 
accentuated. Thus we might be able to see certain features of Kenyan journalism which a 
broader beat oriented approach would overlook. 
Limitations to tools applied 
Ericson et al see observation newsroom ethnography as valuable and that there are limitations 
to the use of interviews as a tool. The way an organisation and its representatives portray 
themselves in interviews are not necessarily their actual behaviour (1989: 26). The Canadian 
researchers (1987) also point at journalists’ lack of articulate consciousness when describing 
choices and selection made. They underline that the ‘web of social relations’ is best mapped 
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by direct observation by the researcher (1989: 25). According to Gans journalists actions can 
sometimes also be unconscious. Journalists may not be aware that they are practicing ‘self 
censorship’ as a response to pressure (1980: 251).  
There are limitations to my approach as news beat or in house observation is not 
employed as a tool. However, sometimes not all tools are viable options due to constraints. 
Access to the newsroom is necessary in order to undertake observation. If formal access is 
denied you risk loosing informal access to valuable informants along the way. Corruption is a 
sensitive issue and a contested area for journalism in Kenya. Journalists use secret sources in 
order to enable themselves to report on corruption issues, and the interaction between 
journalist and source interaction is thus not a public phenomena. Taking these considerations 
into account I did not see observation as an available tool when undertaking research.  
Another limitation to my approach is in part a consequence of my emphasis on 
journalists’ external relations when undertaking the research. The social organisation of news 
work is given relatively less emphasis in the thesis (for example journalist/editor negotiations 
on assignments and angles and how human resources are organised internally in the news 
organisation).  
Do the limitations of the approach and methods employed hamper valid analyses? No, 
not necessarily. While acknowledging that there are other aspects of news production that 
deserve attention, the knowledge gained should still be valid as long as the boundaries of 
research and the limitations of the research methods employed are understood and observed. 
Being aware of the limitations of the scope of my inquiry and knowledge, is valuable and 
might help to avoid the pitfalls of making invalid conclusions. This is done consciously in the 
following chapters.  
The process of analysis 
When undertaking interviews I made efforts in listening and following the reasoning of the 
informants. Steinar Kvale (1999) discusses the use of leading questions. Leading questions as 
opposed to open questions were also used in order to secure valid data, ensuring that my 
understanding corresponded with the respondents’ statements. Kvale also underlines the 
importance of asking leading questions for the purpose of confirming the validity of ones 
interpretation and the reliability of the informant (1999: 97). One example is the discussion on 
the heavy fines following conviction of defamation: 
A: What happened at that time, the media was very critical at judges and the Judiciary 
at that time. So I think we made enemies with the Judiciary. So, [that is] the reason 
why the judges put heavy fines on the media on matters of libel.  
 32
Q: So you think it is a kind of revenge? 
A: Yes, that is my view.  
Gaining knowledge of how journalists experience their role and autonomy when reporting on 
corruption was one of my purposes with the interviews. However, my experience from this 
exercise is that you do not always get the most valuable information when you ask directly. 
When undertaking qualitative interviews the researcher risks receiving conventional answers 
and stereotypes (Repstad, 1993: 14). The terminology commonly used when discussing 
journalism as ‘autonomy’ and ‘the role of the media’ often generated textbook answers rather 
than genuine reflections on the issue. For example, when I asked informants how they see the 
role of the media in Kenya with regard to corruption I sometimes got more programmatic than 
reflexive answers: ‘The medias role is very clear: it is to inform, to entertain, and to educate’. 
From this I learned that different approaches to the topics, including different ways of asking, 
are necessary in order to go beyond and challenge conventional wisdom.  
Gans (1980) emphasises empirical and definitional problems when studying external 
pressures: ‘Surrender to pressure is viewed as an act of cowardice and a sign of 
powerlessness, and those who must surrender are loath to discuss it’ (ibid: 251). I also 
experienced this. Surrendering to pressure, causing a libel suit being filed against your 
employer, and being censured by superiors are not experiences easily shared. It can be 
discussed in general, but hardly acknowledged when discussing personal experiences. In 
respect of the informants, I was cautious when experiencing hesitation. However, this colours 
the interviews and must be observed. Establishing this fact through complementary use of 
knowledge was thus important for the quality of the analysis.  
As a researcher one does not always know where to draw the limit of close 
questioning, I experienced. The issue of ethnicity was for example difficult to approach. One 
informant felt offended by one of my questions as he felt his professional integrity was 
questioned. 
Q: I am told that ethnicity also has an impact on journalism and journalism on 
corruption. How does it work? 
A: Ethnicity… It is a very tough question. It is too complex… [researcher interrupts] 
Q: I know it is complex but is it possible to… [informant interrupts] 
A: I don’t know but… I don’t know what you mean by ethnicity has a role to play in 
investigative journalism… what I believe… (…) Whether I am from this group or the 
other ethnic group. You can’t change it. You don’t take it away from me. It is my 
talent (…) to look out for things.  
These are risks one faces and I guess as journalists impose self censorship when dealing with 
difficult issues so does a social researcher. As a researcher you do not want to offend the 
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informants who voluntarily participate in your research. As such you might put some 
restriction on your enquiries (deliberate or not). However, lack of familiarity with local 
cultural codex’s and being a non-Kenyan might also have been an asset for me as a researcher 
in Kenya. It is reasonable to speculate whether for example a Luo researcher successfully can 
ask detailed questions about source relations of a Kikuyu journalist or vice versa. Being an 
ethnic Norwegian my questions might not provide for the suspicion of a factional agenda as I 
believe native Kenyan might would experience. 
Fieldwork  
The fieldwork was undertaken between 15th of September and 30th of November 2005 in 
Nairobi. 25 interviews were conducted: 16 journalists and editors, two parliamentarians, one 
former civil servant, one professor, and three persons representing the journalist union and the 
Media Council. 
Ideally interviews should be undertaken in neutral places where the informant can 
relax and feel comfortable. If interviews are undertaken in the informants working 
environment, telephone calls and other interruptions might disrupt the interview (Østbye et al, 
2002). I had to give pragmatic considerations when choosing locations for interviews. 
Journalists in Kenya are working long hours and many found it difficult to leave their office 
to meet me. Several interviews were thus undertaken in offices of the Standard and the 
Nation. Others were conducted in quiet cafes in downtown Nairobi.  
Most requests for interviews were accepted. One constraint, however, was informants 
who did not show up to appointments. Media practitioners are busy and often have to change 
their time schedule due to new assignments. Another issue that occasionally was brought up 
by some informants was ‘financial issues’, or ‘consultancy fees’. I experienced these requests 
brought up once as a premise for the participation in an interview, once it was brought up 
during the interview, and once after the interview via sms. Only journalists made these 
requests. No editors or non-media practitioners made such financial demands in return for 
their participation. One of the informants redefined his role from being an informant to a 
research assistant (see appendix 3 for full account of the email exchange):  
Sorry for the dealy in replying. I’ve been out of the office covering referendum 
campaigns. Now, to do what you want me to, I suppose there is a financial 
consideration. Since I would be working as your research assistant. 
Once tha is settled, we shall proceed. 
I experienced these requests as foreign and to some extent problematic, especially during the 
first part of my field research as I was worried I would not be able to conduct my interviews 
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with the possible informants. However ‘financial issues’ are also a feature of journalism that 
could be interesting to explore more in depth. When taking into consideration that the 
informants daily follow codes of conduct in their working life quite similar to that of a 
researcher, and that journalists are reporting on corruption on a regular basis, this is an 
interesting phenomenon. As I proceeded with interviews I also learned that paying for 
information is not something that media practitioners are unfamiliar with. More importantly 
the credibility of bought information is not necessarily hampered, according to the perception 
of one informant:  
If you get somebody who you pay to get the information, most likely you wouldn’t 
have an agenda, or his agenda is just the money. But when they come to you freely 
you want to push him: ‘Why now?’  
However, none of these requests were met.12 As a result of my position on the issue I might 
have lost valuable informants. Another loss is the hampered opportunity to investigate the 
rationality that makes such requests legitimate in the local context.  
Summary and comments 
Chapter 3 introduces the object of analysis, discusses the methods used, limitations to the 
research tools applied, how research is conducted, and considerations on validity of empirical 
data. The thesis is a case study of journalism on corruption of the mainstream press from 2001 
till 2005. The Kenyan newspaper dailies the Nation and the Standard is in this thesis termed 
the mainstream press. The findings are valid as they relate to this construction and not to the 
particular newspapers unless it is explicitly stated. 
The main research methods used are firstly, quantitative content analysis bringing data 
on the extent of and changes in public distribution of knowledge on corruption in Kenya from 
2001 till 2005. Secondly, qualitative interviews are undertaken in order to analyse news 
production on corruption and how social and cultural changes premise news production. The 
field work was undertaken in the period of September to November 2005.  
                                                 
12 Travel expenses for one of the informants who met me out of working hours were once paid. Likewise was 
food or drinks for informants when meeting formally or informally put on the researcher’s bill. 
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4. Ownership and control in the Kenyan press 
Maybe nobody in the press should be expected to be a crusader. This is a business. It 
is not a philantropic sort of outfit. 
Koigi wa Wamwere, MP Subukia constituency 
In order to understand journalism on corruption we need to understand contexts in which it is 
constructed. The political and economic environment of the news media shape journalism on 
corruption in Kenya. The issue of corruption in Kenya and institutional changes with regard to 
fighting it is presented briefly based on fieldwork experiences and reports on corruption and 
politics in Kenya. Second, regulatory frameworks for media reports on corruption is 
presented. This is based on documents and data provided by the Nation Media Group. Third, I 
analyse media-state relations and the issue of ownership interests with regard to corruption 
disclosure. My approach is partly based on annual reports, news, other documents and 
interviews with media practitioners and non-practitioners. This chapter is not an attempt to 
construct a history of Kenyan media.13 Neither is it an attempt to understand politics and 
corruption in depth.14 Indeed, these issues deserve more in depth analysis than possible in this 
format. Nevertheless, below is a brief account of certain aspects of both in order to illuminate 
the case studied; namely news production on corruption from 2001 till 2005. 
Politics and corruption in Kanu Kenya 
Patronage politics including nepotism, tribalism, and corruption has been the hallmark of 
Kenyan politics since independence in 1963, according to Chweya (2005). The rampant 
corruption was not just due to failed policies. The Kanu Governments following independence 
used corruption as a survival strategy as they had ‘vested interests in the malpractice’. The 
party used it as a means to distribute political patronage. Chweya describes the role of 
corruption for Government practices this way:  
The Government (the state) focused on distributing patronage, including allocations of 
opportunities to engage in corruption as for gain in exchange for loyalty. 
Opportunities for corruption became a resource that the political regime “offered” 
clients in return for loyalty and political support. Corrupt officials and businessmen 
characteristically gave a part of their ill-gotten wealth and resources to their 
                                                 
13 For media history in Kenya see Abuoga and Mutere (1988). Bourgault (1995) and Wilcox (1975) provide 
useful insights into media issues in sub-Saharan Africa. Hydén, Leslie, and Ogundimu (eds.) (2002) provide a 
compilation of articles on media and democracy in Africa.  
14 For explorations into the play of Kenyan politics Throup and Hornsby (1998) might provide a starting point. 
Andreassen (2004) discuss multiethnic politics in the Kenyan context. Haugerud (1995) explores micro-contexts 
of politics. Chabal and Daloz (1999 and 2006) provide interesting discussions on the concept and meaning of 
corruption. For a legal and political discussion of the issue in a Kenyan context see for example Sihanya (ed. 
2005).  
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“godfathers” – public servants, especially politicians – ostensibly as a contribution to 
one harambee15 project or another. In addition, the Government irregularly allocated 
public resources to regime supporters, including civil servants and ultimately 
produced a formally sanctioned and executed kind of corruption (2005: 13) 
Kanu had held on to power by ‘virtue of an intricate patronage system financed by the 
proceeds of official corruption’ (Kantai, 2005: 170). Wamwere has described how President 
Moi used cash to improve loyalty among parliamentarians, and how corruption was the very 
fundament of the harambees in Kenya in the 1980’s (1989: 94-5). Corruption did not end with 
the one party state. The biggest scandal yet in Kenya, the Goldenberg scandal, was executed 
in the 1990’s. The Kenyan Government gave subsidies to gold exports paying exporters, in 
Ksh, 35 per cent over their foreign currency earnings. It is held that the Goldenberg scandal 
cost Kenya the equivalent of 10 per cent of the country’s annual GDP. The scandal allegedly 
implicated ministers in the Moi Government, for the purpose of securing finances for Kanu 
election campaigns in 2002 (Mutua, 17.06.2000). Thus some hold that with multipartyism 
new needs for financial resources were introduced as political parties need funds to drum up 
support at rallies around Kenya. Holmquist (2002) asks whether corruption has increased after 
the introduction of multiparty politics. 
President Moi did promise to tackle corruption as he became President in 1978. He 
established a commission to make recommendations, but failed to implement them (Chweya, 
1978: 12). Likewise during the 1990’s anti-corruption reforms were a ‘back-and-forth affair’ 
(ibid: 17).  
If we accept this description of Kanu Kenya, then corruption is more than the deviant 
behaviour of individuals. In post-independence Kenya corruption became a way to secure 
political support, to grant Government contracts, and to distribute welfare.  
Anti corruption efforts and conflicts in Narc Kenya 
When Narc came to power in December 200216 the coalition ended 24 years of Moi 
Presidency and almost 40 year of Kanu rule. As President Kibaki promised war on corruption 
there was also an expectation that corruption would end. Sihania (ed. 2005) for example hold 
that Narc’s election victory was due to its anti-corruption platform.  
The Narc cabinet seemed to act rapidly on graft and institutionalise the fight against 
corruption. A former voice of opposition in civil society and anti-corruption activist, John 
Githongo, became Permanent Secretary (PS) for Ethics and Governance, the President’s 
                                                 
15 Self help projects 
16 See Anderson (2003) or Throup (2003) for details on elections and transition.  
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special adviser on corruption, in January 2003. In February 2003 President Kibaki recalled 
Parliament early to pass two new acts: the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act and the 
Public Officer Ethics Act. The first provides a code of conduct for public officers and makes 
it a requirement to declare their assets and wealth.17 The latter paved the way for establishing 
an independent anti-corruption body that is constitutionally protected. The Act was passed by 
Parliament in May 2003 and several bodies are since established: Kenya Anti-Corruption 
Commission (KACC), an investigating body for economic crime; The Public Complaints 
Office, an Ombudsman’s office; The Public Service Integrity Programme aimed at 
establishing anti-corruption prevention plans within every public institution; the National 
Anti-Corruption Steering Committee established to launch a country-wide anti-corruption 
campaign; and the Kenya National Human Rights Commission (KNHCR), that was given the 
mandate to check on Kenya’s compliance with international human rights standards. Kenya 
ratified the UN Convention against corruption on 9 December 2003 (UNODC, 2005). 
The Narc Government also launched new tribunals and commissions to look into 
allegation of economic crimes from the past. In February 2003 the Narc Government 
established a commission with the mandate to investigate the Ksh 22 billion ($275 million) 
Goldenberg scandal (Throup, 2003: 8). In 2003 the anti-corruption authority found evidence 
of corruption among five of nine Court of Appeal judges. The body also found misconduct 
among 18 of 36 High Court judges and 82 of 254 magistrates. Following a commissioned 
report on corruption in the Judiciary, one-half of Kenya’s senior judges were suspended over 
allegations of corruption and investigative tribunals were established. Analysts acknowledged 
the new regime’s effort to handle corruption. Throup for example holds that ‘the Government 
has moved swiftly to remove the worst offenders left over from the Moi regime and to clamp 
down on corruption’ (2003: 10).  
The Narc coalition was however ridden by internal conflicts. These conflicts started 
almost immediately after it took office as the President was accused of ignoring the 
memorandum of understanding between the coalition parties when composing his cabinet. 
This issue found its climax as a proposed new constitution was given to the people to decide 
on in a referendum held in November 2005. The issue split the Government in two, one 
supporting the proposed new constitution and one rejecting it. Both camps tried to drum up 
support for their view at rallies around the country and in TV debates. For months the cabinet 
didn’t meet and the Parliament suspended its work so that the MPs could take part in 
                                                 
17 No government official has been prosecuted in connection with the legislation, according to Kantai (2005). 
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campaigning. The Narc Government ended in December 200518 as the President dismissed 
the whole cabinet following the Kenyan people’s rejection of the proposed new constitution.  
                                                
Regulatory contexts for journalism on corruption 
The Kenyan constitution provides for freedom of expression and freedom from interference 
with correspondence.19 Journalism on corruption is sensitive. It touches on the very fine lines 
of what is protected by freedom of expression and exceptions to this freedom. In Kenya there 
are about 14 Acts which have implications for media (Barland, 2005: 88).  
The Media Bill20 regulates the media scene in Kenya as it sets an entry cost for any 
new outlet. The Bill, approved by Parliament on 8 May 2002 (IPI, 2003), demands that 
publishers purchase a US $12,800 bond before printing and publishing. Journalists access to 
information from Government offices to the public is for example regulated by the 1970 
Official Secrets Act (OSA). Forwarding, obtaining or receiving information is an offence 
under the Act (Makali (ed), 2003). This means that Government information and Government 
documents are not freely accessible for journalistic inquiry. A journalist can not claim any 
legal rights when he pursues information from Government institutions.  
There are several laws in Kenya that impacts on publishing practices, for example the 
interest of public health, public order, public safety, public morality, the interest of courts, and 
state interests as national security. (Makali (ed), 2003). Some are more important than others 
for the publishing of corruption news. The purpose of the defamation act is to compensate 
individuals whose reputation has been injured (ibid: 105). A new Defamation Act was passed 
in 1992 that seemed to be designed to protect politicians against the press, according to 
Barland (2005: 87). The rewards following defamation convictions increased substantially. 
The penal code can also be used in defamation. The interests of justice also frame media 
publishing as the court can restrain the media from publish a particular article. Not obeying to 
a court order of injunction is a contempt of court (Makali (ed), 2003: 110).  
Libel suits have become a common part of everyday life for Kenyan journalists. 
During the first eight months of 2005 the NMG received 28 suits for defamation. 11 of these 
were filed as responses to different reports on corruption. The number of libel suits against 
 
18 Some hold it ended in 2004 as the President included members of the opposition in the cabinet. 
19 ‘Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in any enjoyment of his freedom of expression, that 
is to say, freedom to hold opinions without interference, freedom to receive ideas, and information without 
interference, freedom to communicate ideas and information without interference (whether the communication 
be to the public generally or to any person or class of persons) and freedom from interference with his 
correspondence’ - Section 79 of the Constitution of Kenya (quoted in Ogbondah, 2002: 58).  
20 Also termed the Books and Newspapers Act 
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NMG has according to an informant increased since 1999. It reached a peak in 2003 before it 














































Number of new libel suits filed 
2001 – 2005 against Nation 
Media Group. The numbers 
from 2001 and 2002 are 
minimum numbers as some 
cases have been settled since 
and are thus removed from the 
Nation files. The NMG’s legal 
officer estimates that the actual 
numbers of new cases in 2001 
and 2002 can be 20 percent 
higher. The 2005 numbers 
includes the first 9 months only. 
Libel suits following corruption 
news is measured for the years 
2003-2005 only. 
 
Of the 29 new cases filed in 2005, 11 were filed following news reports on corruption. 
Complainant can sue anybody who publishes the story: It could be the reporter, the media 
house or it could be the vendor, the distributor. However, according to an informant ‘lawyers 
tend to cut short the process and just go for who they believe can pay and in this case you go 
for the publisher, the employer.’ 
From the libel suit is filed to the court hearing takes place it takes about one and a half 
year. Less than ten percent of the libel cases are settled outside the courtroom according to 
estimates made by Nation Media Group. Of the cases settled in court the NMG loses 
approximately 25 percent of cases, according to a Nation informant. The awards granted by 
the courts have risen significantly during the 199’0s and the 2000’s. One informant sees a 
court decision from 1999 as a turning point regarding the impact of libel suits. According to 
the verdict in the so-called ‘twin Biwott case’21 of 1999 former politician and businessman 
Nicholas Biwott was rewarded Ksh 30,000,000. The court decision set a new standard for 
awards given in libel cases. In a similar cases in 199222  and the award granted was Ksh 
1,500,000. In yet another one in 199723  the award was set to Ksh 3,500,000. The three court 
decisions has in common that they concern the political elite or high ranking civil servants or 
                                                 
21 Civil appeal No 314 of 2000, Nicholas Biwott vs. Clays Ltd & another and Nicolas Biwott vs Dr. Ian West 
and another (HCCC No. 41068 of 1999). 
22 HCCC No. 85, (ref Civil appeal No 314 of 2000).   
23 HCCC No. 42 of 1997 (ref Civil appeal No 314 of 2000) 
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advocates and that the publications condemned is what Kenyans generally refer to as the 
alternative press.  
‘The courts got crazy’, according to one informant commenting on the Ksh30m award 
that was granted in the twin Biwott cases. He saw the increase as an incentive for individuals 
who use the opportunity of filing libel suits as a way of benefiting financially on this practice: 
‘It was an incentive to sue the media’. The court decision thus might be an incentive to 
corruption in the Judiciary. ‘A lawyer can make an arrangement with the judge and say “if I 
claim 20 million Ksh, you get 10”’, according to the informant holding that ‘the financial 
argument became important’ as the awards increased.24  
You may find that one publication is fined three times more than another publication 
that publish the same story. The damage may not be exactly the same. The Nation 
may be fined 10 million Ksh and the Standard suffers 1 million Ksh. damages for the 
same story, for reasons known only to that magistrate. The issue of the interpretation 
of the law is a bit of a problem.  
As one informant held the libel awards now granted are so huge that it becomes a highly 
profitable business, also for the judges. The financial strength of each media house provides 
the framework for awards granted, it is claimed. This has implications for competition 
between the different news outlets. When the Nation avoids certain stories it creates 
opportunities for its competitors as the Standard or the People, according to an informant.  
The number of corruption cases is partly explained as attempts to earn easy money. It 
is commonly held among media practitioners that lawyers read papers carefully in order to 
find potential clients as they find possible defamations in news items. However, as Barth 
(16.01.2005) indicates it is pertinent to ask whether libel suits is a new method to control the 
press and avoid public scrutiny and negative publicity. As will be shown in chapter 6 the high 
level of libel suits have influenced routine practices with regard to news production on 
corruption.  
Ownership and patronage in Kenyan media 
In the 1980’s during President Moi’s dictatorial rule President Moi used the state apparatus to 
cow the media through arrests, detention, the outlawing of publications (Kiarie, 2004) and 
even torture (Faringer,1991). Mak’Ochieng (1993 and 1996) documents how the mainstream 
press gave space to a ‘wider spectrum of political and other opinions’ (1996: 31). Throup and 
                                                 
24 The NMG legal officer expressed hope that an appeal court decision (Civil appeal No 314 of 2000 14th of 
October 2005) might stall the inflation of libel suits and awards.  
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Hornsby likewise uphold the democratic role of the mainstream media in the election 
processes of 1992 and 1997 (1998). Moreover, since the introduction of multypartyism news 
outlets have mushroomed (Karanja, 2000). If you walk the streets of downtown Nairobi you 
will be amazed by the huge flora of publications sold by vendors on the streets, and if you 
turn on the TV there are fairly many options to choose from: Kenya Broadcasting Corporation 
(KBC), Nation TV (NTV), Citizen TV and Kenya Television Network (KTN). The media 
scene in Kenya is diverse, but with a few exceptions dominated by political players.  
Political influence of the alternative press and the broadcast media 
Most Kenyans rely on the broadcast media, particularly radio, for news. The state owned and 
politically controlled public broadcaster KBC was until the 1990’s the only media option for 
most Kenyans. KBC operates under the Parastatals Act that provides the TV station with 
some autonomy – ‘primarily limited to generating revenue’ (Okello, 2000: 82). The main 
sources of revenue are ads, casual and funeral announcements, sale of radio permits and hire 
of equipment.  Moi liberalised the airwaves in the 1990’s and thus ending the monopoly of the 
Kanu controlled KBC. Until recently the liberalisation of broadcasting had a limited impact 
outside Nairobi but some private radio and TV networks now have wide coverage of much of 
the country. According to Okello issuing of frequencies following the liberalisation of the 
airwaves ‘has been based on an ad hoc basis with licences apparently being given to 
organisation which the President and the ruling party Kanu are believed to have controlled 
through manipulations’ (Okello, 2000: 78). The granting of broadcasting licences to the Royal 
Media in 1997 might serve as an example. Royal Media is owned by the former politician 
Samuel K. Macharia, and was granted a broadcast licence by the Moi Government in 
exchange for political support (Okello, 2000; Kiarie, 2004; Barland, 2005: 93). The 
relationship with the former President cooled down, however, and in the 2002 election, 
Citizen’s radio and TV channels supported Kibaki. After the Kibaki victory Royal Media has 
obtained new licences and launched at least five new FM stations. ‘He is regarded as close to 
Kibaki’s Government’ (Barland, 2005: 93). Royal Media operates Citizen FM, Citizen TV 
and several other minor radio stations and is maybe the biggest player in electronic media. 
Royal Media reach potentially 70 per cent of all Kenyans through their various media, a big 
number in Kenyan media context (Kiarie, 2004). 
Since the introduction of multypartyism a lot of informal publications have been 
established (Throup and Hornsby, 1998: 364). This part of the Kenyan press is often termed 
‘the yellow press,’ ‘the gutter press’, or more respectfully ‘the alternative press’. These are 
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privately owned but they are not emancipated from politics. It is generally held that some 
politicians own their own news outlets that can be bought on the streets of Nairobi. It is 
difficult to ascertain ownership, however. Some of these publications were assumed 
sponsored by politicians connected to Moi prior to the election in 2002 (Kantai, 2005: 170). 
Today some informants are more concerned about alleged ownership dominance of politicians 
loyal to the sitting President. The alternative press regularly cries out sensational stories on 
their front pages seldom to the advantage to characters given their attention. It is commonly 
believed that articles printed are to a large extent paid for by persons external to the media or 
used strategically by the owner to paint a black picture of political enemies. 
A: The alternative press is more often than not owned by politicians, and Government 
ministers. (…) They have their own researchers. (…) Now, when they get information 
on you and they know it is damaging to you, he comes to you.  
Q: So they use this information for blackmailing?  
A: Yes, more often not it is used for blackmailing. What you see in the alternative 
press is either what they have been paid for to write or what they were not paid for.  
Whereas the mainstream press operates within the law of the media bill, the alternative press 
does not. According to informants they do not operate with a physical address and a publisher. 
Hence, they are difficult to sue. The alternative press does not seem to enjoy respect neither 
from advertisers nor political players. Advertisers seem to avoid the alternative press probably 
because of lack of legitimacy.  
The mainstream media 
What is a large middle class in an African perspective provides Kenyan media with a base for 
advertising revenue. Thus, Kenya enjoys more diverse media than many other African 
countries. If you look behind the flora of outlets only a few players seem to dominate the 
media market in Kenya. Two major media houses, the NMG and the STG dominate the media 
market today, especially in publishing. NMG and STG have in common that they are owned 
by private and foreign ownership generating income through advertisements and copies sold, 
and are relatively less constrained by political ownership than other media.  
Both the NMG and the STG run various electronic media and newspapers. The 
flagship of the NMG is the Nation and this might have as much as three quarters of the 
Kenyan newspaper market. The paper was launched in 1958 as Taifa and the following year 
Aga Khan bought the majority share in the newspaper (Abuoga and Mutere, 1988: 23). The 
English-language daily grew and soon became the largest daily newspaper in Kenya in terms 
of circulation (Mak‘Ochieng, 1993: 92), and has remained so today with a circulation of 
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approximately 150 000 till 200 000 copies. NMG also runs the weekly EastAfrican and Taifa 
Leo. The latter is the only daily Kiswahili newspaper in the country. NMG has a considerable 
interest in broadcasting, operating the Nairobi based Nation TV, licensed in 1998 (Okello, 
2000) and Nation FM relays in Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Eldoret and other cities. NMG 
has a substantial market share in the newspaper market not only in Kenya but also in the 
Uganda and Tanzania. The biggest shareholder in NMG is the Aga Khan, controlling 44.7 per 
cent of the shares (NMG 2005: 42).  
STG publishes the Standard which is the oldest newspaper in Kenya, and the second 
biggest in terms of circulation (app. 75 000). Started in 1902 by an Indian merchant it was 
controlled by European settlers throughout the colonial rule in Kenya (Abuoga and Mutere, 
1988). The biggest shareholder in the STG today is S.N.G Holdings Limited (STG, 2005: 6). 
However, the Group was until the elections in 2002 controlled by the Moi family and then 
sold to foreign enterprises. STG today also operates the TV-station KTN. The licence of KTN 
was originally granted to Kanu in 1989. After a transfer of ownership to the late Robert 
Maxwell did not work out it was sold to East African Standard in 1998, and then transferred 
to the Lonhro subsidiary Baraza Limited (Okello, 2000: 86). Today KTN is run by STG.  
Commercial and political interests in the mainstream press 
Even if the middle class is big in an African context, the business sector in Kenya is relatively 
small, as Ogundimo (2002) notices. This means that the mainstream press competes for the 
same advertising shillings (2002: 225). A huge portion of the advertising revenue of the 
Kenyan press comes from Government departments or parastatals. In the Standard 20 or 30 
percent of revenue are Governmental or semi-Governmental institutions.25 It is held that the 
Nation on the other hand has a broader advertisement base than the Standard.   
Other issues are cross-sector economic interests and indeed also political interests of 
media ownership regardless of declared independence from the state. According to Gecau 
(1996) the owner of the NMG, the Aga Khan, and the former owner of the Standard, Lonhro 
have financial interests besides being media owners. Aga Khan, the leader of the Ismaili 
Muslim sect, has apart from his media enterprise ownership interests in many sectors of the 
Kenyan society: schools, hospitals and hotels. As Gans (1980) holds such interests might 
impact on editorial decisions as journalists are less likely to report critically on the interest of 
the employer. According to Barland the Aga Khan seldom intervene in editorial decisions. It 
                                                 
25 The number is an estimate based on the account of different informants. One informant claimed it was more 
then 60 percent. 
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has however occurred in matters concerning religion (Ochieng 1992: 60-61; Odero, 2000: 13; 
Barland, 2005: 109). Even if the media in Kenya operate in a free market the press nurtures 
close relations with the Government (Gecau, 1996: 203). Indeed it is also held that the Aga 
Khan ‘influence politics in Kenya by media and networking’ in order to ensure good 
conditions for his business’ (Barland, 2005: 91). Lohnro cooperated closely with the Moi 
regime. Gecau states that Lonhro used to appoint a local chairman from the relatives of then 
President Moi, that editors were ‘carefully selected’ and that ‘the top jobs in the press are 
often a compromise between the owners and the President’ (1996: 203-4). According to one 
informant there were certain things the Standard could not take a position on when Moi was 
President. Throup and Hornsby for example hold that Lonhro struggled with editors to keep 
the editorial line in the Standard in favour of Kanu and then President Moi prior to the 2002 
election (1998: 364). It is generally held that Moi today has political interests in owning the 
Standard.  
New Government, new roles 
When Kenya changed Government in 2002 the role of the Nation and the Standard changed. 
The Nation became supportive of the new President and changed position on certain issues, 
for instance on principal issues such as the power of the President, according to informants. 
The Standard also changed its role to become an oppositional newspaper. ‘They gave us 
freedom. We had a free hand to run the paper’ according to former editor David Makali. The 
paper was given increased editorial freedom by its ownership after the change of Government 
in 2002.  
However, it is thus difficult to hold that one paper or the other supported the Narc 
Government or the opposition because the opposition was very much a part of the 
Government itself, as shown above. It is however generally held that the Nation supported the 
camp of President Kibaki up to the referendum in November 2005 and that the Standard 
supports Kanu and Moi interests in the country.  
Corruption stories, ownership and media competition 
The role of the papers with regard to disclosing corruption is however not very different, 
according to various informants. From the accounts of informants the commercial aspect 
seems today more important than the political interests of the media owners. As MP Maoka 
Maore sees it, ‘if a media house, if an editorial management is able to pick a story, it does not 
matter who it is. I can assure you they will actually expose it.’ Corruption revelations impact 
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on the day to day circulation of the papers. As one of the informants put it ‘corruption sells. 
Everybody wants to put it on page one.’ Tiffen underlines that the commercial interests of a 
media enterprise informs news selection (1989). According to an informant the bigger picture 
is swallowed up by minor things which are important to the ruling class, more than to the 
general public.’As the Nation addresses the buying and reading middle class what might be 
considered the public interest in this regard is narrow. Whereas more than 30 million people 
live in Kenya the circulation of the Nation is approximately 200 000.26 The informant told me 
to look at the ownership of the paper: ‘you need to think about ownership of media houses. 
They always remind us that the Nation is a business (…).’  
Commercial demands of the media house are also reflected in production routines. The 
Nation for example brings in Circulation Department when there is a ‘hot story’ in the 
pipeline in order to achieve the right publishing strategy.  
As and when stories break the regular meetings in order to be held amongst the 
editors, start where and how to go about publishing the story. It could be a one-off 
story. It could be a series of stories. You bring in a variety of people, from circulation 
department, editorial people to discuss how to go about that story. Circulation may 
say ‘we should double or triple the print order’, because such stories sell as hot cakes 
across the land. So ‘in stead of publishing 200 000 copies lets publish 400 000 
copies’. It is a day to day operation.  
The circulation experts are brought in on the one hand in order to define the right number of 
copies to meet the demand from the newspaper buying audience. On the other hand 
commercial interests informs the unfolding of a story, in other words how it is designed by the 
newsroom in time and space. To some extent the very conduction of news selection and 
presentation is not only a matter for journalistic professionals but for other non-journalist 
decision-makers in the media house.   
As corruption news is good news in terms of circulation it is also subject to 
competition. The competition between media institutions also serves publishing, according to 
Ezekiel Mutua at the Kenyan Union of Journalists (KUJ): ‘Because of the competition also, if 
one media house does not cover certain stories another one will cover’. Mutua informs that 
news media competition therefore also work in a different way. Ignoring corruption issues 
might be difficult to legitimise, according to him:  
A: You don’t want to be seen to be ignoring major corruption stories.  
Q: So this competition also contributes or is a cause… [interrupts] 
                                                 
26 One informant however held that each copy might be read by as many as 20 people, thus making the actual 
readership many times bigger. 
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A: Yes, it is, because there is no monopoly. If you do not publish and your competitor 
publishes it the… the public will read you clearly… that you are a bet in corruption, 
you are trying to cover up and those things will be discussed.  
The competition between papers might be considered biased or corrupt if they are perceived 
as ignoring corruption issues. Thus media practitioners perceive that media acquires 
legitimacy by avoiding representing factional interests and that this promotes journalism on 
corruption.  
The role of the ownership is however not irrelevant, as the Standard experienced. The 
new editors of the Standard ‘hit the roof’ when they started to report on Moi’s alleged 
involvement in corruption.  
We didn’t give a damn about the ownership of the paper. We were doing our thing as 
we understood. So the ownership of the paper were on the receiving end as much as 
the current Government. I mean I was publishing stories on corruption against the old 
regime and the current one. (…) One story that offended them really was one headline 
we had that related to Goldenberg: ‘How I bribed Moi with 150 million.’  
According to the informant ‘that is when their hearts began to turn. How could we publish a 
story about bribing Moi implicating him in corruption and a crime in his own paper where he 
is a shareholder? I think from then things began to really swell out. We kept doing our job, 
and hit the roof,’ the informant said. The Moi ownership was increasingly less willing to 
invest in the newspaper. ‘We couldn’t do anything. We wanted to do certain changes but it 
wasn’t possible. And the editorial department was starved of resources.’ It seems as if the 
newsroom was crippled of financial resources forcing the paper to downsize investigative 
efforts in 2004/2005. In 2005 the Standard only had one full time investigative reporter.  
Editorial freedoms, as these relate to corruption issues, thus seem to be circumscribed 
by the interests of the media owners. Whose interests are represented by owners is a much 
more difficult issue to answer since ownership also is a contested issue. As mentioned it is 
believed that Moi still owns the Standard through proxy businesses. Wamwere holds that Moi 
also have ownership interests in the Nation. There is not much evidence to substantiate this 
claim. The KUJ representative Ezekiel Mutua however holds that politicians buy shares in the 
mainstream press (through proxy) in order to influence editorial policy and get an avenue to 
intervene in editorial decisions. Neither confirming nor denying multiple political ownership 
in the Kenyan media, what is clear from these accounts from media externals is that the issue 
of ownership is subject to controversies and speculation. It also indicate that journalists in 
Kenya are perceived to enjoy a limited or circumscribed autonomy. 
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Media ownership and autonomy 
Gecau observes that ownership control is highly concentrated in Kenya. This is problematic, 
according to Gecau, as editors and media owners share the same material and ideological 
interests as the political leadership of the country (1996: 203). He underlines that managers 
and editors are drawn from the same ‘pool of people’ as politicians, businessmen and 
bureaucrats share the same background of socialisation and politicisation.  
In the colony and post-colonial situation, the press, in any case is the media of the 
elites – whose aspirations it articulates. The press serves the new [postcolonial] elites 
as a powerful symbol of their newly won independence.  
Gecau seems to understand those with political and economic power as one class with similar 
interests (1996: 213). It is however problematic to uphold a notion of the elite as one and 
unified, as society is divided along vertical lines allowing for some competition within the 
elites. This is also acknowledged by Gecau: ‘Kenya’s clientelist political system led to 
fractions and strata within the dominant group of notables fighting among themselves along 
seemingly ethnic lines’ (1996: 207). The ethnic component of party politics is also underlined 
by others (Throup and Hornsby, 1998; Anderson, 2003; and Throup, 2003). I would claim 
that it makes more sense to see the political-economic elite as plural but holding unequal 
power of influence relative to relations with political office holders, and that this also impacts 
on news production in the Kenyan mainstream press. In this context it should be mentioned 
that the premium of holding office is high in Kenya as it is in other clientelist societies.  
State-media relations are thus more important, in my view, especially with regard to 
journalism on corruption that targets individuals in the very political and economic elite. In 
this regard it is also interesting to note that President Moi and Kanu continued a clientelistic 
use of state resources in order to influence the press after the introduction of multipartyism. 
This was less the use of the police to harass or the judges to outlaw publications but more the 
particularistic granting or denial of broadcasting frequencies based on loyalty. This is for 
example observed by (Okello, 2000; Kiarie, 2004; and Barland, 2005). The Kanu interests in 
the Standard through Lonhro and then as owner is also interesting in this regard. Moreover, 
Kanu seemed to understand the business level of the media as an interesting avenue of 
influence, and used the Judiciary as an instrument, according to Kiarie, who also suggests 
when this strategy was employed.  
The Kanu government used the Judiciary to legitimize its campaign to silence the 
media. This tactic began in 1998, when former president Moi attacked the 
independent press. There then emerged a trend in which powerful individuals in 
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government rushed to court to apply for orders restraining newspapers from 
publishing adverse information about them (2004). 
Now, the increased frequency of libel suits and the escalated awards might be understood as 
the use of powerful government individuals as an avenue to stop bad publicity.  The use of the 
ownership and their business interests as an avenue in order to negotiate news must thus be 
examined more closely in a new political context in order to understand journalism on 
corruption.  
Summary and comments 
The Kenyan press enjoys formal independence from the state. It is privately owned, enjoys 
constitutionally protected freedom of expression shaped by different laws and regulations. In 
particular libel laws accounted for the above impact on corruption reporting in Kenya. During 
the 1990’s and 2000’s the number of libel suits increased. This is interpreted as a consequence 
of increased awards given to the complainant in libel cases and makes it less profitable for 
media firms to encourage journalism on corruption. Its impact on newsroom practices will be 
further analysed in chapter 6 to 8.   
Based on the analysis above we might conceive the Kenyan mainstream media as 
pursuing investigations into corruption issues driven by commercial, non-factional interests 
and demands by its reading public. However, this chapter shows that this is a small public 
narrowed to the literate and news paper buying middle class audience of the Kenyan media. It 
might be suggested that journalism on corruption serve a middle class struggle for universal 
values, non-factionalism, and the rule of law. This role is amended by ownership influences 
into news reports on corruption. As the examples above suggest ownership interests 
circumscribe journalists’ ability to report freely on any corruption issue. Their journalistic 
freedom is relative to ownership interests.  
Analysis of media ownership and legal regulations provides a framework for our 
understanding of the Kenyan mainstream press reports on corruption, but it does not tell the 
whole story. If we accept that the mainstream media enjoys a relative independence, 
journalism on corruption must also be analysed as negotiations over control between media 
practitioners and their external contacts, the sources of journalism. These negotiations are 
multiple with regard to agents and involve different layers of decision makers. The 
mainstream press is particularly interesting in this regard as it is formally independent based 
on revenues from sold copies and advertisements, but interwoven in external relations at 
different levels of organisation. The interests of media owners and their occasional 
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interference in editorial decisions also create avenues for powerful sources. This will be more 
closely examined in chapter 9.  
Chapters 6 to 8 analyse the content of, the production of, and negotiations over 
corruption news as these take place in different institutional contexts. Approaching news 
production I first analyse qualitative and quantitative aspects of journalism on corruption from 
















5. Corruption coverage in the mainstream press 2001-2005 
To what extent does the Kenyan mainstream press cover corruption? Have there been any 
changes in terms of coverage? And if so, what signifies these changes? A starting point for 
my fieldwork explorations and enquiries into journalism on corruption was to measure the 
volume written on corruption in the Kenyan daily newspaper the Nation. In this chapter I 
present the volume of journalism on corruption in this Kenyan newspaper from 2001 till 
2005; and account for different patterns and changes in the volume in the same period of time 
by genre, year, and month. I also account briefly for periods when the corruption content 
peaked.  
Kenyan mainstream journalism 
Genres of journalism 
Newspaper journalism consists of different genres. John Street (2001) observes that 
journalism genres are not ‘fixed or universal’. They are regular practices, historically evolved 
and shaped in different cultural, political and regulatory contexts and represent ‘particular 
cultural form[s]’ (Street, 2001: 44). One way news workers operationalise objectivity is to 
separate opinions from news through the use of different genres. Whereas opinions are 
normally seen as expressions of subjectivity, conventions for news production on the other 
hand emphasise objectivity, balance and impartiality (Street, 2001: 18). In my study, I have 
measured journalism on corruption by different variables: news articles (including notes), 
commentaries, letters, news analyses, editorials and opinion articles.  
News consists of many sub-genres such as politics, business, sports etc. Street holds 
that the news genres differ depending on its relative dependence on advertising and according 
to the regulatory regimes premising news reports in different societal contexts (Street, 2001: 
44). News on corruption in the Nation is reported particularly in the sub-genres of Parliament, 
politics, and business, but also other sub-genres as sports. The different subgenres of news 
occur in different sections. Politics is normally highlighted on the first pages of the paper. 
Commentaries diverge from news articles as they provide for the writer’s opinions and 
analyses. The genres of commentary enable journalists to comment on news reports they 
construct on different issues. In commentaries the journalist’s own opinion on the issue at 
stake is thus reflected. He provides ‘an (assumed to be) authoritative viewpoint’ on an issue 
(McNair, 1998: 10). Newspapers also have different regular columns where in-house 
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journalists or personalities external to the media house are invited to write on different issues 
on a regular basis. Another opinion genre is the editorial. The editorial traditionally reflects 
the opinion of the paper, the editor, or the owner. 
The Nation provides several opinion columns in different sections of the paper. First, 
news analysis provides for journalists analysis of particular issues in that day’s newspaper and 
occur among the regular news in the paper. Journalists’ distinctions between news and news 
analyses are examples of the operational separation between objective reporting and opinion. 
The journalist’s commentary or news analysis is published on the same page as the news 
story. Second, page 8 is usually devoted to opinion and analysis by in-house journalists and 
editors. Third, page 9 provides space for commentaries written by non-media personalities 
from politics and professional life. The Fifth columnist was at the time of my fieldwork senior 
newsman Philip Ochieng’s regular column. The Cutting Edge column reviews many news 
events with short ironic comments. Fourth, the paper contains a section with letters to the 
editor from individuals. The latter includes the column Talking Point highlighting one letter 
over the others in terms of layout and length. Fifth, the editorial and the colophon in the 
Nation occur normally in the left column on page 8. Usually two different issues are subject 
for the papers opinion. Occasionally only one issue is commented on. 
The front page as an argument 
The Kenyan newspapers are not subscription papers. Thus the front page of each edition 
serves the purpose of convincing the literate and possible buying audience of the paper. It 
serves as an advertisement for the editorial product.  
At the time of fieldwork the Nation designed the front page according to different 
templates. One story is always highlighted in terms of space, headline letter size and photo. 
Sometimes the paper provides two other stories with headlines and parts of the body text. 
Sometimes it just provides a few headlines and reference to the pages where the article is 
published.  
A quantitative analysis of extent and change 
In September (and then completed in November) 2005 I undertook a quantitative analysis of 
journalism on corruption. The purpose was to measure the extent of journalism on the 
corruption issue and possible changes in reporting patterns. First, articles published between 
January 1st 2001 and September 30th 2005 filed in the NMG archives under the label of 
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‘corruption, general’ and ‘scandals’27 were coded according to prefixed variables of genre. 
The variables are news articles, commentaries, letters to the editor and editorials. Second, the 
number of front page references was counted. The extent of front page stories serve as an 
indicator of the news value of corruption issues or perceived public interest in the issue. 
Third, the length of articles was also measured. A constructed year was created by measuring 
the length of articles every eight day for the years 2001 and 2005. The latter exercises were 
undertaken mainly in order to qualify the first analysis. As the length of articles counted 
varied from small notes to full page stories, the length of articles serve to qualify the results. 
The chapter provides a descriptive analysis of the data. For details on the methodological 
approach, validity, and reliability I refer the reader to chapter 3. 
News reports on corruption 
News reports on corruption are news items in different subgenres. The Nation published 175 
news items on corruption in 2001. In 2002 this number decreased to 137. The number then 
rises after the regime change 29 December 2002 to 314 in 2003 and 376 in 2004. During the 
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Fig. 5.1: News articles on 
corruption and scandals 
in the Nation 2001-2005 
 
The number of news articles 
published in the Kenyan 
newspaper was 175 in 2001, 
137 in 2002 and 314 in 2003. It 
increased further in 2004 to 
376. During the first nine 
months of 2005 the Nation 
published 316 articles. These 
numbers do not differenciate 
between long and short articles. 
The most remarkable change seems to occur between 2002 and 2003 as news production 
more than doubled in numbers from 137 to 314. In percentage terms this accounts for a 131 
per cent increase. When combining data from 2001 and 2002 and then comparing it with the 
aggregated data from the years 2003 and 2004, the same trend is evident. On average the 
Nation carried one news item on corruption every other day (0.42 per day) in 2001 and 2002. 
This number more than doubled in 2003 and 2004. On average the paper published 0.95 
                                                 
27 This file contained mainly corruption articles and was considerably smaller than the first mentioned. Those 
articles which did not concern corruption were left out.  
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articles on corruption per day during these years. In percentage terms there has been an 
increase of 121 per cent from 2001 and 2002 till 2003 and 2004.  
As accounted for earlier, the lengths of the news items vary. Have I measured the right 
trend? In order to qualify the numbers I have compared the volume written on corruption in 
2001 and 2005 by the length (column centimetre) published. Every eighth day in 2001 and 
200528 all articles on corruption were measured, thus creating a representation of two years 
without leaving out any particular weekdays. The representation of 2001 consists of 46 days. 
787 column centimetres were written on corruption on 11 out of these 46 days. On average 17 
column centimetres were published on corruption each of these 46 days. If I account for only 
those editions containing corruption stories the volume is 71.5 column centimetres.  
The representation of 2005 consists of 39 days. 1551 column centimetres were written 
on corruption on 17 out of these 39 days. On average 40 column centimetres were published 
on corruption each of these 39 days. If I account for only those editions containing corruption 
stories the volume is 91 column centimetres.  
This comparison by column centimetres of volume published does not change the 
trend depicted earlier. Rather it confirms it: the volume of corruption has increased by more 
than 100 per cent (from 17 to 40) from 2001 to 2005 according to the data gathered.  
Representing the publisher: The editorial 
The volume of news articles is one way to measure the level of attention given to a specific 
issue. However there are other ways of representing symbolic importance. In this section I 
measure the extent to which corruption is subject to attention in editorials. Traditionally the 
editorial represents the voice of the publisher of the outlet. The newspaper addresses its 
readers in its ‘public voice’ (McNair, 1998: 10). NMG sees their editorials as ‘the 
authoritative voice of the group’ and ‘the flagship of the various media platforms’. The 
editorial will normally ‘comment on the most significant events of the day’ (NMG, 2003: 6).  
A quantitative analysis of the attention of corruption in the Kenyan medium’s editorial 
is particularly valuable for two reasons: first, the size of this column has been the same even if 
the newspaper has increased in size now including different sections such as ‘Business’, 
‘Lifestyle’, and others sections making the newspaper bigger in volume. This make this 
column particularly fitted for analyses of change of attention given to the issue of corruption. 
Second, the editorial is traditionally used as column where the media house expresses its 
views on issues high on the public agenda. Whereas the number of news items might not 
                                                 
28 First nine months only. 
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indicate the relative importance of corruption vis à vis other news stories of the day the 
editorial is exclusive as the space is fixed and limited. As such it is a good indicator of the 
relative importance the authority of a media house gives to a topical issue. 
The Nation published 11 editorials on corruption in 2001; 14 in 2002; 25 in both 2003 
and 2004; and 24 during the first nine months of 2005 (see fig 5.2). The number of editorials 
on corruption issues have doubled from an average of approximately one every month in 2001 
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Fig 5.2. Editorials on 
corruption published 
in the Nation 2001-
2005. 
 
The Kenyan daily published 
11 editorials on corruption in 
2001; 14 in 2002; 25 in 2003 
and 25 in 2004. During the 
first nine months of 2005 the 
newspaper commented on 
corruption in 24 of its 
editorials. 
 
The numbers of editorials seem to confirm the main trend accounted for in the section on 
news content on corruption namely that the issue gets increased coverage after 2002. It is also 
interesting to note that the number of editorials increased from 2001 to 2002 counter to the 
trend in news content.  
Representing the public interest: The front page  
Yet another way to analyse the relative importance of corruption reports is the front pages of 
the newspaper. What is on the front page is also a representation of significance. It is also the 
poster that is there to sell the newspaper, and thus highlights what is considered most 
newsworthy. As Jewkes notes ‘news values cater for the perceived interest of the audience 
and they capture the public mood; a factor usually summed up by news editors as “giving the 
public what it wants”’ (2004: 61). Serving as a poster for each newspaper edition the front 
page is supposed to sell the issue by its appeal to and adherence to consumer interests. The 
number of front page stories on corruption was 30 in 2001, 18 in 2002, 53 in 2003; and 85 in 
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Fig. 5.3: Numbers of 




The number of front page 
stories on corruption was 
30 in 2001, 18 in 2002, 53 
in 2003; and 85 in 2004. 
By 31st of October the 
number was 52 for the year 
2005. 
The trend is that front page coverage has almost tripled from 2001 and 2002 to 2003 and 
2004. The increase in per cent is 188 per cent. What becomes news is premised by a lot of 
factors including the supply (Tiffen, 1989) or availability of sources. What become front page 
stories is to a larger extent a commercial consideration. The fact that front page attention in 
per cent has increased more than the actual news coverage of the topical issue, might suggest 
that the perceived audience’s preferences of corruption stories increased in the period 2001 till 
2004. The newspaper buying audience (as perceived by news workers) seems to prefer 
corruption issues relatively more than they used to prior to 2003. This might be a preliminary 
hypothesis as I proceed from analysis content to analyses of process. There might be other 
valid ways to interpret these trends. 
Preliminary conclusions, quantitative content analysis29 
Figure 5.4 shows the overall numbers of all articles published in the period 2001 till 2004. 
The numbers include all articles; news notes, news articles, news analyses, commentaries and 
columns, editorials and letters to the editor. In 2001 the Nation brought 239 articles. In 2002 
the number decreased to 184. The number increased to 427 in 2003, 449 in 2003, and 435 by 
the first 10 months of 2005. The graph shows that the Nation has written more articles on 
corruption after the regime change in 2002 than prior to it. On average the Nation has 
published more than one article on corruption every day from 2003 till 2005. In conclusion: 
the graphs presented seem to suggest a consistent trend. The reporting of, commenting on, and 
                                                 
29  Data on opinion articles are available in appendix 4. These don’t diverge considerable from trends accounted 
for in this chapter.  
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representation of corruption has increased between 2001 and 2005. The change from 2002 to 







year 2001 year 2002 year 2003 year 2004 year 2005
Numbers of articles (all)
 
 
Fig. 5.4: No of 
published articles on 
corruption in the 
Nation 2001-2005 
(all) 
The numbers include all 
genre articles; news notes, 
news articles, news 
analyses, commentaries 
and columns, editorials 
and letters to the editor. 
The Nation published 239 
articles in 2001, 184 in 
2002, 427 in 2003, and 449 
in 2004. During the first 
ten months of 2005 the 
newspaper daily published 
435 items on corruption. 
2002) if compared with Narc’s first two years in office (2003-2004). It is also interesting to 
note that corruption was less reported in the election year 2002. This might suggest that less 
emphasis was put on the disclosure of or reporting on corruption prior to the election. This is 
contrary to what is popularly held; namely that corruption issues were important for the 
election in 2002 (see for example Sihania (ed.) 2005). A counter trend in this regard is the 
number of editorials that actually increased in 2002 compared with 2001 maybe indicating 
that the management of the paper still upheld the topic of corruption and reform in the 
election year. There seem to be a similar trend in the year 2005 as corruption coverage drops 
during the year as the referendum on the proposed new constitution approaches, whereas the 
number of editorials is upheld. 
Corruption stories in the mainstream press 
The change from 2002 to 2003 seems to bear most significance as the coverage doubled. 
However, a closer look at the trends suggests that these changes are not as linear as they seem 
when categorizing by years. Categorised by month the pattern is more nuanced. As figure 5.5 
shows, there are differences within a year as to how much is written on corruption in the news 
media. The data the graph is based on includes all articles on corruption regardless of genre. 
There are differences within a year as to how much is written on corruption in the mainstream 
press. Corruption is reported more intensely in certain periods of time than others. The 
                                                 
30 A reservation must be made in this regard as the data has not been tested for statistical significant differences 
(Holme and Solvang, 1991: 296).   
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numbers of front pages seem to follow the same trend (see fig 5.6). The peaks are more 
prominent in the years 2003, 2004, and 2005 than the previous years. The data might suggest 
that the change is more of periodic intensity than of the day-to-day reporting. First it is 
interesting to note from fig. 5.5 and 5.6 that corruption coverage and front page attention 



















































month 2001 - 
2005 
 
The graph is based on 
all articles on 
corruption regardless 
of genre, and shows 
some significant peaks 
in October 2003, April 
and July 2004, and 
February 2005. 
The peaks shown in the figures correlate to some extent and show that corruption was high on 
the agenda in October 2003, May and July 2004, and February 2005. In July 2004 and 
February 2005 for example the Nation brought 21 front page stories on corruption. On 
average two out of three editions carried news stories on corruption on the front page during 
these months. Below is a review of the front page stories during these peak periods. This short 
review is included in order to highlight how graft stories might unfold and to explore how the 
multiplicity of sources, overt and covert, contributes to their creation. 

















































In February 2005 and 
July 2004 the Nation 
brought 21 front pages 
stories on corruption. 
Two out of three editions 
on average brought news 
stories on corruption on 




October 2003: The Ringera reports on corruption in the Judiciary 
The disclosure of the so-called Ringera reports on corruption in the Judiciary contributes to 
the October 2003 peak. The reports were the subject of 20 front page news reports in October 
2003, plus news, commentaries and editorials in the course of the month. On the 3rd of 
October the front page of the Nation informed its readers: ‘Sh15m: What it costs to bribe 
Appeal Court Judge’, followed up next day as the Chief Justice (CJ) Evan Gicheru told the 
judges accused of corruption that they should ‘Quit or face trial’ (Kadida and Mugonyi, 
2003). Details of the alleged misconduct was made public after journalists on Tuesday 7th 
after Nation journalists conducted several interviews of judges, magistrates, court officials 
and complainants (Nation team, 07.10.2003).  
The judges however held that they would not quit (Kago and Kadida, 12.10.2003). ‘CJ 
sends judges ultimatum letters’ the headline said (Nation team, 15.10.2003), and according to 
the news report 25 judges were asked by the chief justice to resign or face ‘disciplinary 
tribunals’. One of the judges ‘it is understood have pleaded with the CJ – but in vain to have 
his name removed from the list.’ The next day the names and pictures of 23 judges were on 
the front page of the Nation following the headline ‘Suspended: Judges who will face graft 
tribunal’, using the Kenya Gazette as their source of information (Nation Team, 16.10.2003). 
A few days later some judges preferred to step down in order to avoid standing before a 
tribunal, according to ‘sources within the Judiciary’ (Njeru and Munene, 18.10.2003). 
However, the moves to get rid of judges were not applauded by everybody. On the 19th of 
October four MPs urged the President to address graft in his own cabinet before targetting the 
Judiciary (Mwandotto and KNA, 19.10.2003). On 21st of October the President announced 
that ‘the day of reckoning for those engaged in corruption has come’ (Rugene and Mugonyi, 
21.10.2003). 23 judges and magistrates appointed during the Moi regime resigned or were 
forced to quit following the graft reports.  
May 2004: The Anglo Leasing and Finance scandal 
The first major corruption scandal that hit the Narc administration was the so-called Anglo 
Leasing scandal. The initial revelation happened in Parliament on 20th of April 2004 as Kanu 
MP Maoka Maore tabled documents allegedly proving that the Narc cabinet had 
misconducted tender procedures for immigration security and terrorist proof passports. The 
accusations were reported the next day (Orlale, 21.04.2004). The magnitude of the scandal 
was soon to be discovered as the scandal was termed the ‘new Goldenberg scam’ by an MP 
comparing it with the multibillion corruption scandal of the 1990s. According to the Nation 
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front page headliner the Vice-President would be quizzed in Parliament (Nation Team, 
22.04.2004). Three days after the disclosure in Parliament the Nation brought front page news 
that Permanent Secretary John Githongo at the Office of the President had ordered the anti-
corruption police, the KACC to launch investigation into the matter. The article also held that 
the PS of the Ministry of Finance was in the spotlight over the scandal (Nation Team, 
23.04.2004). The PAC of the Parliament launched its own investigations, and the Minister of 
Security Chris Murungaru suspended the contracts awaiting the investigations. As more 
information on the scandal was disclosed, four top bureaucrats were suspended and later 
charged. In January 2006, one and a half year after the scandal was disclosed the Ministry of 
Finance decided to resign from the cabinet. So far noone has been convicted of corruption.  
The gradual disclosure of Anglo Leasing scandal in April 2004 contributed to peaks in 
May and July 2004. During the first days reports were made mainly from the Parliament beat 
and Government. The Nation then started disclosing results of their investigations. They 
revealed that a businessman ‘with high level links in the Kibaki Government’ was involved 
(Nation Reporter, 26.04.2004); that the firm which was granted the tender did not exist; that 
the very same company was involved in ‘yet another deal’ (Okwembah, 27.06.2004); and the 
person they claimed to be ‘The man behind Sh7 billion finance scandals’ (Nation Team, 
16.06.2004). Unfolding and reporting the Anglo Leasing issue, the paper also used leaked 
documents and covert sources besides regular overt beat reporting. The paper suggested that a 
famous businessman was involved (Njoka, 28.04.2004); it questioned whether the police 
investigation had been ordered to stop, quoting covert sources (Nation Team 03.05.2004); it 
brought exclusive information that two permanent secretaries had been questioned by the 
police (Muiruri, 04.05.2004), it revealed details of statements given in a closed Parliament 
committee meeting (Okwembah, 04.06.2004), and details of investigations (Wabala, 
27.07.2004). Government sources were quoted in the paper claiming that the money paid to 
the firm had been paid back (Agutu and Gatheru, 09.07.2004). The scandal was intensely 
reported on during the summer 2004 and has occasionally been reignited later. 
February 2005: Clay’s dossier and Githongo’s resignation 
The claim by the then British envoy to Kenya Edward Clay that there are 20 more cases of 
high level corruption yet to be disclosed (Nation team, 03.02.2005), and the following  
resignation of the head of the anti corruption department at the Office of the President, John 
Githongo (Rugene, 08.05.2005) are followed by a series of front pages, corruption news 
articles and commentaries in a ‘staged drama’ (Eide and Hernes, 1986) in the weeks to come, 
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explaining the February peak in fig 5.6 and 5.7 above. The US reacted to the news deciding to 
withdraw development funding to Kenya (Bosire, 09.02.2005) and cabinet members urged the 
President to act (Rugene, 10.02.2005). Kibaki then ordered investigations into ‘suspect 
contracts’ (Nation team 11.02.2005). The next day ‘Key ministers urge end to secret deals’ 
and demanded dismissal of minister colleagues involved in corruption (Nation Team, 
12.02.2005). The following day the Nation claimed that ‘Half the Cabinet is not clean’ 
recapturing who has been publicly mentioned in connection with graft or ethical breaches 
(Mathenge, 13.02.2005). The day after that President Kibaki reshuffled his Government and 
sacked two permanents secretaries (Nation reporter, 15.02.2005). 
The Nation revisited the dossier of Edward Clay the very next day disclosing the list of 
questionable deals the Government allegedly was undertaking (Okwembah, 16.02.2005), and 
two days later the Nation announced that a special cabinet meeting was to be held on 
corruption issues the same day. Ministers were, according to ‘sources close to the Cabinet’, 
urged not to accuse the Government of graft (Nation reporters, 18.02.2005), and the next day 
the Cabinet announced ‘tough stand on graft cases’ (Mugonyi and Namunane, 19.02.2005). 
The coverage also brought irritation from members of the cabinet. Cabinet minister Amos 
Kimunya suggested that the British envoy be questioned on whom his covert source of 
information was (Kago and Mugonyi, 22.10.2005). From 3rd to 19th of February corruption 
was the main front page news story 14 times in the Kenyan newspaper daily.  
Summary and comments 
The quantitative descriptive analysis suggests that journalism on corruption has increased 
from 2001 till 2004. The number of news items, editorials, opinion articles and front page 
references on corruption all suggest that the issue of corruption has increased by 100 per cent 
when 2001 and 2002 numbers are compared with 2003 and 2004 numbers. During the year 
2005 there is a decline in corruption coverage. Within each year there seem to be differences 
in the intensity to which corruption is highlighted. Corruption is periodically a big issue. In 
February 2005 and July 2004 the Nation brought 21 front page stories on corruption, an 
average of two front pages in three days for those periods. However, between the peaks there 
are sometimes weeks with no front page stories on corruption. A brief account of periods of 
peak coverage suggests the importance of credible sources for the revelation of corruption. It 
also suggests that the ability to achieve credible information on corruption premises coverage 
of it. For this the participation of covert sources is important. 
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6. Institution, organisation and corruption news values  
‘I expose corruption, you know. I destroy networks of people and I destroy their 
earning, because those people have earned nothing but corruption.  
Kenyan reporter 
How do professional norms, journalists’ idea of news and journalists’ ideas of journalism 
inform news values, and how are routine practices amended by organisational demands. The 
existence of ‘shared norms distinct to the profession’ as protection of sources and 
newsworthiness (Mancini, 2004: 34) must be observed. However these are not a static fix. In 
the process of news production the news institution is reproduced and changed. Inspired by 
Eide (1992) I would state that journalist cultures and norms structure journalist action, and 
provides journalists with resources when conducting journalism.  
Tiffen (1989) notes that there are several dimensions of news values and that these 
might be conflicting. He stresses that ‘it is more important to understand the severe 
qualifications of any consideration of news values’. As journalists share professional values 
and norms of the news institution their work is framed by organisational demands. This 
chapter explores the news institution and how it is negotiated by organisational demands.  
Ericson et al (1987) underline that as media practitioners’ news judgements are based on 
journalists’ social norms; working and occupational ideologies of the journalist and sources; 
and ‘the dominant ideology in society’, judgements are made contextually. I analyse whether 
journalists’ way to value news on corruption and whether professional norms or the practices 
of these norms have changed from 2001 till 2005.  
News values of corruption inform distinct but related processes of news production. 
First, it relates to the news production as journalists interact and negotiate with their sources. 
Second, it relates to the selection of news items for publishing by managers or editors in the 
newsroom. These negotiations are analysed in the next chapters. 
Journalists ideas of corruption news  
How do journalists understand the news value of corruption and the role of journalism on 
corruption? One journalist informant reflected on his role and expressed that 
I have always think that our job as journalists is basically to call Government or 
public attention to the welfare of the society whether it is undermined by the 
Government or by private interest. It is our job to raise the flag and say ‘hey, this is 
going on. We don’t think it is right for the greater good of the public.’ That is really 
where our job lies. 
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One way to interpret this statement is that Kenyan journalists uphold a notion of the Kenyan 
in a vertically divided society upholding the ideal of the rule of law. Officially corruption is 
rejected as deviant both by the mainstream press and the sources of journalism. Ericson et al 
(1987) hold that journalism seeks common sense; that the main news value is deviance; and 
that news media act as agents of control suggesting remedies for deviances and anomalies in 
society. Journalism produces or reproduces ‘common social knowledge and social values.’ 
Journalists’ ideas of news are informed by the image they bear of their own occupation, how 
they perceive themselves as professionals. Ericson et al (1987) hold that news values relate to 
the dominant ideology of society. Journalism might be understood as serving the public 
interest as it ‘addresses authorities who are distant from the rest of us, and does so on our 
behalf’ (Ericson et al, 1987: 17). What is in the interest of the public is contextual. Professor 
Ciru Getecha states with regard to how corruption in Kenya is perceived in a local context 
‘They may even say I am a hero because I have been able to enrich myself. There is no social 
sanction against the corrupt people’. The acts of individuals are perceived differently in 
various contexts.  
I will argue that the Kenyan mainstream press provides a frame for the understanding 
of certain practices as corrupt or unacceptable, and a language for the perception of society as 
Kenyan rather than tribal. What is termed deviant or corrupt in the news is thus what news 
workers perceive as values shared between themselves and their reading audience, namely the 
literate multicultural and urban middle class.  
Corruption news values 
As the Narc Government came to power on an anti-corruption platform they created a 
framework for the evaluation of their performance. If anti-corruption is the norm to be 
followed, the lack of initiatives, investigations, or prosecutions might be considered deviant 
by the mainstream press. As one informant put it, ‘the Narc Government was elected on a 
platform of fighting corruption. Therefore everybody is looking out for anything that would 
confirm that they are not seriously doing it.’ This is a change from the past according to one 
informant: 
A: this Government was elected to power on anti-corruption. (…) That is why you see 
that stories on corruption is more now than when Moi was in power. When Moi was 
in power, corruption was all over. (…) In fact it was no big deal hearing somebody 
was investigated for corruption.  
Q: it was not newsworthy actually? 
A: Exactly. Exactly. But now the people who took over told us they are going to fight 
corruption, there will be zero tolerance to corruption.  
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In October 2005 I went to a press conference in Nairobi where a report on corruption in 
parastatal organisations from 1992 till 2002 was released. The report presented old corruption 
committed under the former regime. During his speech at the conference Maina Kiai, the 
chairman of the Kenyan Human Rights Commission, urged the journalists also to look behind 
the figures. Look up those heading the parastatals. ‘What are they doing now?’ Kiai thus 
provided journalists with a new angle for the reporting of old corruption. Reframing old 
corruption is necessary for anti-corruption players to gain journalists interests. One of my 
journalist informants underlined that old corruption lacks news value as it comes ‘post 
mortem. It comes after somebody has died.’ Discussing the Auditor General’s report he held 
that   
Some of them [corruption cases] are as old as three or four years, so if you look at 
Auditor’s report you are likely to be doing a case of a scandal that happened two years 
ago. So it is really not fresh. (…) And if you are going to wait for the Auditor 
General’s report it hasn’t come out you are operating two years behind, everything 
would have been ‘eaten’31 and life would have moved on.  
Newness is also a frame for corruption reports, understood both by Kiai and my journalist 
informant. Old corruption is most interesting in the context of the present.   
What gives meaning to journalists in the mainstream press reporting to a multiethnic 
national (but still middle class audience) is to report what they term ‘high level corruption.’ 
The value of corruption as news is relative to the power of the individual performing 
misconduct according to an informant:  
A: Lets say a small man in courts, then he takes a bribe of one million, that one we 
don’t consider newsworthy.  
Q: why not? 
A: but when a big person, even me, takes a bribe of twenty Ksh that is big news. 
Cause we tend to make stories juicy depending on the individual. 
Many stories involve both, however. The Anglo Leasing scandal for example involved three 
ministers and five top ranking bureaucrats and the fraud of many million Ksh from public 
spending. Likewise the Goldenberg scandal of the 90’s was reported for the extraordinary 
amount of money involved in the fraud.  
Journalists ideas of journalism 
Corruption is a good story from the journalistic perspective, that we… the media 
consider ourselves to be the watchdog of society. We must blow the whistle every 
time we know things are going wrong. 
                                                 
31 ‘Eating’ is a common used term for undertaking corruption. 
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Journalists consider themselves as watchdogs, and investigate corruption as a journalistic 
mission. However, media workers perception of what their audience demands and appreciates 
is also an important aspect of news judgement. Satisfying the audience demand and increased 
circulation also bring satisfaction to news workers. According to an informant, journalists 
perceive that the newspaper audience wants corruption exposed and so get inspired: 
When we expose a big scandal of corruption and all that, it is reflected in the 
newspapers sales of that day. People wish to see that issue exposed and people 
punished. It is a motivator.  
Satisfying the audience’s demand inspires journalists and add meaning to their routine 
practices. However, it is difficult to separate what is undertaken in order to serve the 
commercial interest of the media house and what is the journalists’ own idea of news on 
corruption. As one of the informants says, every journalist wants a front page story. 
Corruption stories aspire to front page exposure, and a front page by-line also adds meaning 
to the practice of journalism for journalists. Another informant holds that the exposure of 
corruption is also serving journalists as it serves any other: 
Corruption inflicts on everybody very badly. In that way we serve ourselves. It is 
something we do without much prompting. Stories on corruption especially high level 
corruption is a story that any journalist will jump at.  
Reporting corruption also make journalists feel powerful. They impact on the work of societal 
institutions and political and administrative decisions.  
I think the thrust in those stories is that we like to see it addressed. When you publish 
something, a story that relates to corruption, you aspire to get those people arrested. 
You get the scandal investigated, and the people behind it arrested. And of course in 
the end of the day it all reduces corruption in the country. That is our desire. We now 
write about corruption and action is taken. The anti-corruption authorities follow up 
and investigate. That is our desire. It is happening. People are actually being arrested. 
Some are being transferred. Some are taken into court. That trend, we believe, can 
only be enhanced with regular reporting on corruption as on when we get evidence. 
And I think the general readership is very happy with that campaign.  
This perspective is contrary to the idea of media as a mirror reporting objectively about events 
in society. The statement brings to the forefront media as an active player not only reflecting 
the acts of sources but also actively constructing meaning and shaping political culture and 
institutional practices. One informant perceived journalists as ‘activists’ holding they had a 
mission to change societal ills: ‘it is about the mindset you bring… to do something about 
corruption.’ According to the informant activist journalism ‘takes you away from the middle 
ground’ as a certain subjectivism is applied to journalism. This is however a contested view 
on journalism that will be discussed below. 
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Changed perceptions of corruption news value 
The journalists’ perception of what is the public’s interest is relative to conjunctures and 
events. According to several informants the political climate changed after the regime change 
in late 2002 and this impacted on journalists’ perception of corruption as news. The news 
value of corruption increased as media are provided with a frame to evaluate the sitting 
Government. The new anti-corruption rhetoric did impact on media norms. The rhetoric 
served as an incentive to undertake journalism on corruption. One informant explained that  
when the Narc took power again President Kibaki, his ministers almost always 
campaigned against corruption in the first year, in the second year of the Narc the 
accent was on rooting out corruption with the Government saying it was out to fight 
corruption. 
Government promises are now used as an incentive to investigate and a frame for covering 
corruption: 
The Government has committed itself to the agenda to fight corruption. So in the 
process the media observe corruption as an issue, since the Government has 
committed itself to fight corruption so the media say ‘OK fine, we take on your want 
and we want to check on this’.  
As other institutions act on news reports it adds meaning to the practices of corruption 
reporting.  
There is more satisfaction being a journalist, because what they write is acted on. This 
is unlike before you just wrote and wrote and nothing would happen. To me, it has 
been a significant improvement. There is more pride in actually exposing these 
criminals in business because there is normally action in the end of the day. Before, 
during the Moi regime, nothing would happen.  
A new felt power might thus have increased the value of corruption as news; as such 
journalism on corruption matches journalists’ idea of journalism as a protector of the interest 
of the public. 
Professional norms and organisational demands 
How do professional norms shape news values? And how do organisational demands shape 
professional practices. Above I introduced ‘activist journalism’ as a term. This idea of 
journalism is contested in Kenya and in the mainstream press. In a commentary on the 15th of 
January 2005, Peter Mwaura discusses how journalist can avoid being ‘burned by a hot story’ 
(Mwaura, 15.01.2005):  
When covering a story about corruption, it is safer to let the facts speak for 
themselves. No interpretation, no conclusions, no opinions. Just the facts. The job of a 
journalist is to find and report the facts as they exist, not to make them look bigger 
than they are. A journalist should always remember that he is a reporter, not a member 
of the opposition or the Baghdad Boys.   
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As newspapers in this country compete with one another in exposing 
corruption and other wrongs, they face many hazards – threats of criminal and civil 
libel lawsuits, claims of bias and invasion of privacy. Such hazards may not be 
eliminated altogether but they can be minimised with the exercise of proper caution 
and common sense.   
Journalists can avoid getting burned when the story they are covering is a hot 
one. They should not publish a story that they cannot reasonably support by evidence. 
They should not publish information that is not the business of the public.  
The commentary might be read as a comment on the investigative story of Kamau Ngotho in 
the Standard, ‘Mr. Moneybags’ (Ngotho, 07.01.2005). Ngotho was ‘burned’ by his story as 
then Security minister Chris Murungaru immediately ordered his arrest over criminal libel. 
According to informants it became difficult for the STG to support the journalist because he, 
it is suggested, could not support all his claims by evidence, even if most of the story was 
factual (80 per cent according to one informant). Second, he wrote the investigative piece 
without separating opinion from mere factual news reporting, challenging the genre 
boundaries. The example shows how dominant interpretations of journalistic norms are 
contested by journalistic practices. Below I will analyse how the notion of objectivity is 
subject to rules and how these are operationalised by news workers conducting journalism. 
The consideration of objectivity, balance and facticity is a part of the process of news 
production and judging its suitability in the Kenyan mainstream press. However, avoiding 
interpretation as Mwaura suggest is difficult according to some sources. An informant stated 
it this way: ‘If you are basing it on a report, you just say this happened, this happened, this 
happened.’ But if there is a tender, “this has been done and this has been done,” but you don’t 
make a firm conclusion.’ This is an artificial dichotomy, one of the informants argues, as all 
selection of facts is based on interpretations: 
once you have presented a fact, the fact that you have chosen a particular set of facts 
or a particular headline it self is a conscious effort you are making. It is a subjective 
thing in it. It is a bit. It’s a more of a theoretical issue. (…) But you have to be 
conscious, though. You avoid making certain conclusions. You have to question 
things more carefully in the presentation and the conclusion. I don’t think you can 
avoid conclusions and interpretation completely.  
Facticity 
There are social rules that provide guidelines for how journalists are to achieve factiticity in 
the process of news construction. One of the informants explains the rules this way: 
Once you get a tip, you need to get two independent sources to confirm that 
information. That is a rule. Then, you have to get the documents if they are available.  
Establishing facticity is considered important. One journalist told me that causing libel suit 
against the employer would be devastating, causing shame, and raising doubt about the 
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journalist’s professional execution of the craft. Journalists didn’t speak easily about it, and 
tried to avoid questions on whether they had experienced it personally. At the same time the 
general attitude among media practitioners is that the issue of libel is not necessarily 
concerning the quality of their work but the dubious practices of politicians and lawyers who 
want to benefit financially from the media. As corruption disclosures regularly become legal 
issues journalists giving their professional judgement on news must leave the scene to the 
company lawyers in order to establish factuality in judicial terms rather than journalistic. Thus 
a media external has the final say in judging the suitability of a corruption disclosure as news.   
Balance 
Kenyan journalists have to follow rules in order to achieve balance. According to the code of 
conduct that applies to Kenyan journalists  ‘[t]he fundamental objective of a journalist is to 
write a fair, accurate and unbiased story on matters of public interest’. The rules demand that 
the different sides of the story should be reported and that comments should be obtained from 
‘anyone mentioned in an unfavourable context’. It also holds that media practitioners should 
not publish stories that ‘fall short on accuracy and fairness’ (MCK, 2002: 7). 
Eide and Hernes (1986) conceive journalism as a drama unfolding over time and space 
in different acts. The corruption discourse of February 2005 accounted for in the former 
chapter might provide an example of such a drama. After the former British envoy to Kenya 
claimed there were 20 more corruption cases, different overt players responded to the actions 
and statements of each other using the mainstream press as an arena.  
When producing investigative reports and accounts of covert sources, on the other 
hand, the convention of objectivity is a different one. Balance must be obtained within the 
very same article or newspaper edition in order to achieve objectivity.  
What we now do is try to give the other party an opportunity to say their story before 
we publish. So that is… when you end up in court you say ‘this was a fair comment. 
He was given an opportunity to say his part of the story and defend himself.’ So in a 
way that is what we try to do… Just to cover up ourselves. That does not make it 
simple.  
The norms and practices of balance and objectivity provide opportunities and constraints for 
journalists and sources involved in the construction or obstruction of news. On the one hand 
they are resources; on the other hand they are procedures that constrict journalist freedoms; 
and finally these procedures are understood and used by skilful sources. This is accounted for 
in the next chapters.  
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Organisational demands and changes of professional norms and practices 
According to informants the practical interpretation of facticity, balance and objectivity has 
changed since 2001. A higher standard of proof is demanded. News stories have to fulfil new 
and stricter norms with regard to evidence. There are different explanations for this. In part 
this is explained as a reaction to Government pressure: 
There was increasing pressure in many of these media houses for higher standards of 
proof. Much higher standards of proof than normally required as a result of the 
Government’s insensitivity.  
Another (and possibly complementary) explanation is the rising or sustained high level of 
libel cases filed (see figure 4.1 in chap 4).32 Both the NMG and STG use financial and human 
resources on libel cases pending in court.  
According to the legal officer the NMG now tries to ‘avoid new claims coming in’ 
through different means: First, by providing weekly training sessions for journalists. Second, 
the legal office has the mandate to check stories before they are published. Third, journalists 
are encouraged to take more care: ‘We now tell them to check and verify stories and get 
documents as evidence if there is a lawsuit’. A fourth measure the NMG considers is bonuses 
for journalists that have not created a lawsuit for Nation media. The economic impact of libel 
suits and convictions is an important factor when explaining more conservative publishing 
practices. According to some journalists it has disabled some articles from being published.  
Some cases… when we really cannot cover ourselves we don’t touch the story, we 
keep it in a wait hoping along the way we will stumble on documentation which will 
give us the opportunity to tell that story.  
According to one source that might also explain the decrease in corruption coverage in 2005, 
as editors have become more careful when they consider news content: 
The editors are more strict and more careful in terms of content: ‘What is it that is in 
this story that might put us in trouble?’ And that’s one. I think that is one way in 
which it has changed. The other way in which it has changed is maybe we are 
reporting less and less on issues that… You know like on personalities, like on 
corruption cases… which always have a tendency of having an element of libel in 
them. For me there are those stories. There are those two factors.   
Another factor of change is organisational in character. The Kenyan mainstream press 
changed their capacity to investigate corruption after the regime change in 2002. The Nation 
strengthened their investigative desk with new staff and the Standard revitalised and 
professionalised its editorial and journalistic team in 2003. Both papers did deliberately give 
                                                 
32 The figure shows that the number of new libel cases increased until 2003. It is however difficult to ascertain 
whether it is decreasing in 2005 or not as only the first five months are accounted for. With regard to libel suits 
that follow corruption reports in the press the numbers have increased from 2003 to 2005.  
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corruption journalism a boost. However, as Tiffen note one news item competes with another 
for space (1989). In this sense news values are relational and contextual. An example might 
be the shift in attention given to corruption issues by the mainstream press during 2005. As 
the referendum on a proposed new constitution approached in late 2005, human resources 
were channelled to cover political alliance building and disintegration. Investigative reporters 
in the Nation were assigned to cover politics and cleavages in the Narc Government as the 
referendum approached. The upcoming referendum on the draft constitution was thus 
considered most newsworthy by both the Standard and the Nation. In this perspective public 
expectations, the relational aspects of news value and human resource allocation might 
explain the significant rise of corruption coverage in 2003 and 2004 and the equally 
significant steadily increased silence on the issue during the year 2005. 
Summary and comments 
The chapter shows how different political contexts for news making and different logics shape 
news values regarding corruption. The news value of corruption increased as Kibaki entered 
state house. Corruption became newsworthy and revelations pleased journalists’ ideological 
perceptions of independent journalism serving the public. A new-felt power inspired 
journalists to report on corruption since their reports were acted upon. The new frame for 
reporting corruption became the new Government’s promises to fight corruption, whereas 
under President Moi corruption was considered business as normal and thus less newsworthy.  
The chapter shows that journalists share some distinct professional norms with regard 
to news production. Whereas occupational norms are common for journalists as all news 
media are to observe the codes of conducts set by the MCK, journalists’ ways to observe these 
must be understood in plural terms. We should presume that journalistic cultures develop in 
different departments and organisations. The norms are interpreted differently supposedly 
providing for different kinds of journalistic practices as some undertake a more ‘activist’ 
approach to the craft than others, and allow the voice of the journalist to be present in the 
news text. Whereas objectivity is the norm there are different aspects of objectivity and how it 
is to be observed. The mainstream press changed its practices with regard to the selection of 
corruption news in 2004, changing the interpretation of objectivity. The different notions of 
journalism and its role with regard to corruption are also subject to arguments and debate 
(also public) as shown above. As Tiffen notes, in this respect ‘[t]here are often tensions 
between the achievement of different values, between professional ideals and organisationally 
operative short-cuts’ (1989: 67-68). 
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7. Back region journalism and Government leaks  
If an ethnic group is victimiced it will not take long before documents get out. There 
are a lot of civil servant who will see journalists as their first choice because they trust 
us more than others fex MPs.  
        Kenyan journalist 
Journalism on corruption in Kenya is to a large extent the covering and targeting of abuse of 
office by politicians or executives in public bureaucracies. The journalism on corruption 
analysed in chapter 5 accounts for all genres and all kinds of discourses. This chapter explores 
the negotiations of access to and use of corruption information as journalists penetrate 
government back regions for hot stories. The news media identifies anomalies and propose 
cures (Ericson et al, 1987), and as suggested in chapter 6 news of corruption in Government 
offices and state bureaucracies are regarded as deviants of official culture and good news by 
journalists, especially so after the Narc Government entered office on an anti-corruption 
platform.  
Different institutional beats enable and constrain reporting on corruption. The 
Parliament and court beats provide privileged information. The immunity of the floor of the 
House enables journalists to report stories otherwise rejected because of libel threats. The 
Information flow from Government institutions is however regulated by the Official Secrets 
Act, enclosing much Government information. In this chapter the back region journalism of 
Government institutions is analysed. As shown in chapter 5, disclosure of corruption is 
essential in order for public discourses on corruption to take place. Thus, even if revelations 
of graft quantitatively are a minimal part of news reports they are vital for the quality of the 
news discourses as they ignite and premises debates. Such information is confined to the back 
regions of Government institutions, where the organisations want them to remain secret, 
whereas players internal or external to the organisation have an interest in disclosing them. 
Inspired by Ericson et al (1989) I explore social aspects of negotiation between covert 
sources and journalists; cultural, how sources and journalists value news, and physical, how 
the source organization seek to control and patrol its back region, and the methods they use to 
uphold secrecy. In doing so I touch on aspects of journalistic autonomy as it relates to 
sources, and how professional norms are practiced. Finally, changes to covert source 
participation in news stories on corruption and how these changes are understood by media 
practitioners are highlighted.  
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Revelations are only aspects of news on corruption. First it is relevant to approach a 
broader picture of journalism on corruption before a model of back region leaks and 
negotiations is presented.  
Reporting Government and state corruption, a framework 
What regulates the information flow from state bureaucracy offices to the public in Kenya is 
the 1970 Official Secrets Act (OSA). Forwarding, obtaining or receiving information is an 
offence under the act. As such the act applies for civil servants. For state employees it 
basically means that knowledge they gain at work is confidentiality and that communicating it 
to outsiders is a violation of the act. This is how an informant formerly employed in the state 
bureaucracy experiences the act: 
[It] is like a stick that wielded over your head, you know at all times. It is designed to 
keep people in line (…) [I]t is designed to cover anything and everything you do 
while in civil service. (…) That is why that you will see even today in Government 
offices internal memos or anything else is marked confidential.  
Downing, comparing the US and Britain, claims that ‘[t]he assumption is common but 
misguided that there exists an organic logic at work in the classification of documents and 
information’ (1986: 154). There isn’t. Secrecy is used as ‘a device to allow the pinnacle of the 
power-structure to communicate how and when it prefers. It is a mechanism of control over 
all the other echelons of Government,’ according to Downing (ibid: 157). According to 
informants Kenyan politicians and executives enjoy the privilege of deciding publicity and 
censorship. They choose what, when, and how to communicate and thus perform acts of 
publicity and enforce censorship in the process. Government employees in Kenya might face 
repercussions if caught leaking to the press, for example being transferred to branch offices in 
rural areas, or losing their job.  
However, efforts to make civil servants comply with the act are not only social. 
Rituals are used in order to secure a culture of loyalty. According to Downing, ‘[s]igning the 
Official Secrets Act upon entering and leaving even lowly Civil Service employment is a 
potent ritual, stimulating a degree of awe, and an instinct for self censorship and secrecy 
among those subjected to it’ (ibid: 161).  
Organisational plurality 
Even if the social rules are manifested in the same law for civil servants working in different 
state institutions, there are reasons to be careful of identifying the state as one. There are for 
example several ministries governing other institutions with different operational objectives in 
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the public bureaucracy. Some state institutions in Kenya are established to control and advise 
others in terms of ethics and conduct. As accounted for in chapter 4 there were several new 
anti-graft institutions established following the change of Government in late December 2002. 
These include Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission, a department for ethics and governance at 
the OP, an ombudsman’s office, and the National Anti-Corruption Steering Committee. 
Moreover, as the state bureaucracy consists of many state organisations each organisation 
develops different cultures. They are multicultural (Ericson et al, 1989).  
Likewise there are organisations external to the executive that serve to police 
Government activity. The Parliament and its different committees such as the Public Accounts 
Committee (PAC), Public Investments Committee (PIC), and different select committees 
serve these functions. Likewise the report of the Auditor General is a resource for any 
policing agent, and some national and international non-Governmental organisations such as 
the Law Society of Kenya (LSK), the Transparency International (TI), and political 
organisations provide for a formal organisational plurality in Kenya. The business community 
suffers from corruption for instance as they compete for Government contracts but are 
sidelined as a consequence of clientelist use of state resources. And last but not least foreign 
envoys have an interest in Government accountability and use of donor funding.  
Thus, the Kenyan mainstream press is not the only institution scrutinizing Government 
activity. In chapter 5 I showed that the British envoy to Kenya disclosed a list of possible 
graft cases and that MP Maore’s disclosure in Parliament started the public unfolding of the 
Anglo Leasing scandal in 2004. To some extent media rely on these overt sources and 
accounts of information for the construction of corruption news. However, as the media, these 
overt sources rely on covert sources of information for their public accounts. In this sense 
they are also competitors for the same information and the same exposés. In this regard it 
must be emphasised that covert and overt sources are just as much a matter of different roles 
as different individuals. A powerful source might just as well see it as beneficial to act 
covertly depending on issue, context and what is at stake. 
Back region information flow – a model 
For corruption information to transpire to the newsroom it is not a linear or uniform process. 
Figure 7.1 is a sketch of back region relations and the negotiations of corruption information 
that makes secrets confidentialities as they become known to journalists. It aims to illustrate 
the complexity of relations and interests that enables secret information of corruption to 
become known to journalists. Covert sources exist at all levels in Government organisations, 
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in the business community, in the cabinet, and among politicians. It is a role performed 
occasionally. The figure also accounts for the occurrence of series of negotiations as 
confidential information is ‘traded’ or reciprocated between covert sources and what I term 
mediators, and mediators and journalists. Mediators are sources as they approach journalists 
with Government confidentialities; however they are not the original source of information. 
 
Figure 7.1. Back region 
information flow 
 
The figure is an illustration of 
back region relations that 
enable Government secrets to 
be known to journalists as 
confidentialities. The arrows 
illustrate the flow of 
information and point of 
transaction or reciprocattion 
negotiated as information is 
negotiated by different agents.  
Individual sources approach 
journalists and journalists 
approach sources. Sometimes 
information is reciprocated in 
several steps as the illustration 
suggest. 
 
The different arenas for disclosure shown in the figure compete with each other in attracting 
covert sources and corruption information. However, Parliament and the alternative press are 
also resources for the mainstream press utilised as sources of information and basis for further 
enquiries.   
Parliament as an arena for the disclosure of corruption information differs from other 
arenas as the floor of the House provides immunity to statements made there. However, it is 
only during the official proceedings of Parliament this immunity exists. If an MP walks out of 
Parliament and addresses journalists both the MP and the journalist are liable for the 
statements made and eventually reproduced in the paper. The Parliaments immunity is a 
double edged sword according to one informant. 
A Member of Parliament can misuse it because he wants to expose somebody else, so 
that he can give false information in Parliament, especially with regard to technocrats 
who do not have an opportunity to defend themselves in Parliament. Sometimes 
members of Parliament abuse that immunity. Second, it has an advantage. Whereas 
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some things might be common knowledge you may never get documentation, so you 
never speak about it outside Parliament. Parliament will be the only forum where you 
can be able to discuss those things without attracting a suit from lawyers or whoever 
you are talking about.  
For journalists working on corruption issues this also provides opportunities. The Nation had 
been working on the Anglo Leasing and Finance scandal for several months without finding it 
safe to publish any articles on the story. When the revelations were finally tabled in 
Parliament on 20 April 2004 by Kanu MP Maoka Maore, they had an opportunity to go ahead 
with all their findings after months of investigative work.  
The only reason that the Anglo Leasing and Finance scandal came out was because 
somebody used the privilege of Parliament to bring it out. We had the information, 
which we could never publish. We did not go to that MP though. Someone, I think, 
who knew the difficulty we were in decided to give it to the MP. But it was only when 
he brought it out that we brought up all the information we had about that scandal and 
that is how it started. 
The immunity granted in Parliament is a resource for journalists looking into sensitive stories. 
One technique possible for journalists and media houses fearing law suits or political pressure 
is to provide MPs with information and let the story break in the Parliament and then report 
with full immunity. This is scarcely used however as it levels out competition between the 
different media outlets.  
A good example I think is the recent case of Anglo Leasing, where a Member of 
Parliament came to Parliament and named some two businessmen, who were believed 
to be involved in the transaction, but they had no evidence. But it was obvious that 
those were the people who had linked up civil servants to those who were involved in 
the contracts. Whereas it was common knowledge they had no evidence, so the only 
safe place you could make that kind of allegations was in Parliament, and it is up to 
businessmen how to find a forum to defend themselves.  
The public disclosure of these names at privileged floor enabled media to report on these 
individuals even if they had no physical evidence of their involvement.  
The alternative press provides for a diverse media scene in Kenya, crying out 
sensational stories on their front pages seldom to the advantage to individuals given their 
attention. It is commonly believed that printed articles to a large extent are paid for by persons 
outside the media or used strategically by the owner to paint a black picture of political rivals. 
A: The alternative press is more often than not owned by politicians, and Government 
ministers. (…) They have their own researchers. (…) Now, when they get information 
on you and they know it is damaging to you, he comes to you.  
Q: So they use this information for blackmailing.  
A: yes, more often than not it is used for blackmailing. What you see in the alternative 
press is either what they have been paid for to write or what they were not paid for. So 
they have blackmailed. More often than not that is what you find in the press. They 
have facts, but they have a tendency of exaggerating.  
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Still, looking into the news production on corruption it is difficult to ignore the alternative 
press. No matter how biased and ethically doubtful these publications may be, they do provide 
information all of it is not fiction, according to an informant: ‘But you see what happens if it 
comes to the alternative press is that it is used as an avenue. Because there are some cases or 
stories that the mainstream media can not publish.’ Whereas the mainstream press operates 
within the law of the media bill, the alternative press does not as these outlets don’t operate 
with a physical address and a publisher. Hence, they are difficult to sue. Investigative 
journalists in the mainstream press, however, highly value the alternative press as a source of 
information. They find new leads for investigations and ideas to pursue: 
I read it, not sometimes; all the time I read it. Sometimes they have good stories, but 
sometimes it is that way they push their agenda. (…) Sometimes you can use the 
information to get documentations and do a more detailed story, more balanced and 
with the public interest at heart. They have good stories, but they treat them badly 
because of the interests they pursue.  
As such, the alternative press provides a basis for further inquiries and an extended source 
network for the mainstream media.  
Journalist-source relations: Trust, distrust and reciprocity 
Government back region secrecy as accounted for above is a contested space as information 
on corruption do find its (covert) ways to disclosure in different arenas. The relationship 
between covert sources and the discloser whether it is media, politicians, or others is based on 
trust and different kinds of reciprocity. In this section I account for how corruption 
information is negotiated between covert sources and journalists. 
Covert sources, trust, and arenas of disclosure  
There are several opportunities for individuals who want to report crime or disclose 
information on malpractices and criminal activities in Government institutions. The media is 
not the only option. The formal way is to contact the police or the KACC. However, 
whistleblowers contacting the police might face difficulties as malpractices sometimes occur 
within the police force. The police are known to be one of the most corrupt institutions in 
Kenya (TI, 2005). The Sunday Standard for instance revealed that several employees who had 
reported corruption at their workplace found themselves in a situation where the police 
informed their employer and revealed their identity (Namwaya, 18.09.2005). Many people are 
afraid of giving information to the police as, according to an informant, ‘anything they say to 
the police may be used against them. (…) People have this tendency of having more trust in a 
journalist than they have in the police, especially the investigative journalist.’ 
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Some documents find their way to the Parliament and are tabled and publicly disclosed there. 
However, as MP Maoka Maore sees it, the public does not fully trust their MPs.  
Let me tell you, many Kenyans, they will not trust MPs with documents also. 
(Hehehe) No, because they may not use them appropriately. They may use those 
documents for false favours or to use them for other reasons. But mainly there are few 
whom they can trust with the documents. I get several of them. I make sure I use all of 
them the one I get.  
The lack of trust in Governmental institutions leads sources to find other channels in order to 
address their concerns. According to media practitioners the mainstream media happens to 
have the advantage of trust among sources who want to address corruption in society.  
Journalists’ ways to establish trust 
Investigative journalism requires a lot of name-building. You have to build yourself 
so that people know you, and then they can approach you: ‘I suspect something wrong 
is happening here! There is something that is not in order. Can you just go and check 
out’. And then it is my duty to find out what is happening.  
The social relation between journalist and source is based on the level of trust. For sources to 
volunteer corruption information the source need to be confident that his identity is not 
revealed. Journalist autonomy provides the very basis for covert source participation, as 
journalists’ ability to keep their identity hidden is the premise for their co-operation.  
According to the code of conducts for journalists they have a ‘professional obligation’ to 
protect sources (MCK, 2002: 10). Such norms are followed in journalistic routine practices. 
The use of secret sources is common in corruption stories. As news texts impact on social 
relations in the source organisation (Ericson et al, 1989) one way to achieve anonymity of the 
source is to keep the reporter hidden in the news text. 
Sometimes when you go to official offices you sign papers that you are going to see 
so and so, so if you are seen there and tomorrow there is a story, it is assumed that that 
person gave you the information. He may not even have contributed to that story. So 
that is what we try to do for ourselves and for our associates. That’s why we don’t use 
by-line occasionally. But in most cases we use by-line.  
The importance of protecting sources also impacts on the time frame of the news production 
process. Sometimes the news media adds additional time in order to de-link their own 
physical presence and investigations in the source organisation with the news item published.  
Sometimes deliberate, you take long just to tie up the loose ends and when you 
publish a story it looks like it is a well written story. Sometimes to protect sources you 
wait a bit longer, just to see how things will move before you finally write it. 
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Covert sources, trust and the unfamiliar media 
However, journalists often experience that sources do not trust that their identity will be kept 
secret by the news media. Sometimes investigative reporters receive envelopes with 
documents containing Government secrets.  
[S]ome of them do not even want you to meet them or know who they are. They tell 
you ‘I have this document, tell me which hotel lobby you want me to drop it for you’, 
and they will drop it for you with your name on it. Then you verify and you know 
they remain anonymous.  
Sources might use hide their identity by using, what I have earlier referred to as mediators, 
who in order to approach the news media and negotiate the use of the information. When 
analysing the negotiations of corruption information, the transaction of information, 
documentation, and its use might be considered a separate process of negotiation where 
cultural bonds, political affinities, money, and other benefits should not be ruled out as part of 
the negotiations. These transactions are not empirically accessible for the researcher. 
However, the mediators themselves become sources for the news media. The following 
arguments do not distinguish between the two. 
Reciprocity and journalist-source familiarity 
Corruption information is to a large extent achieved through journalists nurturing social 
relations with individuals in different source organisations. Sources anonymous to the reader 
provide information to journalists. According to informants familiarity and friendship were 
upheld as important for these relations. One informant held that his source relations were very 
much based on old friendship from his time as a student. Being enrolled at the same 
university, studying the same subjects, and developing friendships provided a good basis for 
professional relations between him as a journalist and his friends employed in state 
bureaucracies.  
However, source relations as friendship have to be established and worked on in order 
to be sustained. 
A: But you see, when you make somebody a friend, it is easier for them to talk. And 
knowing you, even out subconsciously he will drop something, and then you follow it 
up. So you don’t have to be very official. ‘How are you? You have anything new?’ 
More often than not he will tell you. And then you attend his daughters wedding, or 
something you just (hop in), visit him once in a while. Then he looks at you… in case 
of anything. He may say: ‘Off the record it is this, but you must find out your own 
way.’  
Q: but what if he expects something in return for giving you information? A kind of 
favour or something? 
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A: Yes. Once in a while you have a present for him. His daughters wedding, those 
kind of things, the occupational hazard that we have. The things you have to do, 
whether you like it or not, you have to do that. You will always want to do something. 
He thinks he owes you and you also feel you owe him. So it is a two way system. You 
talk to this person, he talks to you. You do this, they do that. So it is a give and take. 
Not necessarily that you are bribing him or that you buying information or whatever it 
is. If something come they will sometimes… you do something without him realising 
that you have done it. Then later your contact tells you ‘the work you did was very 
good. It helped us in this way and that’.  
Friendship is thus not only friendship. In reciprocal relations both parts benefit. It might take 
part of a co-operation where one agency and journalist source co-operate with journalists in 
order to penetrate back regions of other institutions for the purpose of revealing corruption. 
As an example covert sources in the anti-corruption agencies use the media for the purpose of 
policing other Government units. As journalists are tipped off about certain misconducts they 
are invited to take part and investigate certain aspects of the case when the agency is met by 
closed doors. They have a mutual interest and converging goals as they seek to reveal graft. 
According to one informant, this friendship is not based on kinship or local contexts. 
Investigative journalism all depends on how you deal with your contacts, how do you 
doctor them, how do you empathise with them, how do you react to them. Once you 
have confidence of your contacts, they will give you information anytime, anywhere, 
regardless of what ethnic group you come from. They will always give you 
information. 
One informant emphasised that also politicians and ministers are important in order to gain 
secret information from Government back regions.  
A: [Cabinet ministers] are valuable in order to ‘get information that is not 
attributable’. (…) Over the years you develop a symbiotic relationship. 
Q: What do you mean by symbiotic relationship? 
A: They will find out for you what is happening. In return you tip them what is going 
on in their own ministry.  
The fluidity of organisational boundaries becomes evident from these statements. In this case 
the journalist gets valuable information about the Government businesses while the minister 
receive information that is vital for him as head of a big state bureaucracy, ‘for example that 
their PS is corrupt’, as one informant mentioned. Information is passed from journalists to 
their sources as part of a transaction that is mutually beneficial.  
The symbiotic relationship is what Ericson et al (1989: 7) terms a relation of 
reciprocity and something that is mutually beneficial. Familiar sources are valuable because 
the journalist does not have to check the source and the information he provides for its 
accountability as his trustworthiness is already established. As such back region journalism 
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becomes a routinised operation. Journalists routinely contact familiar sources in order to gain 
information. 
Q: Do you check with them regularly, or do they come to you? 
A: No I check them regularly, all guys in the morning, try to find out what is 
happening. Sometimes if there is something they will call me… and say: ‘How come 
you have not talked to me for a long time. It looks like you are contempt.’ (…)  
You meet them over a drink, and make them more friends, so encouraging 
them to talk to you. Sometimes what you get is what was dropped to you without 
anybody know, even the contact person doesn’t realise he gives you something. He is 
just talking: ‘hey, the other day I was doing this and that.’ Then you get information, 
and then try to dig deeper and find out more. Then: ‘eh, I didn’t know that that was to 
any interest for you? You should have asked me!’  
Investigative journalists have a budget for the entertainment of their sources in order to 
sustain their friendship and co-operation in the news production process.  
Journalists, trust, and the unfamiliar source 
When journalists are approached by unfamiliar sources they are cautious, as information they 
receive is not always factual. One informant gave me an example from the time when he was 
working in a branch office of the Nation of how a police officer, the son of an MP, tricked the 
media: 
And he had got a reporter to publish names of people who had allegedly been sacked 
for having stolen money. It turned out that two of those people had not been sacked. 
And we were sued. So when he came next time I told him that I didn’t want his 
information again. And I was very blunt with him. I told him he was settling his 
cause. And it is so common; it is there in the police; it is all over. Some of them 
[whistle blowers] may not be genuine. And like I say: don’t take it for granted. 
Whereas information without documentation might be false, information with documentation 
might be unbalanced. Many journalists experienced that documents obtained were selectively 
chosen in order to paint a picture favourable to themselves or their acquaintances or 
unfavourable to their political rivals. 
We also have a problem when you are working on it. Somebody malicious might get 
something on somebody… on corruption or anything like that… and brings it to you. 
It is just part of the whole case, just part of it. He is giving this part, but things will 
deliver what he wants. It will achieve a mean, an end that he wants.  
The unfamiliar source is thus treated with routinised caution. As one informant puts it ‘before 
you trust your whistleblower you must establish his or her intentions. Some people want to 
settle scores using the media and they will pretend to do whistle-blowing.’ Politicians also fall 
into this category as they are not considered trustworthy by many journalists: ‘I consider a 
number of parliamentarians as acquaintances. I can not call them friends because they only 
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want to use you. They are not genuine friends.’ In order to establish the truth journalists check 
their sources.  
A: So it is the duty of the media to (…) establish the intention of the whistleblowers, 
and we do that at the Nation, try to do some audit. And even investigate the 
whistleblower without them knowing. It is very important.  
Q: How do you do that? 
A: How we investigate whistleblowers is, one, this is a matter of policy. When you 
come to us and say this is a big story, a big scandal, we will get your contacts, and we 
will send our journalists who will first of all establish the department where you work. 
That is part of our job. We strive to establish who are your friends, who are your 
enemies. We try to establish whether you have any problems at that place of work. 
Once we have established your friends, we will also be friend with some of your 
friends and try to look at your group psychology. Is there a cause you are fighting as a 
group? And this is not difficult to do. Yes. We have a team of trained journalists in the 
department of investigations. 
Negotiating reciprocity, the role of money 
The reciprocity between sources and journalists is not necessarily based on equality. A source 
might be a friend, and he might be a stranger. The different knowledge on sources impacts on 
journalistic practice. A familiar source might be regularly inspected and nurtured for new 
information. The trustworthiness of an unfamiliar one has to be checked. Whereas the 
reciprocity of familiar sources are mutually agreed upon, the reciprocity of new ones are 
subject to negotiation. Sometimes balance is achieved by the use of financial transactions. The 
guideline of the NMG states that journalists should avoid paying for information because 
serious questions can be raised about the credibility of that information and the motives of the 
buyer and seller (NMG, 2003: 12). This guideline is taken seriously by journalists, but there 
are exceptions to this rule. According to some informants sources expect journalists to pay for 
information, and journalists do buy documents. 
Though ethically it might not be allowed, but I had to use money to get some of these 
documents from them. Because if you don’t have these there is no way you are going 
to prove that they are corrupt. And if you don’t have these there is no way you are 
going to authenticate your story. So you have to sometimes use money to get some of 
these documents to prove a story.  
Buying information is not only the private practice of an eager journalist wanting to disclose 
ills in society. It is also incorporated into the routine practice of the newsroom, it becomes an 
editorial issue and the news media covers the expenses. 
A: Sometimes I have to use my own money. It is not accounted for by the way. Some 
times when it comes to documentation – a juicy story, a very nice one - then you 
discuss it with the office, and ask them: ‘This is what I have got, and this is what this 
guy wants. So if we can have it, well then, good’.  
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One informant told of how he negotiates with potential sources for them to share the 
journalists’ notions of the public interest.  
But I always try to make my contacts friends, not business partners really. So I tell 
them: ‘this is for the best of the society. It is not for me’. I mean, if it is a name. I have 
already made my name. Everybody knows I can do this. So it is not for my name. It is 
just to improve the society. Because at the end of the day any corruption… it always 
trickle down to the citizens, to the tax payers. It always affects you. ‘So if you think it 
is good for you, give it to me.’ I will not promise money to somebody, because I know 
I am not capable of doing that.  
Contrasting the notion of the altruistic source with converging ideals some journalists actually 
see sources who demand payments as easier to handle. Those who appear to be altruistic 
might have an overt agenda whereas the agenda of those selling documents simply is money: 
If you get somebody who you pay to get the information, most likely he wouldn’t 
have an agenda, or his agenda is just the money. But when they come to you freely 
you want to push him: ‘why now?’  
News values and how sources value news 
Journalists believe they share the notion of public interest with many of their sources. They 
share the notion held in the ‘dominant public culture’ (Ericson et al, 1987) or maybe more 
precise in the Kenyan context, the official, middle class culture that the misappropriation of 
public fund is deviant. This is a significant notion that corresponds with that of journalists. 
There is a perception of this ‘altruistic’ source among journalists. The altruistic source blows 
the whistle for the sake of the public interest. Sources leaving documents in hotel receptions 
for journalists to pick up are for instance considered by one informant as such an altruistic 
source, as the source claimed no reciprocity.  
Journalists however hold that there are many agendas pursued under the guise of 
whistle blowing. They regard some as more legitimate than others.   
Achieving professional and organisational goals 
Whereas they share a notion of the public interest with journalists many sources have their 
own professional or organisational goals to pursue. Individuals working in state bureaucracies 
are for example understood by media practitioners to use the mainstream press as a way to 
move the case forward if internal lines of communication prove unsuccessful. If a state 
agency investigates a Government body or a parastatal organisation they create a report to the 
appointment authority. These reports are not public. If no action is taken on the report, people 
within the agency might pass the report on to the media, one informant said. One of the 
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informants told of servants in the National Security Fund who used the press as a second 
route: 
They first of all did an internal audit of the retirement benefits scheme, and found 
several quite, quite a huge chunk of money was being misappropriated, and they tried 
to raise it internally and none paid any attention to it. So they pass this information on 
to us.  
Informants mentioned several examples of how different covert sources in state 
bureaucracies, the police, or parastatals use the news media as a second route in order to 
address corruption in their own organisation.  
News as an expression of the official culture is also useful for cabinet ministers in 
order to address the President, for example that their PS is corrupt and should be sacked 
following the case mentioned earlier. In Kenya political power is highly centralised and the 
President appoints (and fires) permanent secretaries, officials and directors in parastatals, 
ministers and assistant ministers. Media thus becomes instrumentally important for a cabinet 
minister as a channel for communicating with the President in order to serve his own 
objectives as head of a state institution.  
Sometimes if the minister gets a difficulty within his own ministry he can leak it to 
you in order to put pressure on the President. A lot of cases we publish come from 
ministers.  
Many cases of corruption happen in procurement processes where private enterprises compete 
for tender awards. Several journalists found business people very valuable as sources on 
corrupt practices in tender processes: 
Disappointed contractors are also very useful, but very slippery to deal with. They 
will try to influence the tender evaluation committee and pay them bribes to give them 
good scores. Then some will understand the committee is bribed or compromised. 
Then we get everything, minutes from their meetings, everything. We get all the 
information and documentation we want. But you need to understand the dynamics of 
the process: wait, talk to everybody involved.  
Their agenda is often transparent. They want a second opportunity to win the tender, and use 
the media for this purpose. However, they will not complain on tender processes in public as 
they depend on future Government contracts for their businesses.  
Factional, political and private interests  
Corruption leaks stemming from the civil service might also be strategic action of political 
factions present there. They use the national consensus of the evil of corruption for 
instrumental or factional gain: 
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People are very heavily aligned to certain political interests. And because of that even 
the civil service fall into certain of those categories, and although we pretend that the 
civil service is neutral, they are sympathetic to certain interests, and you find that if 
there is a scandal that is being perpetrated by the Government, there are some people 
that most likely will provide information on that scandal. That is my cynical view. 
According to the informant some ministers for example ‘have an interest in black-painting 
cabinet colleagues’, and use the mainstream media, the Parliament or the alternative press for 
that purpose. As politicians have informants in different ministries they are able to provide 
none-favourable information about cabinet colleagues or corruption taking place in their 
ministries. Civil servants will tell the minister that ‘such and such is being misused, especially 
by these guys from the other communities here.’ (…) Sometimes he will not even necessarily 
want to say it himself. He has his own way of using [MPs name].’  
In the process of investigating the source and establish factuality and balance 
journalists sometimes discover that the account of the source was partial. According to the 
informant, whistle blowing is used as a way to draw attention away from the individuals own 
role in a scandal.  
And then as you, in the course of your investigations, you will tumble on these things. 
(…) But as you go in there are cases where you see maybe his name has come in (…) 
you see, maybe in this group that is ‘eating’33. That is what he wants to pre-empt by 
running that and pretending to be whistle-blowing.  
Journalistic autonomy and covert sources 
Sources trying to serve other interests than the altruistic, public service ones are not 
disqualified as sources. These motives might be factional or politically biased or intentionally 
(and maybe effectually) instrumental. Journalists acknowledge that sources try to pursuit 
other interests than their own. This is not a problem according to some informants. The 
important thing is that the information is factual, and the provider’s intentions with it is 
inconsequential. Journalists believe they can balance and reframe it as they process the story 
using their professionalism. Thus factional interests are reframed in the service of public 
interest and the source of information and threads leading to him are made invisible in the 
process. As one media practitioners puts it, ‘I will always listen to him, because my duty is to 
listen. And what I am doing with that information is my own problem.’ The widespread use of 
money for reciprocal purposes might be understood in this regard. Journalists perceive the 
need to use money to buy documents as unfortunate but not as a problem of integrity. To 
achieve this they use their journalistic routines and the judgement of the legal expert at the 
media house. 
                                                 
33 Eating means looting, commonly used for taking part in corruption.  
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Source relations are to some extent based on a long term mutual trust and routine 
interaction. Kwamchetsi Makokha observes the importance of sources for the process of 
interpretation.  
Without the politicians seeking publicity in creating embarrassment for their foes, 
genuine whistle-blowers, and organisations whose mandate includes researching and 
exposing corruption, the media in Kenya would be at a loss as to how to catch graft. 
Often, corruption is a complex subject that journalists and editors find hard to sell 
because they are unable to understand it or even spend time assessing its implications 
(2006: 5).  
For this they depend on their sources. Sources not only provide information on corruption but 
also a framework journalists can use in order to interpret data and information and put it in 
context, and so create a news account. Informants also perceive that their autonomy vis-à-vis 
covert sources is possible as they employ routines securing balance. The accused part is given 
the opportunity to correct facts and defend himself before the story is published:  
You try and find out what is hidden on the other side. So that you have… you almost 
have a balanced story. (…) [Y]ou contact the other person and get his side of the 
story. ‘These are the accusations against you, what do you have to say about it? Is it 
true? Is it not? I have these facts, I have these evidences. What do you have?’ You 
see? 
Changing premises of covert source participation 
According to Downing (1996) secrecy is a battleground and thus changes over time with 
ongoing issues at stake and political conditions. As we have seen above both journalists and 
sources in Government institutions, the police and business men are able to challenge formal 
regulations of the information flow. Downing claims that Government secrecy ‘responds to 
shocks, crises, dictats and disaffection’ (ibid: 154). Secrecy is thus not a static element. It is 
changing as repercussions against whistle blowers change over time together with political 
and organisational culture and the relative sensitivity of issues at stake. Changes in 
Government organisation culture have impact on journalism. Journalists experience changes 
in source relations that affect the ability to access information on corruption and to report on 
corruption. 
More sources, multiple news cultures 
In Kenya institutional pluralism also seem to impact on journalism on corruption. After the 
2002 election the Government established several new organisations. The creation of new 
anti-graft institutions also meant new sources for journalists: The KACC, the Governance and 
Ethics Department at the Office of the President; National Anti-Corruption Steering 
Committee; and the Public Complaints Office. This came on top of other public institutions 
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such as Kenyan Human Rights Commission, Ministry of Justice and non-Governmental 
organisations.  
Moreover, new organisations also enable multiple news cultures not sharing the 
institutional culture of secrecy in old establishments. More sources (both organisational and 
individual) seemed to provide for more accounts of corruption in the news. Some of these 
Governmental institutions operate on a freer basis than the older state institutions and are 
more willing to cooperate with the media. Some Government institutions have developed a 
very close relationship with the media after Narc came to power.  
This finding is not surprising. In urban centres journalists potentially have a huge 
amount of sources from different institutional settings with different needs for access to the 
news. Ericson et al (1987) observe that with a large number of source organisations in a 
particular market area, provide for more openness and variation. However, more 
Governmental institutions in Kenya might also make it easier to refuse responsibility. One 
journalist experienced that it sometimes is a constraint: 
I think the more these bodies are in society, the headache becomes for you to get 
information, because each time you call Githongo’s office they refer you to KACC, 
the KACC will refer you to the steering committee, and the committee will refer you 
back, so you get everybody to back pass, and nobody wants to take responsibility. 
A new ‘democratic space’  
When Kibaki came to power Kenya felt optimism. People stood up against corruption. Media 
reported incidents where passengers of matatus34 intervened to stop traffic police taking 
bribes and vice versa. Many sources speak about a ‘democratic space’ that opened up.  
I think every institution is becoming democratic. You go to the Judiciary everybody is 
willing to speak. You go to Parliament everybody is willing to speak; you go to the 
police force people are willing to speak.  
Informants talk of a new climate – a new ‘democratic space’ - that enabled them to report 
more extensivly on corruption issues. This new space has not only influenced media but also 
organisational cultures media rely on as sources. Journalists experience these changes 
directly. As sources become more vocal and outspoken crucial information becomes more 
available for journalists looking for a good story. Some journalists report that they get more 
tips. 
A: We get so many cases and reports of things that people think are fishy going on 
(…) from Government institutions, private institutions… Sometimes we follow it. It 
could be just a normal thing (…). So they just raise the red flag just to be sure that this 
is not a corruption issue. Sometimes there is a real story there, so we go and dig 
                                                 
34 Public transportation minibuses. 
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deeper and come out with some… You get tips, you never know whether it will be a 
big story or not. Sometimes you follow it and you find it is a normal business, which 
is fine. We don’t ignore any tips that we get. 
Q: And you get more tips now than it used to be.  
A: Yes-yes. Very many.  
Loosened social control 
New organisational cultures must be seen in relations to social practices of control. According 
to informants there was a slightly more liberal practice with regard to whistle blowers, at least 
in the initial phases of the Narc rule. During the former regime media leakages could bring 
serious consequences for the offender.  
The Government knows that they [covert sources]disclose, but they will do nothing 
about it. At least they will not fire, they will not harass because of doing that. What 
will happen is of course that colleagues will not share information with you. They 
withhold information because you occasionally pass it on to the media. But, during 
Moi you would have been sacked or removed, you would have been sacked 
immediately.  
According to another informant Moi regime was also stricter with the Government officials in 
this regard: ‘During Moi’s time there were no Government official who would come and tell 
you, because he would definitely have lost his job.’ Some informants held there was a more 
liberal practice in some state institutions after Kibaki became President than there was during 
Moi’s centralised regime.  
Tightened back region control measures 
However the picture drawn above is not uncontested. Indeed there are certain events that 
support the view that the regime in 2004 did tighten control of the information flow from 
Government ministries, departments, and parastatals. Seven days after MP Maoka Maore 
tabled confidential Government documents in Parliament and disclosed corruption in the 
Kibaki Government, a circular from the office of the President to all Permanent Secretaries 
warning whistle blowers. The circular was forwarded to heads in ministarial departments 
warned that ‘[o]fficers found to be releasing classified information to unauthorised persons 
should be suspended from the service or recommended for expulsion depending on the gravity 
of the subject matter’ (Magari, 2004). The letter and other internal efforts by the Government 
to reduce the flow of confidential information from Government offices worked, according to 
informants. 
When that one came, the standing warning from the secretary of the cabinet, then 
there was a definite crippling of the system, because everybody was scared.  
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According to another informant the letter was just one of the measures taken by Government 
bodies in order to tighten control of information.  
There is a point at which… especially after Githongo left35 things changed a lot. The 
Government became very, very harsh with its own officers. They plunged a lot of 
loopholes, they moved certain key people from certain positions, and they started 
asking the question ‘where is the information coming from?’ 
Different means were employed in order to gain control of organisational boundaries and 
Government secrets. One informant said that State officials in some Government offices are 
now asking all secretaries to write down all the telephone numbers of those contacting the 
department. Then they check with the telephone registry or call newspaper secretaries to get 
cell phone numbers of journalists. This way they are able to monitor communication between 
journalists and different civil servants. Tighter control measures as these are enforced to scare 
civil servants from providing information to journalists.  
Government employees might face repercussions if caught leaking to the press. One 
informant told about whistle-blowers in a parastatal who were punished by their employer 
after the corruption case was disclosed in the mainstream media, and there are also media 
reports about such events: ‘As soon as this information was out they were transferred to some 
backwater of Kenya to go and work there.  (…) So it is still happening. It is actually a little 
more vicious than before,’ according to the informant. Civil servants’ ability to inform the 
public has not increased with a new Government. Some experience no change or a negative 
trend: ‘Public servants are not freer than they used to be. There is actually hazard that they are 
probably less free than they were before’.  
Constrained social relations 
According to several informants, the use of social sanctions in the source organisations as 
well as physical measures as external communication control, also impact on the social 
relations between confidential sources in Governmental organisations and parastatals and 
journalists. Some sources find it difficult to openly acknowledge that they know certain 
journalists: ‘Now they don’t greet me and pretend they don’t know me when I meet them in 
the corridors of the [ministry]. I get treated like a leper’, one informant said. The former asset 
of having a face known now became a disadvantage for the journalist.  
So many know my face. They are afraid: ‘I saw [name] coming to your office.’ If I am 
invited to a party where ministers or state officials are present I don’t dare to say 
‘hello’ to my friends. And the same with press conferences.  
                                                 
35 John Githongo ended his job as PS for ethics and Governance at the Office of the President on the 7th of 
February 2005. 
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Another journalist told me sources that used to contact him directly now had to use other 
means to get in touch. The fear of being seen with a journalist changes the source-journalist 
interaction. More effort is put into hiding connections and social interaction with journalists.  
They don’t even want to be seen with me. Somebody would rather that we see 
somewhere out, where you are not expected to be. Within town they don’t want to 
meet. 
As a consequence of tightened control within Governmental offices some journalists find it 
harder to perform their tasks as journalists. It is more difficult to check Government business 
than it used to be in the early months of the Narc Government. 
Establishing factuality constrained 
Even if some media practitioners experience that source interaction has become more 
problematic, it has not dried up. As long as journalists are able to protect their sources they 
get and maintain them. ‘There are some of those civil servants… who as long as you are able 
to protect them, to assure them confidentiality… then they are able to cooperate.’ What 
changed in 2004 seems not to be that journalists became less aware of Government 
businesses. They still had access to their sources and were able to be informed even if social 
relations became somewhat constrained. The ability to report on these informations, however 
became more difficult. This is an important distinction one of the informants make:  
We get a lot of information. I am chasing some information which looks to be a very 
juicy story, but you see it is only until I get the information… until I get 
documentation that I can sit confidently and write. Even if somebody wants to sue me, 
‘well lets meet in court’, I will write, because I have documentation. When I don’t 
have documentation, how do I go ahead with it?  
Q: You get less tips, but is it also more difficult to talk to civil servants and other 
servants off the record? 
A: no, off the record it is so easy. You will get that. But if I want to get some 
documentary proof, one, two, three letters, some communications in black and white 
then I will be very confident in writing about it. There are so many things happening, 
and all I can do is listen and keep in my archive and hoping that one time I will 
stumble upon a document that will help me out.  
The problem thus does not seem to be lack of information about Government business but a 
declining ability to publish stories lacking documentary proof:  
A: He [the source] is telling you: ‘I can not give you documentation, but I can give 
you a brief: this is what is happening.’  
Q: I see, and that has changed? 
A: and that has changed. And the problem is that when it comes to my… to verify my 
information. If I don’t have the documentation and I get in touch with you to verify 
the information and you say ‘no comment’.  
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When documentary proof is scarce it empowers the accused part. As a professional obligation 
journalists have to establish factuality and balance their stories through the consultation of the 
part unfavourably mentioned in the article. As factuality can not be established without the 
cooperation of the source himself the choice of silence serves him better. ‘No comment’ 
seems to be the best strategic option. Thus the power balance between journalist and source 
changes. 
The changing source relations and ability of journalists to access Government 
documents, described above applies to sources in Government institutions. Journalists do have 
other sources, for example business people. None of my informants described changes in 
these relations.  
Summary and comments 
Sources are crucial for journalism on corruption. Without persons supplying information on 
corruption the journalism would be without fuel. As Kwamchetsi Makokha notes  
If Kenya’s media seem vibrant in the fight against corruption, it is because there is 
sufficient malice within the political system to fuel it, disgruntled suppliers who feel 
short-changed, honesty and indignation in the public service, and staying power in the 
civil society to focus on corruption (2006: 5).  
As we have seen the cooperation of sources in the production of news stories on corruption is 
strategic. It is for the purpose of achieving occupational goals, private income generation; it is 
for the tactical purpose to be left out of a future corruption story presumably disclosed; or to 
achieve political goals. The ‘public interest’ might be considered a frame for news 
construction and a resource for covert sources who wants to legitimise factional-political and 
professional goals within the consensual and ‘dominant culture’ (Ericson et al, 1987). 
Professional norms of objectivity and internal demands to prevent libel suits oblige journalists 
to establish facticity as a requirement for publishing disclosures. Journalists’ professional 
obligation to authenticate a story provides for a market whereby civil servants and politicians 
‘trade’ confidential Government documents for the purpose of achieving professional goals, 
political goals and/or personal wealth accumulation. Trading documents for money is one way 
to reciprocate. Friendship and exchange of information are others. However, leaks must also 
be understood as journalists and sources sharing a common perception of the role of the media 
and public interest as a core news value. 
Journalists are aware of sources having different agendas for the disclosure of 
information. Investigative journalists routinely investigate their sources in order to avoid 
biased stories or false accusations. In the process of investigation and reframing of stories 
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they gain a relative autonomy from their covert sources. However, they sometimes realise that 
they have not been able to fully illuminate a case and therefore used by factional agendas. 
Revelations of corruption were increasingly enabled after Narc entered Government 
offices creating more anti-graft agencies and thus sources of journalism. As new graft was 
revealed, new social and physical resources were used in order to keep Government 
confidentialities confined to back region secrecy. As social and cultural resources are used in 
journalist-source negotiations over news, changes in the physical terrain shape interaction of 
journalists and covert sources. This change did influence journalists’ ability to establish 
factuality and thus to produce news reports on corruption.  
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8. Battles in the news room 
The Judiciary is corrupt, Parliament has corrupt people, we have corruption in our 
churches, why would journalists be any different?  
Koigi wa Wamwere MP, Subukia 
Journalism on corruption is a battle over the construction and distribution of knowledge. 
Chapter 7 explored journalists and covert sources negotiations in back regions of 
governmental institutions. As journalists gain access to corruption information in the back 
regions of the source organisation I suggest the negotiation shifts from the Government 
context to the news organisation as secrets become known to journalists. The negotiations 
explored in this chapter between powerful sources accused and journalists are thus over 
enclosure or disclosure: censorship or publicity. Inspired by Ericson et al’s (1989) model 
presented earlier, the first part looks into how influential sources employ different resources 
in negotiations over news, and the second analyse how journalists employ counter strategies 
to remain in control of the process of production and mediation. Third, I analyse how source 
actions impact on social relations in the newsroom and journalistic practices as these attempt 
to overcome source influence in order to remain in control of the production and selection of 
corruption news.  
Powerful sources shaping news  
One Nation informant mentioned an episode where the paper was in the process of finalizing 
a story on an individual nominated for a top position in an anti graft agency. Before the 
appointment was decided by the President he received a report that implicated the person in 
corruption while holding a senior position in a parastatal agency. In order to complete the 
story the journalist called the individual to get his version of it. The first response from the 
individual was to refuse to cooperate. He refused to comment, trying to obstruct news 
production. He also sent his lawyer to dissuade the journalist from writing the story. As 
persuasion did not lead to the desired result, the journalist was told to expect a law suit if the 
article was published. The example illustrate that powerful sources use different resources 
cultural, social, and physical in order to disable disclosure of stories that affect their person or 
organisation. Doing this they appeal to identities, they use their skills and knowledge of 
journalism, and they use physical resources as injunctions in order to achieve censorship. The 
most powerful ones do not wait for the journalist to contact them. They attempt to get early 
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knowledge of journalist investigations in order to choose tactics and ensure that enclosure is 
maintained.  
Source surveillance of journalists  
Many informants held that sources use different means to gain early knowledge of journalistic 
enquiries in order to protect themselves against negative public attention. Two journalists 
brought up independently that they were regularly under observation by external agents, 
possibly the police. According to one of them powerful sources have a relatively easy task in 
figuring out what is in the pipeline as they know which journalists are able to dig up 
corruption information. ‘They know who is capable of stumbling upon what kind of 
information,’ according to an informant. There are not many investigative journalists in 
Kenya. The Nation has five, the Standard one at the time of fieldwork. According to 
informants they are occasionally monitored, but they do not know who is behind it. According 
to the same informant:  
A: One thing I know is that there are a couple of guys… intelligence (…) keep cops 
on us.  
Q: they tap your phone? 
A: yes, that is for sure. They tap our phones. That is for sure. I have changed my 
number enough times. They tap your phone. They always know where you are, where 
you are supposed to be, you see? That kind of things.  
Another way to get an early warning on what is about to be disclosed is to use in-house news 
workers for this purpose. Using journalism as a private resource does happen in Kenya and 
this is often termed ‘corruption in the media’ since financial consideration is considered a part 
of the reciprocity between the source and the news worker.  
They approach the person and they tell them ‘so and so, an investigative journalist, is 
digging you. He has got this story, and it is very damaging. It can be very bad for you. 
And if we talk I can do something’.  
According to one media practitioner and informant some business journalists nurture close 
relations with their business sources. According to MP Koigi wa Wamwere it is common in 
political journalism. As autonomy from superiors is a resource for dishonest media 
practitioners it is an avenue for external agents who want to influence or stop a news item on 
corruption. Some have regular informants or agents in the media house. One journalist 
informant said that a key minister mentioned in one of the major scandals shaking the Kibaki 
cabinet has sources within one of the newsrooms of the mainstream press. One journalist 
informed of how he was approached by a journalist serving as in-house agent for an external. 
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I remember two incidents where some junior reporters approached me with saying 
that there are some individuals who wanted to meet me so that we can discuss the 
reporting of the [NAME]-scandal. And they offered me some money so that… every 
time we are writing the stories, we re-account their names. And the amount of money 
which was being offered was a huge amount of money.  
Editors are also concerned that informants are operating in the newsroom and providing 
internal information to external agents:  
A: At the Nation we have been very concerned about the extent to which politicians 
are able to find out what we know and what we have in our system. They have 
informers all around.  
Q: They have? 
A: They do that. We know that. Sometimes we get a call from a politician asking you 
about a story you have not even published, which you are still writing. That happens. 
They call the editors and ask you about the story and sometimes ask ‘why should you 
publish it?’ you know. ‘How do you know that I have this story? I don’t have it; it is 
up to you to prove.’ But they do have allies. They do have friends.  
The reasons for surveillance are obvious. When the newsroom is punctured by external 
surveillance it enables sources to use their knowledge to employ the right tools needed to 
secure enclosement or even better, know what to disclose and how. One informant reflected 
on the knowledge game of Anglo Leasing: 
Those who were involved were out trying to find out how much information the 
media had, what they could hold back, what they could release, so it was kind of a cat 
and a mouse game.  
Knowledge of journalism as a source resource 
Occupational norms and practices become part of this knowledge game. Journalists producing 
disclosures observe objectivity as a balance that must be observed within the news item. 
Balance is not conceived as something achieved over time as a case unfolds. As one 
informant puts it: ‘For me to write a story, editors insist that I must get a story from you. If I 
am accusing you of anything I must get your other side of the story.’ He will eventually be 
consulted on the matter and asked for his version before the story is published. This provides 
the journalist with the advantage of a surprise attack if the source is unprepared. Journalistic 
norms and routines provide some opportunities for the skilled and even more for the powerful 
ones.  
Threats of law suits seem to be an instinctive way for sources to react when confronted 
with corruption allegation. But it is also a threat that is taken very seriously by journalists and 
editors as shown in chapter 6. Journalists whose stories are the reason for libel suits against 
the paper might face difficulties with their employers. According to one informant 
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suspensions over libellous articles have occurred. However, these are merely ways to 
intimidate the journalist, according to one informant. 
I remember during Anglo Leasing I think I got about three letters; none of those have 
ended up in court. I have not been asked to appear in court on any of those issues 
which gives you an idea that people just try to intimidate you not to continue writing.  
Libel suit is not only a consequence of journalism but a part of the negotiation of journalism. 
The courts become part of journalism. As the Judiciary is perceived as unpredictable and 
indeed by some as corrupt threats of libel suits create uncertainty among journalists and 
editors.  
Knowing the routines of news production and the fear of libel suits the source may 
refuse to comment on a story and thereby obstruct the news production.  
Anybody you talk to will tell you, ‘I am not aware, let me find out, I will talk to you’ 
and then they will switch off their phones. Then you suddenly can’t get to them and 
all that. That is a strategy that is very common now. Very, very common.  
Sources use this tactic in order to prevent bad publicity. They interpret the journalistic 
professional norms literally and believe that the paper can not publish a story where one part 
is left out, even if the source refuses to cooperate. ‘They believe that if they don’t talk to you 
or give their comment, you will not publish the story.’ According to one informant ‘there is 
no way you prove that you tried to talk to him if he is not appearing on the paper.’ It is 
difficult to prove that you have actually done everything you can in order to get in touch with 
the source. Some journalists said they wait for weeks and months in order to get some 
sources’ accounts. As the former chapter suggests increased source surveillance of 
communications between journalist and source employees empowers the accused part. As 
objectivity is difficult to establish without the cooperation of the source, choosing silence 
serves him better. Silence seems to be the best strategic option.  
Injunctions 
According to one informant, the use of court injunction is also effective as it stops the 
mainstream press from publishing on persons or issues related to particular individuals. 
You have had people who go to court, not because they believe they can win the case, 
but just to stop you from publishing. We have had cases where somebody go to court 
to sue, then you forget about the case and the case stays there. You can’t write 
anything about it.  
Filing injunctions mean employing a strategy of censorship. Injunctions are effective because 
not only do they stop an individual journalist from writing about someone, but the media 
organisation as such. 
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It is more effective in that it stops media from publishing anything about that 
individual. As opposed to where somebody is arrested, his colleagues can still 
continue to publish and write on the story. But when a court injunction is locked on a 
media house not to publish anything about that politician then it means: ‘That is it.’ 
And some of those injunctions can stay in force for months. 
The possible corruption in the Judiciary is a part of the framework for publishing on 
corruption. The mainstream press can not be certain to win a case even if a news story is well 
documented because of the possibility of meeting a corrupt judge.  
I do not believe that corrupt or corruption in the Judiciary is been eradicated, I think it 
is still there. So I can not exclude the possibility that some lawyers are working in 
conjunction with some judges. 
Filing law suits or injunctions and bribing judges are methods sources use in order to control 
publishing and to avoid public scrutiny and negative publicity. At least media practitioners 
assume such particularistic or clientelist methods to be widespread. 
Appeals to loyalties and identities 
As is common knowledge among cultural anthropologists culture is not something static. 
Indeed it is constantly shaped and negotiated in different contexts. Individuals are not bearer 
of one cultural identity but many, and these are employed in different social or professional 
settings. Action might be guided by different norms that give meaning in different contexts. 
Different identities - national, communal, or professional - are appealed to by sources in 
situational negotiations for control over news and news content. Informants claimed that those 
accused of misdeeds often attempt to reframe investigations as the outcome of tribalism rather 
than conducts of professionalism.  
When somebody is being investigated, he goes hiding behind his tribe. (…)  When 
somebody is being investigated for corruption, then the next, he calls a press 
conference. He says, ‘oh, I am being investigated because they want to finish my 
tribe.’ Where does the tribe come in?  
One informant characterise the corruption discourse following disclosures of Government 
corruption as a propaganda war. He calls it ‘instant rebattle, denials and discrediting’ as they 
publicly attempt to discredit corruption reports and blame them on dirty tactics of the political 
opposition. The informant mentions the Anglo Leasing scandal where different sources in the 
Government made several attempts to change the public perception: For example the Anglo 
Leasing scandal was according to the Justice Minister Kiraitu Murungi ‘the scandal that never 
was. (…) It’s unlike Goldenberg where public money was lost. What we will be looking for is 
the conspiracy to defraud the Government’ (Munene and Kago, 21.01.2005).  
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Whereas the dichotomy of professionalism and tribalism is a common battleground 
when corruption is to be understood and framed in public, identities are appealed to when 
sources negotiate corruption news with media practitioners. One informant told how 
Government officials appealed to the national identity of journalists as they urged them to 
consider the collective national interest when reporting corruption. The informant mentions 
one example where the State House urged journalists to play down corruption cases prior to 
an important donor meeting. 
We were called out to a breakfast meeting early this year with the head of public 
service, Government spokesman, several PS, principle secretaries just ahead of the 
donor consultative meeting, here in Nairobi, and the general brief to us was: ‘go a bit 
easy on these corruption issues, because we have this review meeting with donors and 
we want this money so that [they] can come and help our people. So why don’t you go 
easy on this corruption thing and don’t go too much on it.’  
According to one informant the Government classifies journalists in two groups, the patriotic 
and the non-patriotic: ‘Now if you report corruption you are deemed to be non-patriotic, the 
same trick as a lot of dictators use everywhere. But it is coming to force very, very heavily.’  
‘Patriotic reporting’ might be understood as a reframing of the public interest. Journalists 
must undertake responsible reporting and not act contrary to the good of the nation and its 
people. Thus journalists should rest the issue of corruption for the Government to successfully 
negotiate donor support.  
The issue of ethnicity was also brought up by another informant. According to him 
there are certain expectations held by the ethnic community that constrict non-discriminating 
reporting of corruption and other perceived misdeeds. As one of my informers put it:  
A: [E]thnicity is a method by which somebody can say that ‘this is our very own, let 
us not crucify him.’ Yes.  
Q: Does it make it more difficult for you to report on [people from your own tribe]? 
A: It makes it difficult, because you are in a position where you do not know what to 
do. You don’t know what your people will think about you… you will go out and say 
that my tribe man refused to help me… and also you will also be guilty of crucifying 
my own…  
The influence of communal or ethno-political identities on journalistic practices is not just 
source claims holding no substance in the Kenyan context. It is a perception in Kenya that 
communal ties do influence on journalism. You are perceived as biased if you write nice 
about one of your own or corrupt if you scrutinze him. Journalists are not unified on this 
issue. The news worker quoted above experienced that his ethnic identity made it difficult to 
report critically about members of his own ethnic community. Yet another media practitioner 
said he did consciously edit articles in accordance with his ethno-political sympathies during 
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the referendum campaign in autumn 2005. As one informant put it ‘we as journalists have not 
been able to rise above the tribes. That is the biggest problem we have in here.’ 
Accusations of bias against journalists are common. Journalists are accused of having 
an agenda dismissing ideals of objective reporting. Typically those being investigated for 
corruption will try to convince editors that their researching journalist is malicious or 
politically and ethnically biased.  
Sources appeal to the different registers of identity they believe are most influential in 
situational contexts. Meeting a fellow tribesman they seek to appeal to communal identity or 
professional identity when they present their case for the editor.  
Threats  
Journalists working on corruption stories are also subject to threats from sources or their 
affiliates who want to stop investigations into certain matters or individuals’ conducts. Several 
of my informants had experienced what they interpreted as threats:    
A: There are so many experiences. One, either I get threatened, because for instance if 
I am exposing corruption as far as drug trafficking is concerned… arms trafficking are 
concerned... That is a risk to my life. Yes. (…) They simply tell you not to write the 
story. ‘You are messing up with me. I can mess up with you.’ (…) 
’why are you writing stories like you are writing your last story?’  That is threat. 
Because I can not write my last story unless either I am dead, I am planning to retire 
and never to write again. 
Q: (…) How is such threats communicated then? 
A: it is so easy. They will call the office. They will call you on your cell-phone.  
Sometimes journalists receive threats concerning their life by sources they can identify. ‘I was 
told [when I asked for an interview] that ‘this land has killed so many people and you might 
not be an exception, so you better leave it alone.’ Sometimes threats are communicated more 
indirectly, as a friendly advice by strangers:  
An acquaintance of you, or somebody you don’t know, might bump into you… [for 
example] in a social place and (…) in the process of introduction he says: ‘ah, so you 
are this person, I have never met you, I have heard a lot about you, I have read a lot 
about you but don’t do this and this and this. This is very dangerous’. You see? You 
don’t know this person, why you want to do you a favour, (…) so why would you 
want to be so friendly to me.  
Journalists differ on how serious they believe these threats to be. ’We don’t consider it to be 
too serious to get us worried, but I have got several calls.’ Others have experienced threats 
they hold to be more than mere intimidations. The more powerful the individuals they 
investigate the more serious journalists consider threats and harassment. In this context 
investigating State House is difficult, according to sources.  
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One of the informant I met in Nairobi employed different security measures in order to 
be able to work. He had engaged a private security guard, slept at different locations, and 
changed travel routines in order to make it harder for sources to catch up with him. However, 
as the informant said, ‘if they want to find me they will find me easily. I have no car. I stay in 
the suburb. So… getting me, and work on me, and disciplining me is very easy.’ The 
informant planned to go into exile and did eventually do so some time after I left Nairobi. A 
second informant left Kenya for a temporary exile abroad following the police raid of the 
STG in Nairobi in March 2006.  
Journalist counter strategies  
Sources use different tactics to obstruct news production and achieve censorship as they 
obstruct the balancing of a story or the process of establishing journalistic facticity. Some 
powerful sources infiltrate the newsroom to negotiate news production and journalists 
sometimes experience that their stories are killed. Pressures or attempted interventions from 
sources and the media management make journalists employ counterstrategies in order to 
control their stories and public disclosure.  
Overcome source silence and secure facticity 
When producing a news story the standard procedure is to get the party involved in the news 
production by giving his own comments and statements on the claims before it is selected for 
publishing.   
What we now do is try to give the other party an opportunity to say their story before 
we publish. So that is… when you end up in court you say ‘this was a fair comment. 
He was given an opportunity to say his part of the story and defend himself.’ So in a 
way that is what we try to do (…) just to cover up ourselves.  
If sources refuse to cooperate in order to avoid a story journalists use different techniques to 
overcome these obstacles. When the Ministry of Finance came in the media spotlight over the 
Anglo Leasing scandal in the summer of 2004 the Finance minister Mwiraria did not surface 
for a long time.  
A: We begged him, we tried all manner of things, wrote letters to respond to us. He 
did not respond. So they believe that silence is the best weapon. So they just keep 
quiet. If they don’t say anything, you can’t quote them.  
Q: are there techniques you use to break this silence? 
A: (…) Sometimes the minister when they have official functions, when they know 
that media are chasing them they never hold official functions, so we wait for them 
until they have official functions. (…) 
Q: But the fact that Mr. Mwiraria did not speak. Did that create a difficulty? 
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A: Sometimes we just have a document, and just want to tell him, this is what we 
have. What is your side of the story? If he doesn’t speak to you and somebody else 
has spoken elsewhere, we just say ‘according to the document available…’ and print it 
out to the market.  
Journalists use different means to enable a story when sources keep quiet. If it is impossible to 
get in touch with the accused part the reporter might leave out his name. The mainstream 
press prefers to identify the assumed culprit, because it makes the news story more 
trustworthy: ‘You may have to do the story without naming names. For the reader, may not be 
convinced that facts are correct if you are not naming names.’  
What we do sometimes, if we are sure the information is correct. (…) We may publish 
the story, but we do not publish the names of the culprits. (…) So that is a technique 
we use, and the person we cannot name brings himself out. (…) Once he has 
responded we can use his name and legally we have also given him a fair chance… 
you secure your position in case somebody go to sue you. 
Another informant used to find overt and powerful sources that he uses to ‘attribute the story’. 
‘Now, of course some documents are not privileged. Therefore you can be taken to court for 
quoting them if the information is libellous. [These sources talk] while I am quoting a 
document.’ If a journalist fears a law suit he consults with his editor and company lawyer in 
order to check whether the evidences in the case are strong enough to win a law suit.  
No matter how evidenced a story is there will be complains. These are part of the 
game. According to one informant they are trying to find out whether a story is documented 
or not. They are ‘fishing’ trying to find out if a law suit can be profitable: 
Most times what businessmen and civil servants would do is write you and demand 
letter to apologise: ‘we hope you will apologise and therefore ask you to settle out of 
court.’ They also do fishing. They are trying to find out if you have information, do 
you have documentation? They will send you a letter and threaten to sue you in seven 
days. What we normally do is to ask our lawyers to respond to them and tell them that 
we have the evidence and we should meet in court.  
The possibility of lawsuits and convictions do impact on the selection of stories. Some stories 
never find their way to the media.  
Some cases when we really cannot cover ourselves we don’t touch the story, we keep 
it in a wait, hoping along the way we will stumble on documentation which will give 
us the opportunity to tell that story.  
Filing law suits is not without risks as media practitioners do control positive coverage which 
politicians strive for.  
If for example we find that somebody is very problematic and always complain about. 
That means that we have to be extra careful, whenever we cover his utterances, never 
publish his utterances, you know what I mean. We have to be more careful. At times 
we may just avoid covering that person.  
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One politician who bullied and threatened journalists with libel suits today faces serious 
difficulties when trying to get positive publicity or any publicity at all. The politician is more 
or less boycotted by the press, according to several informants. Journalists know that 
politicians depend on positive media coverage. ‘I think they need the publicity more than we 
need them. So they also don’t want to annoy us very much, because they want us to come 
again tomorrow (ha-ha).’ This empowers them when handling threats of lawsuits and pressure 
from their politician sources. 
Handling surveillance 
According to one informant the longer it takes to publish a story ‘the more are the chances 
that the networks will be able to catch up with you.’ One informant explained that the police 
are very good at covering up corruption: 
The police are very good at covering up. So one of the things you want to do is to 
close the options for the police, shut off the options for the police, so that there is no 
opportunity for them to cover up.  
The journalist is given an advantage if the investigation is not revealed to the possible culprit 
before the journalist is ready to face him with the evidence. The external and internal 
monitoring of journalists by external sources has made journalists employ several measures in 
order to maintain control over the news production process. Journalists use their sources 
within the police force and get tipped off when they are being monitored:  
It is very easy for me to find out information if something is happening. And we also 
have contacts, we also have friends. People you have done favours for, people owe 
you a favour. If something is happening on you, they will tell you by the way. ‘This is 
happening, but I did not tell you. (…) I am not aware of anything.’  
At least he has tipped you off on what is happening. So you get that tip, and 
then you know what a phone sounds like when it is being tapped. If you are given 
those kind of tips, you will know when your phone is being tapped.  
Then they take precautions on what they speak about on the phone, they switch between 
different SIM-cards and meet their sources privately.  
Impacts on news room relations and journalist practices 
The mainstream press does hold responsibility for occupational risks that journalists are faced 
with carrying out journalism on corruption. According to an editor in the Nation  
[w]e do everything possible, we even provide physical protection if it is necessary. 
We do that. And the others know that anything that arises from their work, the 
company will take responsibility. Yes anything, whether it is you are taken to court, 
you are in physical in trouble, we can take security guards to your house if necessary.  
 101
However, he also held that there is a limit to which staff and information in the newsroom can 
be secured. There is also a need for efficiency and transparency in the news production 
process. The Nation uses a computer system that enables journalists to work together and 
share information. Access to articles in progress is diversified and increased with 
responsibility. However such systems also enable some to profit from others. As one 
informant put it ‘such systems always have loopholes. (…) The problem is also a lack of 
loyalty among journalists.’ When externals operate within a newsroom it might alter news 
production, as vital information on the status of investigation is revealed to suspects. This 
might put covert sources’ identity and the production of the story at risk. As sources and 
power holders infiltrate the different work division of a media firm it thus impacts on relations 
and journalistic practices within the news room.  
Trust and distrust in the newsroom 
That journalists perceive a clash of interests between loyal and disloyal journalists in the news 
room, is evident from this statement: 
One of the most important things that really bothers me is you do a very good story, 
you work very hard, you work on a story that… is almost threatening to take your life 
(…). But somebody else comes to benefit from that story.  
The informant told me about personal routines he employs in order not to lose evidence for 
his story. In order to prevent colleagues from stealing documentation he always makes several 
copies and keeps these at different physical locations. If one copy is taken then he always has 
a backup. The relations between editors and journalists are also impacted by suspicions of 
journalists nurturing relations with politicians that are too close. 
I would like to have firm evidence because that will be a disciplinary matter straight 
away. It means you can not share certain information with that journalist. It means 
that when you are planning certain things which are very sensitive you need that 
journalist out. It means that when you get any stories from that journalist concerned 
with that particular politician you will have to check very closely to be sure that he is 
not planting a story in the interest of that politician. 
One journalist informant had once experienced that the identity of his whistle blowers were 
exposed by an editor. The sources faced consequences at their work place following this 
disclosure. Likewise, when stories are ‘killed’ it raises anxiety, suspicion and distrust.  
This issue concerns the journalist because it puts him in a difficult position vis a vis his own 
sources, as the journalist’s integrity is put in doubt.  
The other side, I write a story and somebody kill the story. Somebody out there will 
think that I refuse to publish the story because I received some money.  
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Journalists do not always get any explanation for such decisions. Sometimes they are just told 
to leave the company or person alone or they are asked whether they have an agenda. Such 
actions by editors raise suspicion. The secrecy such editorial decisions are wrapped in 
increasingly make them a source of speculation. When journalists get a phone call from one 
of their seniors to leave a company or an individual alone, they might and do interpret the 
incident as the action of a corrupt leader. The commercial well-being of the newspaper also 
becomes part of the journalists’ corruption news judgement.  
If you are the journalist who wrote the story that resulted in a response where 
advertising was stopped, and for some reason maybe the manager negotiated and the 
advertisement was stopped. So, next time you get a big story on them you are really 
not sure whether you want to touch it, because again, it might just come direct to you. 
Yes, So... to that extent, yes, it does affect the work of journalists.  
Examples of disloyal or corrupted journalists or editor colleagues fuel suspicions and 
speculations in the news room. Relations in the newsroom are to some extent marked by lack 
of trust between journalists in the newsroom and between journalist and editors. Some 
colleagues and superiors are perceived as corrupt, politically biased, or both. This is not 
accounted for in research literature, and as will be shown below it also influences how 
journalists negotiate their stories in order to achieve their publishing.  
Impacts on journalist autonomy 
In-house surveillance and the lack of trust between journalist and editor made one journalist 
practice more autonomy from his editors. 
There have been occasions where I have come under pressure from my own media 
house, where they have asked me to reveal the identity of my sources. But I have 
refused. Because of that I am still enjoying their confidence and they continue giving 
information.  
Some also undertake investigations without their editors’ knowledge in order to minimise 
interference with their work.  
More often than not I know the story, the editor is not aware of what I am writing. So 
I have all the facts. So it is me and the person I am writing about. My employer 
doesn’t know. It is only a degree of when I present the story to him. That is when he 
will be aware that there is such a story I am chasing. Otherwise he is not aware.  
The careful internal and external information management is important in order to succeed in 
producing and publishing a story. It seems as if the fewer the people that know about ongoing 
investigations, the better. Important in this regard is the time it takes from the accused part is 
contacted till the time it is published. A well documented revelation of corruption is hard to 
kill. However it does happen and the argument of a possible libel suit is difficult to 
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renegotiate in the news room: ‘You know, this will take us to court. You know, you don’t 
have this, you don’t have that.’ One journalist explained that it sometimes was worthwhile to 
present different stories to different editors in order to master and overcome individual bonds 
of loyalty or challenge media owners’ directives:  
There are some editors who know which are the sensitive areas. (…) He will not touch 
the story. He will not publish it. Luckily now, I think the story was published, because 
the editor who I presented the story to, (…) decided to bite the bullet and he knew that 
he was doing that. 
Many stories are put on hold as documentary evidence is not perceived as consistent. Some 
stories are killed. In case of the latter it might not be the end of it as information and 
documentation can be forwarded to other outlets or to parliamentarians as the last resort, 
according to one informant. If one is unable to select and publish a story as a consequence of 
loyalties or corruption, another might.  
Summary and comments 
Sources appeal to loyalties, they use their knowledge of the news production process and they 
penetrate the newsroom in order to get knowledge on and negotiate news production. 
Powerful sources also use the management level to gain influence the editorial practice and 
the selection of singular stories. The revelation of sources’ identities, attempted bribes, and 
the killing of corruption stories create distrust among media practitioners in the newsroom, 
impacting on social relations and journalistic practices. Journalists practice increased 
autonomy in order to protect their sources, their stories and themselves. This autonomy of 
journalists, I suggest, provides for practices that make journalism the instrument of powerful 
and, in this respect, governmental sources. It is thus a resource exploited by journalists for 
professional purposes and by other media practitioners and their patrons for clientelist 
favours. Journalism on corruption is experiencing this puzzling paradox of media freedom. 
Whether it is social or cultural explanations for the breakdown of professionalism is difficult 
to tell. With loyalty there is also often a social or economic benefit.  
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9. Media ownership and sources: interests and conflicts  
The Kenyan mainstream press reported extensively on corruption in 2003 and 2004 (see 
chapter 5). In 2004 rumours held that the new Government had merely inherited the old 
networks of corruption from the former Kanu regime. These allegations were further detailed 
in January 2005 when a Standard article Mr. Moneybag detailed how businessmen known as 
supporters of the former regime now frequented the Office of the President, and detailed 
allegations of corruption against then National Security Minister Chris Murungaru were put 
forward (see Ngotho, 07.01.2004). Murungaru ordered journalist Kamau Ngotho to be 
arrested and charged with criminal libel contrary to Section 194 of the Penal Code. The 
Standards ‘Media Maverick’-columnist Kodi Barth wrote of the irony he experienced as Mr 
Moneybag was being investigated by the CID: 
While Associate Editor Kwamchetsi Makokha was being grilled on Tuesday at the 
Criminal Investigations Department headquarters in Nairobi, I was saying nice things 
about this Government to a visiting Norwegian official. (…) 
I told her that in my opinion, Kenya’s media was now enjoying a relatively bigger 
democratic space compared to the years before Narc. The fact that the media could 
now talk and publish without undue fear of a sudden torrent of police rungus on their 
back, I figured, was progress enough – even if we still had over 200 libel cases 
littering our courts (Barth, 16.01.2005) 
Barth (ibid) and several of my informants expressed that the ‘democratic space’ increased as 
Kibaki and the Narc entered the Government offices in 2003. These accounts are interesting 
as there have hardly been any formal changes of media regulations since Moi left State 
House. Laws and regulations obviously impact on journalistic practice in Kenya. Brian 
McNair (1998: 83-100) see the political system and the laws and regulations it imposes on the 
society’s cultural producers as one of four variables that define the extent to which the 
political environment shape the journalist’s work. However, he also holds that the political 
culture shapes the political environment of journalism. When Barth evaluates the democratic 
space he does not evaluate the formal requirements of press freedom but the political culture 
that premises it. I have argued earlier in this study that Kenyan power holders and 
Governmental sources historically have used state resources selectively in order to control 
news. Are such clientelist political uses of the state changing in Kenya? In this chapter we 
revisit the role of ownership in order to explore how it gets involved as an agent in the 
mediation of news on corruption in Kenya.  
Doing this we should assume that different owners hold divergent political 
orientations, different economic interests, and indeed we should assume different ideas of 
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journalism. As the state is plural in terms of organisations, goals and powers, as the Cabinet is 
divided along political and ethnical lines, and as Kenya has a history of clientelist selective 
use of state resources state-media relations is best understood as qualitative relations rather 
than fixed structures as argued for in chapter 2. Below we look at the perception of 
interference and their consequences, namely that stories on corruption are occationally 
stopped by the non-professional management. Then we look at how powerful sources turn to 
the non-professional management of the Nation and the Standard respectively as avenues for 
influence and the resources they use. Accounts of media owners and top management are not 
part of the empirical material for this thesis. Thus this is primarily an analysis of how 
interferences is understood and perceived by media professionals. Such a focus is not without 
value as the meaning media practitioners’ add to their experiences influence their counter 
strategies as shown in the former chapter.  
Stories ‘killed’ 
[The source] gets worried and he talks to my employer, my boss, and says ‘I am trying 
to be malicious and I want to mess up his name.’ And when that happens I go to my 
editor and tell him ‘this is what I have. I have got this and this from here and there. 
Factual, this is what I have. What do you have to say?’ And then it is his decision, not 
mine. If he tells me to go on I go ahead and write my story.  
Journalists undertake the production of corruption news. Editors have the final say in the 
publishing of these stories. Corporate executives act to ‘protect the commercial and political 
interests of the firm’ (Gans, 1980: 95). However, powerful sources such as cabinet ministers 
do not (necessarily) argue with journalists. They call the senior management (business or 
editorial) of the newspaper in order to negotiate their cause. The Kenyan President does not 
call the Nation or the Standard to complain. He has his advisers to call. As any media firm 
works by division of labour and decisions powerful sources seek influence editorial practices 
the level most likely to bring the desired outcome. Both media owners and senior news 
management in Kenya are important in this regard, as media owners in Kenya have the 
opportunity to and occasionally do interfere in editorial decisions (Barland, 2005: 105). The 
management and sometimes ownership figures are contacted over stories worrying influential 
sources. When the media CEO is called by powerful sources he talks to his editors and they 
handle the issue discussing the case with the journalist. The journalist has the opportunity to 
defend the story he is currently writing, as the above quote shows. Journalists are occasionally 
told to leave a story or a person alone. Stories are sometimes ‘killed’ by the media 
management. Sometimes the longer terms investigations are restricted. Source interferences 
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through the media ownership have been observed historically during Kanu rule in Kenya (see 
for example Gecau, 1996; Munene, 2004). However, to my knowledge it has not been subject 
to analysis after the regime change in 2002. 
The extent to which firm representatives interfere in singular cases is not known. 
However, it does happen. Selection practices are altered and changed by source and 
ownership interventions and according to informants increasingly so as new revelations began 
hitting the Narc regime in 2004.  
The case of the Nation: friendship and loyalty 
With the Kibaki administration new people came to power. These were individuals whose 
time in opposition saw themselves in alliances with the press over a common cause, to see the 
end of the more than two decades long rule of President Moi. As one informant put it, ‘their 
days in the opposition have formed very close alliances in the media, because they were 
fighting the same cause.’  
Informants disagree as to what degree the newspaper daily is subject to pressure from 
the owners. According to informants powerful sources such as cabinet ministers address 
media executives when they are unhappy with media coverage or if they scent that news 
reports touching negatively on their public image are in production and about to be published.  
For instance former Finance Minister Mwiraria turned to the CEO of the NMG to express his 
frustration with Nation journalists.  
A: So the CEO would want to find out why this particular minister or chief executive 
thinks that he is getting bad publicity. And we said, ‘he does not speak. If he speaks 
we will give him acres and acres of space.’ If he does not speak and his opponents are 
speaking we cannot hold a story because the minister does not speak or if a chief 
executive don’t speak. So we tell the CEO to tell them to speak to us. We will give 
them an opportunity to say their story.  
Q: so the CEO doesn’t put pressure on you to cover him nice? 
A:  Nooo… hardly. I have not heard an instance where my CEO have told me to go 
slow on anybody. Unless he tells it to my editors, I don’t know. But I have not had an 
opportunity where he has called me to tell me we need to go slow on this one, this guy 
has complained about…. We get to know that they went to see him and complain. He 
sought information on why it happened and he was given an explanation. But that 
never stops us from doing stories. 
This informant held he had never been under pressure from the business management of the 
media house and asked to put certain corruption stories on hold. Others however emphasise 
that the environment changed as the disclosure of new cases of corruption started to hit the 
Narc Government in 2004. According to an informant the close relations between the owners, 
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managers and power holders have been sustained for many years, and they influence 
journalistic judgements on framing and selection.  
It is more than usual to get signals, about a story you have written, the kind of signals 
which make you (…) uncomfortable, because you know purely on professional basis 
you are on good ground, the story was right, you have the evidence. But the kind of 
signals you have probably been too hard on certain individuals (…): ‘are you dwelling 
too much on the negative aspects of the Government? Why don’t you also give the 
Government a chance to settle down’, you know.   
For an editor it is difficult to stand up against external political pressure if he does not have 
the support of the media owners.  
Q: Political pressure, does that create self censorship? 
A: they are forcing you to be too cautious, and sometimes to hold back on a story, that 
is self censorship.  
Q: What might the reaction be? So what if a politician becomes angry? 
A: But you see these media organisations. I don’t own the [newspaper]. I am only an 
employee. (…) It is very different if you own the newspaper yourselves. You can tell 
them go to hell. You see what I mean…?  
The Anglo Leasing scandal 
It is common knowledge that former President Moi put pressure on the media owners during 
his dictatorial rule in the 1980’s. According to Macharia Munene the owner Aga Khan did 
occasionally call the then editor of the Nation Joe Kadhi and express that he should not ‘anger 
his Excellency the President’ (2004). There are indications that ownership still is used as an 
avenue for powerful sources who want to negotiate singular news items and editorial policy of 
the mainstream press.  
Some informants hold that the Nation was put under severe pressure to ‘go slow’ on 
the Anglo Leasing case in the autumn of 2004. The Nation had run a series of disclosures 
summer the summer of 2004 (see figure 9.1). It is interesting to note that investigative reports 
and investigative reporters seem to disappear from the case in the autumn while regular beat 
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The head of this investigation at the Nation said, however, that this was so for reasons of 
security of journalist staff. However, according to other informants the Nation was under 
severe pressure to stop disclosures of the Anglo Leasing scandal. 
There was a lot of pressure on the coverage of Anglo Leasing scandal, when 
everybody was closing in and almost unravelling the mystery around Anglo Leasing. 
And Nation just left… stopped covering that matter anymore, because I think State 
House indicated that ‘hey, you guys, this is getting personal.’ 
Other informants confirmed this information. One informant also mentioned a particular story 
on the Anglo Leasing that was killed by the management of the Nation before it was 
published.  
It was to be published the next day, and the management said no. (…) And they didn’t 
publish that story completely. So it can come to that level where they say: ‘Don’t 
cover too much on this individual, or leave that story out, just forget about it.’ It 
comes to that level. 
A common interpretation would be to see this as a consequence of loyalties since the Nation 
is considered relatively Kibaki-friendly. One informant thus suggested ties of loyalty. 
According to him old friendship and expectations from the days in opposition are hard to 
withstand.  
That intimacy, that relationship which they built (…) is a liability right now. And 
there are such individuals… and you can not turn around and end many, many years 
of friendship between certain vocal politicians and certain people gain more influence 
in the media. 
Whether the Nation decided to ‘go slow’ on the issue as they shared the political or 
ideological beliefs of their sources and displayed loyalty, or whether there were other kinds of 
arguments involved is not known. One informant informed me that the media house might be 
anxious that their sustained reporting would be too damaging for the Government. To bring it 
down would not be in the interest of the media house. As news worker informants are left to 
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speculate on why it was so, so am I. What is clear is that the Nations investigations into the 
Anglo Leasing scandal were going slow from the autumn 2004 onwards, and that this 
happened following Government source pressure of one kind or another.  
The case of the Standard: the selective use of state power 
During Moi’s rule prior to the election in Kenya in 2002 the Standard was considered a pro 
Government and pro Kanu newspaper. As the Kenyan people decided to change Government 
in 2002, the Standard faced a new role as an opposition newspaper. Since the regime change 
the Standard has been a vocal critic of the Government scrutinizing Government figures and 
institutions for malpractices. The oppositional character and possibly the financial situation of 
the paper have led Government sources to use other means in order to negotiate the selection 
of corruption news.  
According to one informant the Government can employ different ‘weapons’ against 
media enterprises that provide unfavourable publicity. This informant claims that media 
owners as individuals are targeted for Government pressure in order to control publishing 
practices in privately owned media houses not showing loyalty to power holders.  
A: It is a sort of… well, I think… What the Government does is… you know it also 
has a weapon, you know like… ‘You are running this business and (…) I have all 
these things about you, so if you don’t go slow on me I will go very hard on you.’ So 
that is one way… 
Q: [So it is a] kind of blackmailing… ? 
A: yes, blackmailing. I think blackmailing is the right word. ‘You know, I have this 
about you and I haven’t quite done anything about it, so if you do not go slow on me, 
really I think I am going to do something about it.’   
Q: does that apply to the ownership level or to… 
A: Well it applies to the ownership level, of course, nobody in Government has 
anything on me. And if I want to put out a story, this really wouldn’t work on me. 
Yes. But at some level it works, maybe at the ownership level. The ownership is 
political. And business paper is owned largely by people who were in the last 
Government, and this new Government still has a lot of issues to sort out with them. 
So at that level I think it can still work, and that trickles down to where we are. 
This information was confirmed by another informant. The courts are used selectively in 
order to stop corruptions stories from surfacing in the mainstream press. As misdeeds are 
found among the former ruling elite the prosecutions of these cases are made dependent upon 
loyalty shown to the sitting regime. Media owners are sometimes told to stop bad publicity, an 
informant said: ‘either [you] are going to be charged in court or you are going to reign in your 
media house. According to this informant one of the shareholders had been brought to court 
and charged ‘as a demonstration of seriousness.’ Thus the political and selective use of state 
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resources for the purpose of negotiating corruption stories out of the public sphere still happen 
in Kenya in the post Kanu era. State resources might be used as incentives and punishment 
when editorial policy and publishing practices are negotiated with owners and senior news 
management. 
A huge portion of the advertising revenue of the Kenyan newspaper daily the Standard 
comes from Government departments or parastatals. According to an informant, the 
‘Government or sub-Government agencies account for slightly over 60 per cent of all your 
income from advertising.’ Other informants deny this number and insist that it is much lower. 
Anyhow, if this revenue dries up it has consequences for a newspaper as its survival depends 
on advertisements. According to informants the advertising purchasing power was used by 
cabinet ministers in order to influence editorial decisions in the media. In 2003 the Standard 
was threatened that they would lose revenue if they continued their investigations into certain 
issues of corruption. In late 2004 the newspaper saw declines in the volume of advertisements 
from Government agencies. Government advertisements are used both as a way to punish the 
Standard for bad publicity and in order to push for a change of editorial practices.  
A: well, there have been cases and the columnists have written about them where 
certain Government… certain arms of Government, ministries, agencies of 
Government, advertised, placed adverts in all the other papers, but us. (…) I mean, the 
life line of a media house is advertisements.  
Q: did that affect the economy of the Standard? 
A: naturally we would like to have as many adverts as you possible can. When you 
are denied these advertisements naturally you will suffer. You are hurt.  
The severe loss of money affects internal relations in the newsroom.  
So the denial of revenue creates havoc. It creates havoc if you understand the kind of 
media model that we work with. If you take away Government advertising, even just 
half of it… (…) for one month you will have played havoc with the finances of your 
company to the extent where you may not be able to guarantee salaries to your staff!  
The editorial divisions of the media house suffered from declining income, and this impacts 
on editorial decisions. Editors find that they must ‘kill a story’ in order to save the company 
economy: 
You see, this is a business enterprise. And when… when… when somebody upstairs 
calls me to tell me to drop that story, it means this business is seriously threatened. 
(…) It is really crucial for them, because this Government has the capacity to shut 
down this organisation.  
Important in this regard is, as mentioned in the former chapter, that decisions to kill stories or 
to halt investigations into corruption issues affect newsroom relations and journalist practices. 
Moreover, it affects the watchdog role of the news media.  
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Summary and comments: Ownership and media autonomy 
The clientelist or particularistic use of state resources was well known in different periods of 
Moi’s rule. In the 1980’s the state banned publications and arrested media practitioners using 
the laws as powerful tools to control media performances. In the 1990’s media loyalty was 
honoured in terms of positive incitaments as frequencies.  
Ownership still matters, also for sources attempting to impact on news production and 
story selection. Many informants upheld that the ownership of their news organisation was 
crucial for their work on corruption issues. However, it seems that Government sources used 
different strategies to maintain enclosure. As owners pursue different interests commercially 
and politically they are subject to different pressure from powerful sources eager to impact on 
editorial decisions. It is held by different informants that the Nation management is loyal to 
the sitting President sharing political oppositional goals in the 1990’s. Sources appeal to 
ownership loyalties in order to influence newsroom practices through media owner. The 
Standard is the smallest paper in terms of circulation and vulnerable to financial pressure. 
Powerful sources use advertisements and selective use of courts to influence editorial 
decisions and policies, first as threats, then in practice, as the Standard experienced. The 
Standard has also experienced that the court system are used selective in order to influence 
editorial policies and practices with regard to news on corruption. These particularistic 
pressures are viable options for influence for only a few individuals/organisations mainly 
those controlling state resources. Publishing practices are partially affected by such pressures 
as it impacts on the selection and production of certain corruption stories. This also leaves a 
circumscribed autonomy left for media practitioners to explore and affects the watchdog role 
of the Kenyan mainstream press.  
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10: Final remarks  
In the introduction the question of the role of corruption news in Kenya in a democratic 
perspective was raised. The Kenyan mainstream press reports regularly on corruption. The 
volume on corruption reported by the Kenyan daily newspaper the Nation more than doubled 
from the years 2001/2002 till 2003/2004. If taken as a general trend Kenyan media seems to 
report more on corruption after the regime change in late 2002, than before. In 2004/2005 this 
trend was reversed, as shown in chapter 5.  
The increased attention given to corruption by the mainstream media after 2002 is to 
some degree informed by findings in the news production analysis. Deductive conclusions 
should however be avoided as the content analysis is based on a much broader understanding 
of corruption journalism than the production analysis, which is primarily narrowed down to 
disclosures of back region secrets. Some links between content and production however are 
obvious. First, the increased coverage might be understood as a response to a vocal 
commitment by leading Government figures that the new regime will have no tolerance of 
corruption. As President Kibaki came to power corruption became a major issue. The 
President and the Government’s promises became a benchmark for judging corruption and 
increased the newsworthiness of corruption revelations. As news was acted upon it made the 
journalists feel powerful and proud as they perceived they were fulfilling the journalist 
watchdog mission, as suggested in chapter 6. During Kibaki’s first two years of presidency 
new anti-corruption institutions were established. This provided for more sources on 
corruption issues and might also have contributed to a culture of more openness and 
transparency in Government organisations. As a new coalition of parties entered the 
Government offices, civil servants, Government officials, and other whistle blowers felt 
encouraged to disclose information of misdeeds undertaken during the former regime. 
Openness and transparency seemed to increase as Kenya changed Government. Moreover, 
openness made more documentation available to news workers, enabling them to publish 
corruption stories without too much anxiety about libel suits. It also encouraged journalists to 
investigate and disclose corruption. The empirical data presented in chapter 7 suggest that 
there is a shared belief of the public interest among sources and journalists disclosing 
corruption.  
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With all reservations with regard to the validity and significance of this finding, the 
decline of corruption news coverage from March 200536 might be explained in terms of 
organisational factors, as chapter 6 suggests. Politics gained prominence, as extended human 
resources were put into the coverage of the referendum on the proposed constitution. Some 
also suggest that reporters with important stories in terms of impact might wait to file copy 
until after the referendum in order to gain front page coverage. New routines introduced in 
order to establish factuality do seem to contribute to the decrease of coverage. Some claim 
there are many stories waiting to be written or filed as journalists wait to come by evidence 
that the news organisation believes will support a possible court case.  
However there are other powerful attempts to explain the significant decrease. In 
chapter 7 we saw how the Government source organisations tightened their practices with 
regard to leaks. Increased numbers and impact of libel suits as shown in chapter 4 changed the 
practical interpretation of professional norms with regard to objectivity, as chapter 6 
documents. The impact of this is strengthened by the crack down on whistle blowers in April 
2004 that made the participation of covert sources more difficult and impacted on the 
availability of supporting documents in corruption cases. The decreasing trend might also be 
due to clientelist use of journalists in newsrooms, as shown in chapter 8. Informants have 
diverging views on this issue. Moreover, particularistic use of state resources, as shown in 
chapter 9 for instance blackmailing of media owners and selective advertising impacted on 
corruption journalism in the newspaper daily the Standard. The Nation’s investigations into 
the Anglo Leasing scandal were halted as a consequence of political pressure. In both media 
houses it seems as if it affected the ability of the mainstream press to reveal corruption.  
Journalist autonomy and control 
In the introduction I asked whether the Kenyan mainstream press plays a positive role in a 
democratic perspective. The democratic role is narrowed in this context to concern media’s 
ability to act as watchdogs of public authorities. In the normative liberal theory the democratic 
role of the press is to ‘act as a check on the state. The media should monitor the full range of 
state activity, and fearlessly expose abuses of official authority’ (Curran, 2002: 217). This is a 
normative and ‘timeworn’ ideal, according to Curran (ibid: 219). However, as Hallin and 
Mancini (2004) argue ‘the adoption of an ideology of journalism as ‘public trust’ is an 
important historical development and should not be dismissed as ‘mere ideology’ any more 
                                                 
36 The data thus bring down the widely held assumption that corruption was a major issue during the referendum 
campaign as constitutional reform to get rid of corruption was one of the main arguments for a new constitution. 
Corruption does not seem to have been subject to much discussion at the rallies covered by the press. 
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than it should be accepted as pure altruism’. This thesis shows that Kenyan journalists are 
guided by the perception of themselves as watchdogs as they investigate and expose 
corruption in the public interest. Thus, timeworn or not, as this ideal is a part of journalists 
understanding of what they actually do it is well worth to make some considerations on the 
issue. The issue of media autonomy is crucial when the watchdog role as a notion of medias 
democratic role. 
As shown in chapter 6, journalists follow professional norms supporting a non-
factional journalistic practice and a shared perception of news values and the role of 
journalism providing for a relative autonomy as they perform their work. Investigative 
journalists might work for weeks, sometimes months in order to file a story. Investigative 
journalists seem to enjoy considerable autonomy with regard to story selection and execution 
of their work. They work independently and are conservative with regard to information 
sharing also with their managers as well as their fellow journalists. However, managers 
occasionally assign them to other tasks. 
In chapter 7 we saw that sources use the media for political or economic purposes. 
Journalists do not discriminate against information from their sources that are biased. They 
consider the information, investigate the motives of the source, seek additional and 
complementary information and check the validity of the material before they select and 
publish. Whether the agenda of the source is political-factional is of minor importance as long 
as the information it provides is factual. News media, however, consider the information they 
receive regardless of intention but judge it in terms of significance, impact, and factuality, and 
they decide how news is framed. As journalists meet covert sources they meet political 
agendas and attempts to use them instrumentally. As they observe normative ideals of 
objective reporting, checking the credibility of sources and facticity of information gained, 
they achieve a relative autonomy from these sources.  
However and as shown in chapter, 8 there are clientelist practices also in the 
newsroom. The sources of journalism or other external agents gain influence news selection 
and processing. Some politicians use and pay journalists as informants in order to obtain early 
knowledge of what is in the pipeline about themselves or their affiliates. The very autonomy 
of journalists vis-à-vis their superiors enables these practices. It is a paradox that the 
autonomy of journalist constrains journalistic practices and enables sources to enhance their 
control of news room practices. Indeed journalistic autonomy also provides space for 
clientelist cultures as there is a market for clientelist services.  
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This thesis shows that clientelism is also an in-house constrain for the mainstream 
press. In Kenya professionalism and clientelism coexist in the newsroom. Both are enabled by 
journalistic autonomy, and both request more journalistic autonomy. Today some journalists 
and editors act as instruments for politicians as they perforate journalists’ occupational loyalty 
and act as informants for politicians for different kinds of reciprocity. Thus constrictions on 
the journalist watchdog role are also an in-house challenge and influence newsroom relations 
as shown in chapter 8. This challenge is both cultural and social. A strengthened journalist 
professional culture is imperative if cross factional professional loyalty is to be achieved. The 
challenge is also social as journalists’ ways to exploit autonomy should be addressed.  
Media ownership and independence 
There are also claims that politicians influence media owners, editorial or management staff 
through old friendship, ethnic or regional affiliations, political orientations, or they blackmail 
them. It should also be noted that clientelism has not disappeared after Kanu lost the election 
in 2002. The new Government and Government figures continue to use state resources for 
particularistic purposes constraining independent journalism on corruption and disabling some 
news stories from surfacing in public. Chapter 4 shows that many different economic interests 
of media owners make media enterprises vulnerable to such particularistic political or source 
pressures in a political clientelist society such as the Kenyan. As media owners pursue their 
economic interests they are vulnerable to blackmailing or rejection of Government hand-outs 
as chapter 9 suggests.   
No matter the amount of pressure, however, the mainstream press can not be seen as 
ignoring one of the most pressing issues in the country if it is to sustain legitimacy among its 
middle class audience. It seems as if pressure thus targets the investigative journalism on 
corruption that is based on leaks of confidential information. Beat reporting continues to 
enable a corruption discource to some extent. As media compete in a market the existence of 
different outlets with different owners enables to some degree corruption stories to be 
published. However limited this market is it works to some extent against the forces of 
secrecy and censorship through clientelism and instrumentalism.  
From overt intimidation to covert surveillance? 
The watchdog role of the Kenyan mainstream press is constrained by different kinds of 
interference in the operation of the media firm and conduction of journalistic practice, as this 
thesis shows. It is pertinent to ask whether the quality of interference from the state or state 
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sources is changing. The arrest order on Kamau Ngotho in January 2005 was termed a PR 
disaster for the Narc regime and widely condemned by the donor community and international 
journalist organisations. Such physical harassments of media practitioners were by my 
informants not observed as the norm under the new Narc rule, quite the contrary. Some of my 
journalist informants experience and expect a freer role as a journalist now than they used to 
during the Moi regime, which was at times highly repressive. This also applies to reporting on 
corruption.  
During Moi there was very little press freedom at that time. You could report on 
corruption, but on your own risk. You could be jailed, you could be killed. Or being 
harassed by state for reporting on certain things, or even be harassed and beaten by 
police (…) just for carrying out your work. (…) The previous Government, they used 
the police and AGs office to intimidate the media.  
Detentions and arrests of journalists are not frequent but still occur in Kenya, as Ngotho 
experienced. However, some informants hold that the ‘journalistic space’ or ‘democratic 
space’ has widened up since the regime change in late 2002 as there is less fear of physical 
abuse among journalists.  
Some informants, on the other hand, hold that they do not perceive the efforts of 
control to be any lesser than they used to, but the means have changed from overt harassment 
of the media under Moi, such as arrests and detention, to more sophisticated means of media 
control. These days political and source pressures take other forms, both direct and indirect, 
and according to one informant, are much more methodical. According to another informant, 
the level of surveillance of journalists has increased since 2003. After the disclosure of Anglo 
Leasing and the Naval ship cases the Government have been able to ‘seal the loopholes’ in 
their own organisations and effectuated better surveillance of journalists. Part of this 
surveillance is nurtured by corruption in the media house, and according to another informant 
corruption among journalists has increased: ‘It was there at some point, but [not with] the 
intensity with which it is happening is high right now.’ The number of stories killed or 
stopped increased as referendum on the proposed new constitution approached, according to 
one of the informants.37 This information correlates with the content analysis and might 
contribute to the 2005 trend in terms of content on corruption.  
A: As the freedom is increased and more open, the people who have an interest in 
controlling the media will look for other means, so the informal relations; the informal 
ways certainly has increased a lot. That I can say with confidence has increased. Yes.  
                                                 
37 The Government also withheld corruption reports or reports used as resources for journalists to disclose 
corruption. The report from the Goldenberg tribunal was supposed to be released in October 2005, but was 
postponed till after the referendum. The report of the Auditor General was according to the same informant also 
held back. 
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Q: During when?  
A: Epecially under the Narc regime.  
Q: They use their people in the boards or in different…? 
A: Yes, first, trying to bribe the journalists. Second, trying to influence managers, 
putting pressure on the company as a business entity, all that. I think it is more of that 
than ever before.  
Whereas physical harassment, arrests and detentions might have decreased after Narc 
succeeded Kanu in 2002 it is suggested that the different ways to negotiate and control news 
production and selection have become increasingly pluralistic. This should not surprise us. If 
we accept that (covert) sources and journalists alike felt freer to disclose corruption after the 
Narc victory, if control of information and production was decentralised, and more source 
organisations were established, then these shifts might provide for more a more complex web 
of influences as more players and more differentiated means of control efforts at different 
levels in both the source and media organisation. As media gain more freedom from overt 
state interference and harassment, journalistic autonomy increases. The empirical data does 
not allow a firm conclution on this discussion. A hypothesis might be that as media gain 
autonomy from overt and centralised control, more differentiated and decentralised, covert 
instrumental or clientelistic ways to control the media also increase. 
The watchdog role of the media 
The mainstream press served as a powerful check on the Government in 2003 and the first 
half of 2004. It investigated and exposed graft conducted by the former regime and 
increasingly the news regime. The journalism on corruption might be interpreted as the 
middle class struggle for universal values, meritocracy, and the rule of law. This role is 
amended by clientelist practices in the newsroom and external interferences in journalist 
practices. Pressure on ownership seems to be an avenue for powerful (governmental) sources 
aimed at influencing editorial policies and practices. In this regard it is also a question of 
whether the openness of the Narc regime in 2003 that enabled corruption revelations were 
merely politically instrumental as the watchdog ambitions of the mainstream press converged 
with the interests of the power holders in this post-election context of Kenya in the year 2003. 
As shown, these interests’ of the powerholders and the media soon diverged.  
Any suggestions on the future directions of the Kenyan media would be teleological 
speculations. The divergent practices of Kenyan journalist make the Kenyan mainstream press 
serve as watchdogs of Government deviances. Simultaneously is is used as an instrument for 
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non-professional internal and external interests. It might be coneceived as a power struggle. 
The result of this struggle is not predictable. 
Research proposals 
News workers do not trust politicians since they are likely to lie and reject earlier statements, 
sue the media, plant false information in the news and use the media as instruments for 
political causes. What is significant is that news workers also bear a considerable distrust of 
many of their own colleagues. Secrecy and suspicion toward colleagues and superiors shape 
journalist relations. This is given little attention in the research literature, if any, and is an 
interesting finding in this thesis. Trust and distrust have bearing on the practices of journalism 
and is shaped by practices. Thus it touches upon conflicting norms and registers in the 
newsroom that is given little attention in the African context. Thus, the issue of trust and 
distrust between journalist colleagues on the one hand and journalists and managers on the 
other could be explored in more detail for example through a newsroom ethnography in 
Kenyan media or media in other African countries.  
Lack of trust might also serve as an entrance to another issue deserving further 
exploration. Particularistic pressure is common in clientelist societies. To Hallin and 
Papathanassopoulos (2002) this also involves media using selective exposures as a mean 
against political enemies. Ezekiel Mutua for example holds that news is used this way by the 
news media:  
The fact that you will only… you will publish a good story about me because I give 
you revenue. I publish a bad story about so and so because they don’t advertise with 
you. That is corruption! That is corruption!  
Koigi wa Wamwere also holds that media practitioners use the media they own for 
particularistic purposes as ‘they uncover stories about corruption, not with the intention of 
publishing it, but with the intention of blackmailing.’ As noted in the introduction Anassi hold 
that politicians ‘want to buy and own most of the big and influential media houses so that they 
control what goes to the public as news’ (2004: 334). This thesis neither confirms nor denies 
such claims due to the media centric and mainly culturalist approach. However, media 
ownership and control is an interesting issue, both with regard to the big media houses as 
Royal Media, NMG and STG running media on different platforms, but also the disregarded 
alternative press. As one of my informant held, the difference between the alternative press 
and the mainstream press is not as big as some claim. To find valid data on ownership would 
however be challenging.  
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There are limits to my topical and media centric approach. What it rarely does is to 
account for overt sources’ efforts to frame news through strategic actions. A source centric 
approach might be interesting in this respect. As shown the relations between journalists and 
politicians are characterised by many conflicts but they also reciprocate in different ways. 
Many journalists relate to politicians with ambivalence: 
[Politicians] are not guided by anything, in most cases. So they will say something 
that suits the occasion, and they will deny it the following day because that is what the 
situation demands. In other words, they have an open field, or a blank cheque, you 
know, on what they can say.  
Politicians have many different audiences for their messages that hold different expectations 
and demand: their local constituency, the party, the President and maybe also the middle class 
as politicians express their ‘modern developmentalist ambitions,’ at least rhetorically (Chabal 
and Daloz, 1999: 161-2). 
The importance of local contexts of politics should not be underestimated. Koigi wa 
Wamwere has described how demands from constituents made it difficult for him as an MP to 
support principal and opposition politics as his constituency expressed expectations that he 
develop friendship with rich people and bring development to the area (1989: 119). The 
reciprocity of kith and kins brings expectation that one individual’s (illegal) enrichment 
benefits all, and is hardly sanctioned in communal contexts, as Getecha held. The educated 
middle class are on the other hand more likely to expect meritocracy and the rule of law to be 
observed, and might rather judge politicians on their ability to deliver according to universal 
norms and expectations as opposed to communal ones.  
Whereas political parties in Kenya by and large are based on ethnicity rather than 
ideological differences, alliances are frequently undergoing changes. There are also attempts 
to build stronger party structures in Kenya making principal politics a future possibility. 
Political leaders and the President traditionally value loyal politicians that are able to drum up 
support for the President and the ruling party/coalition. The study of the relation between 
politicians and the media is therefore an interesting one to undertake, and maybe especially so 
in election periods as it highlights conflicting demands of political leaders. The study of how 
politicians articulate their messages is an interesting object of analysis and how their message 
is framed might be a relevant case in this respect. One could explore how politicians value 
and use the media to communicate to different audiences. On the other hand new research 
could explore strategies media use to gain an independent stance when reporting elections in 
an ethnically and political divided country as Kenya.  
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Appendix 1 – List of informants 
Media practitioners 
Clifford Derrick, Freelance Investigative Journalist, KTN, STG 
Mwenda Njoka, Associate Editor (Investigations), the Nation, NMG 
David Okwemba, Investigative Journalist, the Nation, NMG 
Dominic Wabala, Investigative Journalist, the Nation, NMG 
Stephen Muiruri, Crime Editor, the Nation, NMG 
Frank Oijambo, Editor, the Nation, NMG 
Joseph Odindo, Group Manager Editor, Nation Newspaper divisions, NMG 
Mugo Njeru, Staff Reporter, the Nation, NMG 
Owino Opondo, Parliamentary Editor, the Nation, NMG 
Jaindi Kisero, Managing Editor, the East African, NMG 
Otsieno Namwaya, Investigative Reporter, the Standard, STG 
Douglas Okwatch, News Editor, the Standard, STG 
Kwamchetsi Makokha, former Deputy Managing Editor, the Standard, STG 
Kwendo Opanga, Group Managing Editor, the Standard, STG 
Chaacha Mwita, Managing Editor, the Sunday Standard, STG 
David Makali, Former Managing Editor, the Sunday Standard, STG 
 
Non-media practitioners 
Esther Kamweru, Executive Director, Media Council of Kenya 
Ciru Getecha, Professor, United States International University of Nairobi 
Koigi wa Wamwere, MP, Narc 
Maoka Maore, MP, Kanu 
Salaton Njau, Executive Assistant, Kenya Union of Journalists  
Ezekiel Mutua, Secretary General, Kenya Union of Journalists 
Owino Seko, Legal Officer, NMG 
Martha Wangethi, Librarian, NMG 
A Former Government civil servant who want to stay anonymous 
 
The interviews were conducted in the period from 27 September to 29 November 2005 
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Appendix 2 – Transcription codes 
In quotes the following symbols are used: 
 
…  pause (mine or informant’s) often following a sentence not completed. 
(…)  words/sentences/repetitions/stumbling deleted for the purpose of clarity and 
succinctness 
(word)  words added for the purpose of clarity 
[name]  name deleted for the purpose of protecting informants 
(hehe)  laughter 
A:   informant speech 
Q:   my speech 
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 Appendix 3 – Selected correspondence 
Hello. 
I'm sorry I don't wish to engage at such a level because it takes up time I 
could spend doing something of value to me.  
I don't think an interview from you for your thesis would benefit me in any 
way. 
You may try out the media libraries or other contacts. 
 




> From:  Helge Kvandal 
> Sent:  Wednesday, November 2, 2005 14:05 PM 
> To:   [ NAME] 
> Subject:  RE: Hi [NAME] 
>  
> Hi [ NAME] 
> Sorry about the late answer. Have been out of town.  
> For clarification: I am not asking you to be my research assistant. I ask 
> for an interview. I am bound by and will keep to ethical standards and  
> principles that applies to researchers. That means informants partisipate 
> voluntarily and get no financial benefits.   
>  





> Quoting [ NAME]<[ NAME]@nation.co.ke>: 
>  
> > Hello Helge.  
> > Sorry for the dealy in replying. I've been out of the office covering 
> > referendum campaigns. Now, to do what you want me to, I suppose there 
> > Is a financial consideration. Since I would be working as your research 
> > assistant. 
> >  
> > Once tha is settled, we shall proceed. 
> >  
> > [ NAME] 
> >  
> > > ---------- 
> > > From:  Helge Kvandal 
> > > Sent:  Thursday, October 13, 2005 13:28 PM 
> > > To:   [ NAME] 
> > > Subject:  Hi [ NAME] 
> > >  
> > > Hi [ NAME] 
> > > Promised som keywords prior to our talk. Been very busy this week 
> > > but here are some words.  
> > > - routines for information gathering 
> > > - routines for source contact 
> > > - investigating techniques  
> > > - how to overcome lack of freedom of information act 
> > > - Goldenberg Judicial reporting 
> > > - and you mentioned some perspectives yourself that could be 
> > > interesting to explore. 
> > >  
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> > > I will be out of Nairobi next week. Is it possible to set a time 
> > > for a meeting in week 43 or 44? 
> > >  
> > > Have a nice week end, 
> > >  
> > > Best regards, 
> > >  
> > > Helge Kvandal 
> > > tel: 0725737228 
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Appendix 4 – Corruption coverage data sheets 
The tables below corruption coverage in the Daily/Sunday Nation by months and genre. It 
also account for the number of front page references each month. The category ‘all opinion’ is 
the aggregated data of ‘commentaries’, ‘letters’ and ‘editorials’. Only the first 10 months of 













January 12 4 0 4 8 5 
February 20 1 1 0 2 2 
March 6 1 0 2 3 0 
April 20 1 1 2 4 0 
May 9 0 1 1 2 0 
June 5 2 1 0 3 1 
July 18 7 1 1 9 7 
August 49 11 5 10 26 11 
September 14 2 0 0 2 1 
October 6 0 0 1 1 0 
November 14 0 1 1 2 3 
December 2 1 0 1 2 0 
Sum 2001 175 30 11 23 64 30 











January 21 11 6 2 19 4 
February 14 1 1 0 2 3 
March 11 1 1 0 2 2 
April 16 1 1 1 3 2 
May 22 3 1 2 6 0 
June 16 0 0 0 0 0 
July 2 0 0 3 3 1 
August 2 3 1 0 4 1 
September 9 0 1 0 1 2 
October 6 1 0 0 1 0 
November 1 1 0 0 1 0 
December 17 3 2 0 5 3 
Sum 137 25 14 8 47 18 
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January 29 1 1 1 3 6 
February 26 5 1 1 7 4 
March 19 3 3 1 7 4 
April 22 3 2 0 5 3 
May 11 4 4 4 12 2 
June 21 3 2 2 7 1 
July 22 3 2 2 7 1 
August 11 2 3 4 9 2 
September 16 6 2 1 9 2 
October 67 15 3 14 32 18 
November 40 6 0 2 8 5 
December 30 3 2 2 7 5 
Sum 2003 314 54 25 34 113 53 










January 20 1 1 1 3 2 
February 28 2 1 0 3 5 
March 15 1 1 0 2 4 
April 20 1 2 2 5 10 
May 51 13 4 0 17 13 
June 40 2 0 0 2 12 
July 79 10 7 3 20 21 
August 24 3 0 3 6 4 
September 28 7 0 1 8 5 
October 33 6 3 0 9 2 
November 29 2 4 0 6 2 
December 9 1 2 0 3 5 
Sum 2004 376 49 25 10 84 85 















January 38 4 3 2 9 7 
February 96 33 10 11 54 21 
March 43 14 4 2 20 7 
April 33 3 1 2 6 9 
May 26 4 0 1 5 1 
June 15 2 1 0 3 0 
July 13 6 0 0 6 2 
August 15 7 2 0 9 1 
September 25 2 3 1 6 3 
October 12 1 0 0 1 1 
November       
December       
sum 2005 316 76 24 19 119 52 
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 Appendix 5 – Interview Guide (example) 
 
 




Your media have produced more than a hundred news reports and commentaries on 
corruption during the last year.  
 
Why are these reports / what makes these stories so important to your paper? (news values) 
 
Could you describe the way your paper work on these issues?  (beat/no beat) 
Keywords:  
• Investigating (checking budgets, public correspondance) 
• Investigating after approached by sivil servant/bureaucracy/politician/others 
• Reporting press releases/ press conferances/  
• Reporting routinely on newsbeats (police/parliament) 
 
Is it different to report on these issues now (during NARC administration) than before (during 
Mois precidency)? How? Keywords/follow up:  
• More sources (anti corruption bureaus have been established, secretary of ethics)? 
• Less fear of percecution (libel laws not applied like before) 
• Less threats? 
• Different view on the role of the press? As Fourth Estate? 
• More active donor environment creates space and openness? 
 
Cases not covered 
The British envoy Mr. Clay more or less asked the press to investigate two particular cases, 
Silversonic and Universal Satspace. Have your paper done any investigating on these cases?  
• Why not? 
• What stops the stories from breaking? 
 
Very few stories seem to break without open sources. Why is it so? 
 
Pressure/(self)-censorship 
How would you define cencorship? 
How would you define self-cencorship? 
As a journalist, do you experience pressure? 
From whom (sources? Your boss? From third parties? Identified/unidentified?) How is this 
pressure communicated? (language used) 
How do you/your executives respond to pressure? Do you routinely apply any techniques? 
Please exemplify. 
 
Beat characteristics (openness / restrictions (culturally/informal), openness / restrictions 
pressure (formal), routines) 
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• Parliament (parliamentary immunity) 
• Police 
• Judiciary 
• Government (secrecy?) 
 
Investigative journalism 
Resource allocation for investigative journalism 
• Money 
• Time 
• Beat team or investigative team 
• Motivations for investigative journalism 
 
Tools of investigative journalism/methods? (jfr Ericson et al) 
• regularized inspection;  
• continual or systematic surveillance or observation;  
• auditing, that is “aggregate date and match information to detect abuse”;  
• investigation, search for evidence of abuse or disorder 
•  
Sources for journalism 
What role do the alternative or gutter press play for your reporting? 
 
Deviance and normality 
• What is a newsworty corruption case, what signifies a newsworthy story 
• Small scale bribes? 
• criteria of relevance 
• How do you meassure normality (jfr int. Donorers rolle)? 
 
 
